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Abstract 
Christian theology and theology of mission have often adopted modernist 
epistemologies into their systems. Postmodernism and other philosophies have made a 
thorough critique of modernism and its epistemologies of pure and foundational reason. 
They have identified some of the negative effects that this has had for both the church 
and those that have heard the gospel. Postmodernism has offered a variety of 
epistemological solutions through the study of semiotics and hermeneutics. Some of these 
solutions are compatible with Christianity, while others are not. 
This research has attempted to provide a solution to the epistemological crisis 
that has had an impact on Christian theology and mission by developing a viable 
epistemological model that could serve in a theology of mission in our global context. I 
begin by implementing an ontological critique of some of the influential epistemologies 
within modernism. My hypothesis is that modernism has deflated ontology, and its 
connection with God, and has inflated epistemology to a role of first philosophy. The 
result of modernism's overemphasis on autonomous reason, when applied to mission 
theology, has been mission practice under the cover of Western hegemony reproducing 
both evangelism and oppression within the missionary enterprise. 
My own critique and that of existentialism and postmodernism demonstrate that 
this process of deflation is in fact the case, and that postmodernism, at times, has 
continued in this process with its use of closed-systems in epistemology. In order to 
develop a solution, I turn toward the interpretive framework of Radical Orthodoxy that 
has sufficiently critiqued both modernism and postmodernism from an ontological 
perspective. I use their model of an ontology of participation to begin to construct an 
IV 
epistemology for a theology of mission. In my research, I sought a way to develop the 
Radical Orthodox model of ontology so that it would have epistemological bearing, as 
well as take on a more Christological form for the purpose of mission. 
First, I examined the work of St. Maximus the Confessor and found that his 
theology of the logoi is effective at describing the relationship between an ontology of 
participation and epistemology. Also, Maximus' theology of the logoi is centered in the 
Incarnation, giving it a more Christological shape. Second, I examined the work of John 
Wesley in terms of the theme of participation and drew some comparisons between 
Wesley's theology of grace and Maximus ' understanding of the logoi. I integrated the 
compatible visions of these two men into an onto-epistemology of participation that could 
be incorporated into a theology of mission. 
Following, I investigated the implications of such a model on four basic 
categories in theology: the Trinity, creation, the Incarnation, and the new creation. The 
results are a model that understands mission as cosmic the os is, that is the work of the 
Trinity in which the church participates in critically contextual and holistic ministry to 
the world. 
v 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL SHEET 
This dissertation, entitled 
PARTICIPATION 
An Onto-Epistemology for a Theology of Mission in the 21 st Century 
written by 
Peter Bellini 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
has been read and approved by the undersigned members of 
the Faculty of 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
~/t1~~d, 
Dr. Michael Rynkiewich j. 
~%JJ~~~-
lDr. George Hunter fiI 
March 2008 
PARTICIPATION 
An Onto-Epistemology for a Theology of Mission for the 21st Century 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of 
Asbury Theological Seminary 
Wilmore, Kentucky 
In Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Dissertation Committee: 
Dr. Michael A. Rynkiewich, Mentor 
Dr. George Hunter III, Reader 
Dr. Terry C. Muck, Reader 
Dr. Larry Wood, Readeer 
By 
Peter Bellini 
March 2008 
Copyright 2008 
Peter Bellini 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
Chapter One 
Chapter Two 
Chapter Three 
Chapter Four 
PARTICIPATION 
An Onto-Epistemology for a Theology of Mission 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 
INTRODUCTION 
ONTOLOGY OF DEFLATION AND NllULATION: 
CRITIQUING MODERNISM AND POSTMODRNISM 
• An Ontological Critique of Modernism 
• The Existential Critique of Modernism 
• A Counter Critique of Ontology in Existentialism 
• The Postmodern Critique of Modernism 
• Conclusions on Modernism and Postmodernism 
• The Impact of Modernism on Mission 
• A Proposed Solution from Critical Realism 
ONTOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION: A RADICAL 
ORTHODOX CRITIQUE AND A SOLUTION 
• Radical Orthodoxy and the Secular 
• Radical Orthodoxy, the Univocity of Being and 
Nihilism 
• Radical Orthodoxy, Participation, and Analogia Entis 
PARTICIPATION IN THE LOGOS (METOUSIA LOGO) 
AND ST. MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR 
• Life of Maximus the Confessor 
• Theological Influences on Maximus 
• Participation and the Theology of the Logoi 
• Implications of Maximus ' Metousia Logo 
METOUSIA CHARITI: PARTICIPATION IN GRACE IN 
JOHN WESLEY'S THEOLOGY 
• Wesley, Eastern Christianity, and Maximus 
• Wesley and Participation in Grace 
• Participation and Recapitulation in the New Creation 
• Summary 
11 
iv 
1 
16 
64 
98 
119 
Chapter Five PARTICIPATION AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR A 
THEOLOGY OF MISSION 
• Characteristics of an Onto-Epistemology of Participation 
• Participation and Missio Trinitatis 
• God the Father: Creation and Participation 
• God the Son: Incarnation and Participation 
• God the Holy Spirit: New Creation and Participation 
• Conclusions and Contributions 
References Cited and Bibliography 
III 
150 
212 
Introduction 
Col. 1:17 He himself is before all things, and in him all things hold together.1 
The Problem 
In light of an epistemological crisis2 that has intensified since the advent and 
development of postmodernism, this dissertation attempts to offer a sound ontologically 
based epistemology that can be used in Christian theology and specifically in a Christian 
theology of mission. I will survey some of the highlights of both modern and 
postmodernism in order to discover some of the symptoms and causes of this crisis. I will 
also investigate three cases that exhibit how this epistemological crisis has affected 
modern mission. 
Along with my own analysis, I will implement the critical framework posited by 
Radical Orthodoxy in order to examine some epistemologies in modernism and 
postmodernism. I argue that the epistemological crisis is truly an ontological crisis. One 
way to solve this problem is through an ontology of participation. Such an ontology is a 
vision that depicts reality as the created order "suspended" from the transcendent God. 
Creation is not an autonomous realm but participates in God who gives it meaning, 
purpose and order. This ontological vision also informs knowledge. Epistemology is not 
an isolated or closed discipline but is inspired and shaped by the creational context which 
participates in the logoi3 or in the workings of God's will. 
1 All biblical quotations from the New Revised Standard Version, unless otherwise noted. 
2 From late medievalism into modernism and postmodernism, epistemological, or knowledge-oriented 
issues, have driven much of philosophy, and autonomous reason has come under heavy scrutiny and 
condemnation for its failure to deliver truth, knowledge, justification and certainty. Epistemology has 
become the first question in philosophy, or what is called "first philosophy" 
3 Logoi is the plural form of Logos which can mean "word" or "reason." SI. Maximus used logoi to signify 
the reason or purpose of being of a thing according to God's plan. 
1 
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One of the key contributions brought to this research is my attempt to modify the 
Radical Orthodox metousia Theou, or participation in God, into a more Christo logical 
construct, a metousia Logo, a participation in Christ the Logos, and then to apply it to 
mission. In order to accomplish this, I draw from the ancient Byzantine theologian and 
monk Maximus the Confessor (580-662) and his theology of the Incarnation and the 
logoi. Anticipating my goal of a theology of mission, I then tum to the founder of 
Methodism, John Wesley, in order to develop some of the soteriological and 
missiological implications of an ontology or onto-epistemolog/ of participation. In 
Wesley, I argue that there are many similarities with Maximus and both can contribute to 
a soteriology that can be defined by theosis5 or sanctification in the image of Christ. 
This soteriology, or cosmic theology of sanctification, can be foundational to 
informing a theology of mission. In the final chapter, I examine the impact of an onto-
epistemology of participation on four areas of mission theology. They are the Trinity, 
creation, Incarnation and the new creation. Mission begins with the mission of the Trinity 
(missio Trinitatis). The church, through its baptism into and participation in Christ's 
death, burial and resurrection, is also called to participate in mission with God. The 
church finds that through creation' s participation in God, there is a universal witness of 
God in the context of culture. 
4 Onto-epistemology refers to an epistemology that is dependent on and shaped by an ontological 
relationship or its relationship with being. In modernism and postmodernism, epistemological constructs 
are often central to a vision of reality in which autonomous reason, semiotics (signs) or hermeneutics take 
on an ontological role. Ontology becomes deflated, and epistemology is inflated. No longer is ontology 
related to the transcendent or God but is enclosed in an epistemological construct. In an onto-epistemology, 
knowledge is relational to being, in this case an analogy of being, and to God. 
S Theosis is a theological term frequently used in Eastern Orthodox thinking that refers to the process and 
final state of being made like God. Although not synonymous with the term sanctification, it is comparable, 
and thus I use them together. I also use the term theosis "comparably" with Christ-likeness. These terms 
also are not synonymous or formally equivalent. 
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As Christ seeks to incarnate the message of the gospel into a particular cultural 
context, so the church co-working with God explores what critical contextualization 
looks like in each unique setting. Finally, the message of cosmic transformation6 in Christ 
is presented in a holistic way which involves a comprehensive understanding and offering 
of salvation (soteria). The role of the Holy Spirit in mission takes a primary place, as the 
Spirit seeks to bring persons to Christ through the ministry of Christ. Nothing less than 
the universe transformed into a new creation in the image, or icon, of Christ is the 
mission of the Spirit, and thus the church. 
A Case of an Ontology of Violence 
Twelve years ago I began to serve as the pastor of an inner city church that was 
dying and ready to close. In order to turn the church around, I realized that we had to 
target new people groups like the growing African-American contingency that inhabited 
the community. The congregation, which was basically white middle class and had 
moved out to the suburbs in the 1960s, became disconnected from the community and 
was driving in from the suburbs to attend church. In trying to reach African-Americans, I 
sought to implement many structural and "church-cultural" changes. 
Things got tense when I removed the sacred cow, the Warner Sallman picture of 
Jesus that hung over the altar table and had been there for years. Its presence was 
legendary in that church. I let the disgruntled parties know that we do not know the color 
of Jesus' skin, but as a middle easterner he probably was not lily white. I also let them 
know that portraying Jesus so overtly as white may not be attractive to African-American 
6 Throughout the dissertation I employ a theological grammar that draws from Eastern Christianity. In this 
case "cosmic transformation," my term, is a general theme used by Maximus the Confessor and other 
Eastern theologians to convey the idea of God's concern for the whole of creation, and his desire to bring 
forth a new creation through the Incarnation and redemption in Jesus Christ. 
seekers. I was then informed that Jesus was white and that was a fact. Some of the 
ensuing conversation fell along the lines of "Jesus couldn't be black because he was 
God." The implication was that being black was inferior to being white. 
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Local church epistemology was shaping a theory of race that was hindering God's 
mission. This line of thinking is not new. It was similar to the ideology that kept blacks 
enslaved over a century ago. Freed slave Henry Bibb records in his narrative how blacks 
had little opportunity for moral education. There were no Sunday schools for blacks, and 
the only Bible exposition heard by slaves was one which divinely legitimized the 
dreadful institution of slavery and proclaimed eternal judgment for those that refused to 
obey their masters (Bibb 1999: 17). A theory of race and enslavement had become 
institutionalized, and was perpetuated in the narratives of the dominant culture. 
Kelly Brown Douglas calls the church in Bibb' s experience "slaveholding 
Christianity." Slaveholding Christianity operated out of a theology that upheld and 
justified the institution of slavery and was centered on a white Christ (Douglas 1994: 10). 
The white Christ allowed for others Christians to be enslaved and construed Christianity 
in a way that made it compatible with slaveholding (1994: 12). Douglas recognizes that 
this system was under-girded by a "wider ideological structure which presupposed that 
hierarchical relationships between human beings were divinely ordered" (1994:10). 
Even Thomas Jefferson, whose pen codified for the United States the equality of all 
men in the Declaration, was part of that ideological institution. Douglas cites Jefferson 
for espousing black inferiority in his claim that the white race possessed more beauty and 
nobility than the black race (1994: 11). Cornel West also cites Jefferson for claiming that 
blacks are inferior to whites in "memory, reason, and imagination" (West 1982:62). 
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West traces the doctrine of white supremacy and racism to modern discourses that are 
established on a rational epistemology that has characterized scientific thinking since the 
Enlightenment. West writes, " . .. the very structure of modern discourse at its inception 
produced forms of rationality, scientificity, and objectivity as well as aesthetic and 
cultural ideals which require the constitution of the idea of white supremacy" (West 
1982:47). 
West uncovers the epistemological roots of the modern discourse in Cartesian 
scientific philosophy and Greek ocular metaphors that promote and encourage the 
"activities of observing, comparing, measuring and ordering the physical characteristics 
of human bodies" (1982:48-49). Cartesian philosophy granted the perceiving subject a 
value-free position of quasi-omniscience through supposedly innate ideas that brought 
order to the observed world, a world that rested as object before the knowing subject. 
Descartes' method was mathematical exactitude serving the goal of developing a science 
that represents the observable world. 
Greek ocular metaphors and classical ideals of beauty and proportion were used 
by Descartes to give his philosophy the position of the "mind as the mirror of nature," an 
inner eye of all-knowing (1982:53). According to West, Rene Descartes ' epistemology 
was foundational for modern science, as pseudo-sciences sought to apply the 
"classificatory categories and the descriptive, representational, order-imposing aims of 
science into natural history" (1982:55). Thus the category ofrace as denoted by skin 
color became the means of classifying human bodies as early as 1684 (1982:55). 
West continues to describe the influence rational epistemology had upon white 
supremacy and racism in the chapter entitled "a Genealogy of Modern Racism" from the 
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book Prophesy Deliverance! (1982:47). Much of that discussion goes beyond the scope 
of this study, but the point is clear. The institution of slavery in the West is an example of 
an epistemological breakdown that has affected the Western world as well as the 
Christian missional enterprise with its temptation to fall into cultural imperialism. 
West recognizes that a certain rational totalization created a hegemony that 
oppressed and marginalized. He locates the institution of modern Western slavery in 
modern epistemology. Of course, the cause of slavery is manifold and involves a 
complexity of issues. However, this writer agrees, at some level, with West that a crisis in 
epistemology, at least in part, is connected with Western slavery and other hegemonic 
institutions.7 Writers like Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Michel Foucault (1926-
1984) have emphasized the role that modern epistemology has played in power and 
control. This problem is often identified as an "epistemological crisis" (Kirk 1999:157). 
However, it is a conclusion of this research that a breakdown in epistemology is merely a 
symptom of a deeper problem, a problem which is an ontological problem with 
epistemological consequences, consequences that extend from philosophy to theology to 
the practice of mission. 
In the past Christian theology of mission has often adopted its epistemologies 
from the periods of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. As reason and 
science advanced technology in the Western world, so also Western nations exercised 
their power through the conquest and colonization of other nations in the Eastern and 
Southern hemispheres. The church, which operated out of the same rationalism, was 
often mixed up with the state in the same type of exploitation. 
7 Clearly, hegemonic epistemology is partly to blame for the evil of slavery. A multitude of socio-political 
and economic factors can be cited, but hatred in the heart towards fellow human beings stands above all 
others. 
7 
However, since the advent of postmodernism, modern, foundationalist 
epistemology8 has been seriously challenged in its high claims to objectivity, certainty, 
and totality. Postmodernism has provided a much needed critique of modernism's 
claims of pure autonomous and absolute reason. Yet in terms of constructing 
epistemologies that are compatible with the scriptural worldview of God and the created 
order, postmodernism has often come short. 
In attempts to tone down the exaggerated claims of modernism, postmodern 
epistemology has often reduced reality to a closed-system in which God is locked out or 
not needed. These epistemologies also have reduced the understanding of reality to 
hermeneutics or interpretation within a closed-system.9 A single category, such as "the 
text," "power," or "the sign" is employed to explain all of reality. In a closed-system, 
epistemology, specifically hermeneutics, takes center stage and an ontology of 
transcendence is "deflated" or excluded.!O Epistemology ends up taking on the role of 
"first philosophy," which has traditionally been occupied by metaphysics and ontology. 
This research assumes the importance and precedence of ontology in informing 
epistemological concerns. 
What happens when ontology is detached from God and collapses under its own 
weight of nothingness?!! Transcendence, in the true sense, is obliterated and a quest 
8 Foundationalism is a type of epistemology which is built like a house. It requires a foundation which can 
be justified by self-evident truths (strong foundationalism) or basic beliefs that can be reasonably admitted 
without self-evident proof (weak foundationalism) in order to build a defensible system of knowledge. 
9 A "closed-system" is a philosophy, specifically ontology, that is unconnected to transcendent being. I 
frequently use the term "closed-system" for those epistemological constructs that interpret reality in 
singular and sometimes plural terms that lack transcendence, external reference, or an ontological basis in 
the larger created order and are often subject to reductionism, totalization and the fallacy of self reference. 
10 Hans-Georg Gadamer is a twentieth century figure who represents this transition of epistemology to 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics becomes fust philosophy. 
II The writer holds a basic belief that God exists and has created all things. Without an ontological 
reference to God, nothing can exist, hence nothingness. I hold this belief to be basic based on a responsible 
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begins to find certainty, meaning, and truth in the centrality of epistemology. Ultimately 
the issue at hand is an ontological crisis with epistemological repercussions. Being 
cannot be supported and shrinks into its modes of apprehension, epistemic construals 
groping to shape what used to be. 12 Radical Orthodox thinker Conor Cunningham 
identifies this breakdown in terms of nihilism, an ontology of nothingness that traces its 
genealogy from the end of Scholasticism to Postmodernism (Cunningham 2002). 
From Scotus' univocity of being13 to Ockham' s nominalism,14 to Descartes ' Cogito, 
to Kant's epistemic dualism 15 and categorical imperative,16 to Nietzsche's will to 
power,17 to Derrida's closed ontological text,18 and to other closed hermeneutical systems 
developed in postmodern thinking, epistemology has sought to ground reality in reductive 
foundations and non-foundations that ultimately hang from an ontology of nothingness, a 
faith that understands that this knowledge is an interaction of a fiduciary experience that is connected with 
reasonable evidence in scripture and creation that is gathered and processed from the proper function, 
reliability and virtue of the individual and the community-tradition of the church within God's created 
order. 
12 In other words, epistemology tries to do the work of ontology. 
13 In medieval theology predication or statements of attribution concerning God and creation were said to 
be univocal, analogical or equivocal. Univocal statements signified that what was said of God and creation 
was the same or of "one voice." Analogical statements signified that what was said of God and creation 
were analogous or similar or comparable to a proportion but not the same. Equivocal statements signified 
that what was said of God and creation were not equal or even similar but different in nature. Aquinas held 
that talk of being in the created order and being in God is analogous, while Scotus held that being was a 
predication equally shared by God and creation. Both God and creation have being in the same way, With 
univocal being, being was raised to a category above God in that both God and creation shared in it 
14 Nominalism is the notion that universals exist only in name and not independently from particulars. 
15 Kant separated how we know things, We cannot know the thing in-itself (noumena). We can only know 
the thing through perception as our minds give shape and meaning to it (phenomena). 
16 For Kant, the categorical imperative was the absolute moral law, the "ought to" or duty, that defines all 
rational, moral conduct for all. 
17 Nietzsche understood all knowledge claims as merely an assertion of power. 
18 Much has been said and misunderstood about Derrida's famous dictum that "There is nothing outside of 
the text" In Derrida, the text defines reality. My claim is that he gives the text ontological status in doing 
this . 
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meontology, a univocity of non-being (Smith 2003: 186-187; see also Cunningham 
2002:xv,240).19 
While looking back on this genealogy of pure autonomous reason, Foucault may 
unearth hidden power plays, but Cunningham locates the DNA of nihilism. 
According to Cunningham and other Radical Orthodox scholars, the modem and 
postmodern univocity of being offers a groundless ground that roots every rational 
structure in nothingness. These rational structures become closed and self-referential in 
that they are closed to any ontological transcendence and thus resort to their own sign 
system or language game for meaning or even deferral of meaning. James Smith calls 
such a closed-system an "ontology of immanence," immanence in this sense implying 
also implosion (Smith 2004:187-188). 
The results of closed-system hermeneutical epistemologies "hanging" from 
ontologies of nothingness are manifold. The first is nihilism itself (Milbank 1990:278) 
(Cunningham 2002: xiii). The created order, and specifically rational systems, within a 
univocity of being that is separated from a transcendent God no longer participate in God 
in an ontological sense. The created order is then immanently dependent on its own 
being, which apart from God is ex nihilo or nihil. It cannot hold together, but becomes an 
autonomous closed sphere that implodes under its own ontological nothingness. Like a 
collapsing black hole, nothing can sustain. No semiotic structure can ultimately hold up 
but is swallowed up in the void. Nihilism is a philosophy of death. 
19 Cunningham turns Scotus' univocity of being on its head. Since the created order cannot have being apart 
from God as its own attribute, that is univocally, then ultimately the created order does not have being but 
non-being or nothing. Cunningham calls the offspring ontologies of Scotus' univocity of being, 
"meontologies," meaning ontologies that take nothing and make it into a something. Meontology is the 
heart of nihilism. 
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The second result is an ontology of difference that leads to an ontology of violence 
(Milbank 1990: 279). If, according to Nietzsche, a hermeneutic of suspicion concerning 
knowledge and power is necessary to unlock the meaning of Western epistemology, then 
every view from this metaphysical assumption is inherently violent. Nihilistic ontologies 
of violence produce competing systems of ratio-empirical geo-politics that wrestle for 
hegemony, tying the rational with the political. Outside of an ontology of peace and an 
analogia entiiO to communicate such an ontology, violence, or a will to power, becomes 
an accurate descriptor for the motive behind the pursuit of knowledge. The third result is 
a denial of the existence or relevance of substance and supra-categories, including God, 
metaphysics, universals, substance, essence, the transcendentals,zt the supernatural and 
immaterial realities etc. This denial becomes problematic for theology. 
What happens when theology, and specifically a theology of mission, is based on an 
epistemology without an ontological base in the transcendent? The Western rationalist 
epistemology that has been foundational to the development of culture, science and 
industry over the last 400 years has also given rise to racist, colonialist, and imperialist 
political regimes that have exploited peoples in Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America 
and in other places throughout the two-thirds world. Further, this same epistemology has 
been foundational to Western Christian mission theology and practice, and the results 
have been mixed. 
South African missiologist David Bosch (1929-1992) showed how a hegemonic 
sense of reason and science in the Enlightenment was adopted into the church' s theology 
as the measure of truth, thus setting the bar of certainty too high (Bosch 1991 :262-345). 
20 Latin for "analogy of being" 
21 The transcendentals for Scholastics, like Aquinas, were the one, the true, the good, and the beautiful 
which are all derivations from being. 
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Truth became the equivalent of fact, and fact was propositional, logical and, most of all, 
judged by the human subject using accepted canons of reason. Faith and reason were 
placed side by side and increasingly it was faith that would have to pass the test of reason 
(Bosch 2002:269). 
As the Western hegemony of anthropocentric ratio-empiricism sought its destiny 
in possessing the earth through systems of colonization, the church ' s mission program 
came to resemble a science as it replaced traditional evangelism with a propagatio fidei 
per scientiam22 mission' s program, i.e. Leibniz ' s propagation of Christianity through 
science or knowledge (Bosch 2002:271). Theology declared itself to be a science founded 
on Western rationality, which prized itself above other forms of knowledge and culture 
(Bosch 2002:269). 
Western rationalism created a hegemony of scientism23 and technology that 
enabled colonialism and Christianity to go hand in hand as exploitation and evangelism 
(Bosch 1991 :303-305). The Enlightenment created hegemonies along the lines of the 
"civilized," who felt it their duty and a service out of their superiority to conquer and 
civilize the "uncivilized" (Bosch 1991:305,312). Within that same hegemony of reason 
difference implies violence, a "rational" violence which may be understood as the hidden 
drive behind global manifest destinies. Nietzsche and Foucault offer a will-to-power 
hermeneutic for the entire Western rational enterprise, including Christian mission. In 
turn, Milbank interprets this will-to-power assessment of history as one that does not 
allow difference due to the totalizing claim of such a hermeneutic (Milbank 1990:278). 
22 Latin for "Propagation of the Faith through Science" 
23 Scientism is a term describing the often exaggerated confidence and faith placed in the empirical sciences 
to arrive at absolute knowledge, to solve all human problems, or to attain a unified knowledge of 
everything. 
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A triumphal theology based on a Western construal of reason often went hand in 
hand with the geo-political triumph of Western colonial powers. Non-Western culture 
was seen as inferior, and the doctrine of tabula rasa24 was implemented (Hiebert, Shaw 
and Tienou 1999:19). This doctrine stated that nothing could be salvaged from non-
Western culture. The missionary would have to start with a "clean slate." 
Wherever this occurred, people groups and nations were converted for the wrong 
reasons and often with the wrong methods, by foreign or exploitive means, and often 
converted to a gospel ofrational propositionalism, Western syncretism. Split-level 
Christianity, a dualism of Western Christian form enveloping non-Western indigenous 
meaning, was the result of a gospel that ignored indigenous culture and pretended to 
begin with a tabula rasa (Hiebert, Shaw and Tienou 1999: 19-21). The Western mission 
project involved negating traditional worldview and colonizing the mind (wa Thiong'o 
1986:3; see also Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). Totalization25 of worldview left no room 
for contextualization during the bulk of the modern mission period. 
While the Gospel has spread and churches have been planted ever since the great 
modern mission movement, the effort at times continues to be tainted by imperialistic, 
racist, and ethnocentric ideologies and practices that value Western cultural expressions 
and semiotic systems over those that express "difference." In this sense, the writer seeks 
to employ the Radical Orthodox understanding that an ontology detached from 
transcendence or a univocity of non-being allows for the autonomy and hegemony of 
reason and ultimately leads to the Nietzschean claim that power underlies all rational 
24 Latin for "clean slate." Used by empiricist like John Locke but was applied to rnissiology to point out 
that nothing of the receptor culture could be used in the sharing of the gospel. Mission was to start with a 
"clean slate." 
25 Totalization occurs when a theory, reality or practice is said fulIy to account for, explain, or dominate its 
domain, leaving no other account, explanation, or voice, it can be said to totalize. 
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constructs, or what Milbank calls an "ontology of violence." Milbank notes that the 
Western genealogy of rationalism leading to nihilism can only interpret "difference" 
within an ontology of violence (Milbank 1990: 278).26 Such an ontology is violent on two 
counts. The first count is that power takes on an a priori status. The second count is that 
power as the hermeneutic takes on totalizing status not allowing for any differing claims. 
One of the assumptions in this research is that ontology influences epistemology; 
whereas in many modern and postmodern systems, epistemology takes center stage 
without ontological considerations. Epistemology makes a significant impact on 
theology, and theology impacts practice, especially in mission where theology is most 
practical. Often epistemic foundations for theology are borrowed uncritically and taken 
wholesale, only later do students of mission find flaws and problems that arise in the 
practice of that theology. 
This research will critique modern and postmodern thinking specifically 
identifying various ontological problems that affect epistemology and hermeneutics. In 
the fact that my critique focuses on ontology and how ontology informs epistemology, it 
is helpful to note that my perspective addresses continental27 currents of epistemology 
26 Milbank plays off of the postmodern attraction toward difference and uses it as a critique of Nietzsche 
and post-Nietzschean thinkers who hold that all knowledge claims are assertions of power or violence. 
Milbank calls such a totalization an ontology of violence. Since all claims are said to be violent, then there 
is no difference. Different claims are really all the same, violent. Milbank claims that with many post-
Nietzscheans, difference is violence, and this goes against the postmodern appreciation of difference. 
Milbank turns to Christianity for an ontology of peace. 
27 Here is a brief overview. Philosophy has frequently been divided into two camps, analytic and 
continental. Analytic philosophy is more prevalent among Anglo-Americans and is preoccupied with 
explanation, specifically employing logic and language in foundational , coherent and pragmatic forms of 
epistemology, though most analytic philosophers are foundationalists. Continental philosophy, of course, is 
prevalent on the European continent and is preoccupied with interpretation. Thus it is immersed in 
hermeneutics, semiotics, and critical theory. The two schools have different interests and methodologies 
and rarely converge (Richard Rorty has been an exception). 
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more than the analytic tradition28 . Besides containing some elements of virtue 
epistemology, my approach is primarily from a continental sensibility mixed with strong 
influences from the Eastern Orthodox and Wesleyan theological traditions. Following 
cursory ontological critiques of modernism and postmodernism, I will analyze and 
evaluate these movements through the theological framework of Radical Orthodoxy and 
will adopt its proposal as part of an ontology of participation as a solution to the onto-
epistemological problem in modern and postmodern thinking. 
This research will further develop the Radical Orthodox model of an ontologically 
based epistemology of participation by incorporating the work of St. Maximus the 
Confessor and John Wesley. The Radical Orthodox "participation in God" (metousia 
Theou) ontology has some of its roots in Platonism and Neoplatonism. Maximus the 
Confessor extracted the concept from its Neoplatonist moorings and transplanted it in 
Logos-based thinking (metousia Logo). Maximus' metousia Logo model of participation 
along with the Incarnation and other Eastern Christian soteriological themes will be 
examined, including theosis and cosmic restoration). Further soteriological consequences 
will be developed from Wesleyan theology and its version of "participation" found in 
universal grace and his ordo salutis?9 
In the concluding chapter, some implications for a theology of mission will be 
proposed based upon an onto-epistemology of participation. A Christian ontology of 
28 My opinion is that analytic philosophy generally represents more of the "science" of philosophy, and 
continental philosophy represents more of the "art" of philosophy. I feel that analytic philosophy, in spite 
of recent developments, is still too bound in Cartesianism with its reduction of philosophy and the 
"knower" to mathematical reason, cognition, and the individual. Continental philosophy seems to be more 
fluid in its operations, especially in its working with ontological problems like being and non-being, and, 
for me, is a more conducive language to talk about the interaction between philosophy and theology. I will 
use Radical Orthodox thinking as a framework for doing ontology. Although this movement originated as a 
British movement, it engages continental thinking in continental fashion. 
29 Latin for "order of salvation." 
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participation needs to reflect the Triune nature of God. Missio Trinitatis will give shape 
to a mission theology that highlights three key elements: creation, incarnation and new 
creation. A high theology of creation recognizes the universal witness of the Logos in 
creation to all cultures. A centralized theology and methodology of incarnation provides 
the grounds for contextualization of the message with the overall goal of cosmic 
deification. A theology of new creation in Christ manifesting a realized and hope-filled 
eschatology provides direction and content to the church and its mission. 
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Chapter One 
Ontology Of Deflation and Nihilation: Critiquing Modernism and Postmodernism 
Acts 17:28 - For 'In him we live and move and have our being'; as even some 
of your own poets have said, 'For we too are his offspring.' 
As we stand at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are at a crossroads 
between or even an overlapping of two worlds, the modern and the postmodern. Since 
postmodernism was birthed out of the rational excesses of modernity, some identify it as 
"hyper-modernity" (Best and Kellner 1991:30). Yet some understand that postmodernism 
also marks a radical break from modernism (Merquior quoted in Best and Kellner 
1991:29). The old paths do not take us where we want to go any more, and we look on 
them with suspicion. Postmodern thinking is opening up the door to an entirely new 
vision of reality, which represents an epochal shift from the old to something boldly new. 
For example, French postmodern philosopher Jean Baudrillard believes that we are in 
such a shift now. In his remixing of the Marxist dialectic, Baudrillard understands the 
historical succession of the image as a "precession of simulacra," that begins with 
sacramental representation of the real in Medieval times and arrives in our time as pure 
simulacra or hyperreality,30 in which the sign replaces reality and is more real than the 
referent (Baudrillard 1983: 11). For Baudrillard, the shift into hyperrealism is seismic. It 
marks the end of the symbolic (Lane 2000:35-40), the end of production (Baudrillard 
1999:99), the end of history (Horrocks 1999: 16 and Best and Kellner 1991: 133), and the 
30 The third "order" of the sign is when it replaces the original. The original or the real has no more 
meaning. The meaning has imploded into the sign. It is now pure simulacra. The simulacra has transcended 
reality and is more "real" than reality, hence "hyperreal." Baudrillard talks about Las Vegas as hyperreal. 
Its representational and pseudo-reality provides more sensation for people than reality. Las Vegas, as a 
sign-polis, is "more real" than reality. 
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beginning of the fourth order of simulacra, the fractal stage in which value is recycled 
and history is reversed on itself, an apocalyptic countdown (Horrocks 1999:21). It is this 
fourth order which we are now experiencing. 
At these crossroads of the modem and postmodern, we are forced to make a decision 
to hold fast and defend the old foundations, or to critique and tear down old structures 
which impede and move on to a more comprehensive understanding of the new world. 
This crossroads has divided philosopher and theologian alike. Postmodernism has, for the 
most part, broken down the epistemological foundations of modernism. What are we to 
do? In this chapter, I will take a tour of the highlights of modernist epistemology and 
some of the critiques that have been leveled against it. Postmodernism has waged the 
most brutal war against it. Are postmodernism's claims valid? Is postmodernism the 
answer for some of the epistemological problems that we face in a theology of mission? I 
will explore these issues in my examination of modernism. 
An Ontological Critique of Modernism 
For Christians, a good deal of our theology and missiology has been built upon the 
epistemological foundations of the Enlightenment (Grenz and Franke 2001 :29). The main 
grid through which I will be analyzing the Enlightenment will be its explicit and/or 
implicit views on ontology or its theory of being. My hypothesis is that the 
Enlightenment tended to focus on epistemology for certainty more than ontology. Thus, 
either ignoring ontological reality or reducing it knowledge constructs. This ontological 
critique of modernism is, of course, one reading of the story and one approach to the 
problem. 
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According to Grenz and Franke, Enlightenment foundationalism, like constructing a 
building, offers the certitude of a strong foundation . This foundation "consists of either a 
set of unquestioned beliefs or certain first principles on the basis of which the pursuit of 
knowledge can proceed. These basic beliefs or first principles are supposedly universal, 
context-free and available, at least theoretically, to any rational person (2001:30). 
Missiologist David Bosch reads the Enlightenment world view through seven contours 
with various missiological implications. One is the undisputed primacy of reason, the 
Cartesian claim Cogito ergo sum (Bosch 1991:264) .31 Whereas in Medieval thinking 
being or ontology took precedence over epistemology, in Descartes it is reason that has 
primacy. Descartes, through methodological skepticism, sought to find an Archimedean 
point upon which the universe could be moved and thought he found it in reflective 
reason. There are many consequences to the Cogito, but two of the most far reaching is 
the belief that all of reality can be known with mathematical certainty through reason, 
and that the autonomous rational subject is the authority to determine that certainty. One 
can also note the missional impact created by the hegemony of Western rationality in 
terms of this equation: Rationalism plus Civilization equals Colonization plus 
Exploitation. 
The second contour is that the Enlightenment created a subject-object scheme (Bosch 
1991 :264). The human mind (res cogitans) was seen as detached from the world (res 
extensa), which it sought then to analyze and understand. The world could be studied as 
an object of research independently and impartially, and as a result one could analyze, 
formulize, quantify, and monopolize the object of study. Autonomous human reason 
became the ontological ground upon which the rest of reality is built. Cartesian dualism 
31 Latin for "I think; therefore, I am." 
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not only helped to form the basis for scientific empiricism, it was also imported by the 
church in the form of objectification of the mission enterprise and the people (1991 :264). 
Bosch' s third contour is that the belief in purpose and even mystery within science is 
replaced with a rigid cause-effect scheme (1991:265). Causality removes the teleological 
questions of metaphysics and life, resulting in schemes of determinism and mastery. For 
the early church fathers up to Thomas, cause and effect was connected ontologically to 
the purpose and will of God in the logoi and telos32 of things as ordered by the free act of 
God. In the Enlightenment project, purpose is replaced with causality. 
The fourth contour is that the Age of Reason brought with it an infatuation with 
progress, which was believed to result from mastery over nature and the uncivilized 
(1991:265). Reason further applied beyond the physical realm to the social realm would 
become a geo-politics of reason Machiavellian style which valued expediency over 
morality and justified exploitation overseas (1991 :266). 
The fifth contour is that there is an unresolved tension between "fact" and "value" 
within Enlightenment thinking. Science held the belief that its knowledge was "factual, 
value-free and neutral," that somehow knowledge is without a knower; "it is knowledge 
without a knowing subject" and cannot be disputed (Bosch 1991:266). On the other hand, 
value is based on individual opinion, belief, and preference to which religion is assigned. 
Yet, religion has come under the bar of reason and presented itself as a science and 
operated rnissionally on the basis of principles and laws that justify colonization. 
Bosch 's sixth contour is the confidence that every problem can be solved (1991 :266). 
Reason 's mastery of nature's laws guarantees solutions in life. There are no holes, gaps 
or mysteries in the conquest of nature, just continuous upward progress, and civilizing the 
32 Greek for "purpose," "goal," or ·'end." 
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world became the white man 's burden. The final contour is that the idea of the 
emancipated, autonomous individual became the ultimate authority of truth (1991 :267). 
Faith in the individual, freedom and autonomous reason superseded faith in God and 
society. 
Through science's discovered laws of nature and the power of reason, the secrets of 
the universe would be unlocked, and humanity was "no longer at the mercy of nature, no 
longer to be encompassed by arbitrary mystery - these benefits (scientific discoveries) 
were to be accompanied by the great new gift of power, power to control natural forces 
and to turn them, in Bacon's phrases, to the 'occasions and uses of life,' and the 'relief of 
man 's estate'" (Willey 1953: 15). Alexander Pope, in an "Essay on Man," claims reason 
has the power to subdue nature (PopeI951:200). Pope's epigram on Newton summarizes 
the spirit of the Enlightenment best, "Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night: God said, 
Let Newton be! And all was light" (1951:203). Newton stole the Promethean fire and 
illuminated the medieval mind to grasp the workings of the divine. Newton and the whole 
Enlightenment ate the fruit which fell from the Cartesian tree and opened up the eyes of 
reason to a New Atlantis. 33 
Each of these contours described in Bosch is shaped by the seismic shift from 
ontology to epistemology that is characterized in Descartes. Being, "I am," is defined by 
thinking, "I think." The ontolological question is answered epistemologically by a 
thinking subject. In Medieval thinking prior to William Ockham (ca. 1287-1347), 
ontology was prioritized over, provided grounding for, and informed epistemology. 
Epistemology did not stand on its own or as first philosophy but was intrinsically 
33 Francis Bacon wrote the novel New Atlantis in 1626. It depicts a utopian society where scientific 
methodology (Baconianism) governs society, technology brings betterment to human life and science 
replaces Christianity as the belief system of the people. 
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connected to being as apprehended by the active intellect. However with Descartes' 
Cog ito, ontology is reduced to the thinking subject or autonomous pure reason. Being is 
identified with thinking, and specifically the context-detached subject autonomously 
thinking in vacuum. Classic and Medieval ontology is turned upside down with 
Descartes. All hangs from autonomous reason, as opposed to any form of ontological 
transcendence. 
This Cartesian inversion intensely advances the collapse of ontology into a closed 
system of individuated pure reason and subjective consciousness which will eventually 
express itself in other closed-systems of linguistics, semiotics, and hermeneutics in 
postmodernism in its plight of realization. It is a "closed system" because it is a totalizing 
system or theory that is separated from transcendent ontology, specifically divine 
transcendence, and places at its center pure epistemological structures of any kind, 
normally semiotic and or hermeneutic. The closed-system then takes a transcendent and 
ontological function to explain its vision of reality. 
Following Descartes, the work of epistemology would take center stage for the next 
four hundred years. Like a dying star collapsing into a black hole, ontology is swallowed 
up in the Cartesian critical self and nothing escapes its pull. Reason and the individual 
become the primary elements for a foundation that will build the modem Western world, 
including shaping the modem mission project. 
As we continue our tour of modernism, we note that the innate rationalism of 
Descartes would be balanced by British empiricism, which together fueled the scientific 
revolution. The primary vehicle of autonomous reason becomes scientism and its 
technological fruits would seed cultures of exploitation under the guise of civilization and 
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advancement. Reason becomes a tool for conquest, the conquest of nature and humanity 
or the metanarrative of manifest destiny. Industrialization and the wealth of nations 
developed where the hegemony of reason was enthroned, and Christianity flourished 
right along side. 
Empirical science as a function of naturalism also did its part to detach creation from 
the transcendent, not necessarily as atheism but at least in terms of deism and the 
functionality of the connection between God and nature. Newton and others discovered 
the laws that nature obeys, and offered a sufficient reason to convert creation into 
autonomous nature. Ontologically, nature became a closed system, meaning that in the 
study of nature no exterior causes would be considered because they could not be 
observed, quantified or measured. Nature became an object of conquest for competing 
ratio-empirical regimes, which in modernity are ultimately expressed as nationalism and 
imperialism. 
As this collapse was further impelled by Lockean representational ideas,34 Hume's 
causal ordering,35 and Kant's structural categories,36 epistemology falls more and more 
into a crisis of identity and certainty, and the task of verifiability piles high. 
Epistemological participation in the transcendent has been severed, and in dying it closes 
in on itself groping for incorrigible validation, justification and certainty that is self 
evident in the episternic structure itself. 
34 For Locke, all knowledge is the perception of simple and complex ideas, which represent things. 
35 Hume believed that objective events like cause and effect could not be proven but were constructs of the 
mind created to bring order to the two events. 
36 Kant understood knowledge as a marriage between sense perception and rational structures in the mind. 
Kant divided the rational categories of the understanding into four groups of three. The four major groups 
are quantity, quality, relation and modality. 
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With Kant's critical philosophy we begin to understand more the nature of this crisis. 
The Cartesian Cog ito cannot truly master the universe through its innate ideas of the true 
nature of things. Descartes' ontological collapse of being into thinking, and the Cogito 
becoming the Archimedean point upon which to 'build back up all' of reality which he 
had doubted, is really just a cognitive grid of categories, which subjectively shape the 
phenomenal world that appears to us. Twentieth century analytic philosophy and 
continental postmodernism both began to tear down Cartesian strong foundationalism as 
unjustified, as also postmodern views of "the self' have undermined his Cogito. 37 
The next major shift in ontology following Descartes is with Kant. Because of the 
ontological detachment inherited from nominalism and Cartesian thinking, Kant posits 
that things cannot be known in-themselves (noumena), because we do not participate in 
the universals or ideas of God through any analogia entis or in any purely analytic 
categories apart from experience. Rather our active mind participates in constructing 
phenomena through the stimuli of the senses creating knowledge without real 
transcendent grounds or reference. For Kant, transcendental Ideas38 hold no ontic status. 
Kant would later turn to practical reason - the deontological, the categorical imperative. 
Its impetus would not be found in thinking but in willing. Such a move sets the stage for 
Nietzsche and Foucault, as they would soon uncover the motive of "pure reason." 
37 Many analytic philosophers, including those in the physicalist (i .e. Quine) and linguistic essentialist (i.e. 
Plantinga) camps have abandoned strong foundationalism, finding it to be an impossible project. In 
postmodernism, we find the deconstructing of the self in thinkers, such as Nietzsche, Gilles Deleuze, and 
Professor Robert Jay Lifton in The Protean Self(1999). 
38Kant held that we cannot know things in themselves (ding an sich), only their phenomena. The 
transcendental ego, or our sense of a unity of our consciousness, is the condition for our knowing. This 
transcendental ego of apperception precedes the content of our perceptions and gives them order and 
meaning through the categories of our understanding and our intuition of space and time. Our knowledge is 
not of the objects themselves . These transcendental Ideas are all that we know. 
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Kant's critical philosophy would bear heavily on "classical" liberal theology, which 
sought a critically historico-rational ground as correlative to any theological endeavor. 
Post-Kantian liberalism is clearly manifest in its ethical version promulgated by Albrecht 
Ritschl (1822-1889) and Walter Rauschenbusch (1861-1918), in its existential version by 
Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) and Paul Tillich (1886-1965), and in its historical-critical 
version characterized by David Strauss (1808-1874) and later evolving in the twentieth 
century into two "Quests" for the "historical Jesus?9 
Kantian dualism so inflated the critical task that the non-existent noumenal had to be 
acted on 'as if it were there' Kant understood ontological claims as "transcendental 
illusions" The decline of theological liberalism and mainline denominationalism has 
revealed this very thing, the difficulty to save face and sustain an 'ontological 
superstition ' Of course, I am not saying Christianity is such, but I am saying that 
theological liberalism has sought to act as an authentic expression of the faith while 
thinking that there is nothing there beyond the practice of the moral imperative. Kantian 
transcendental Ideas are merely useful fictions in a phenomenal world. 
Post-Kantian theology could not accommodate a historical and ontological Jesus as 
Christ or resurrection as physical or other seeming antinomies of traditional Christianity, 
and thus relegated such "mythologies" to existential proclamations that correlate with and 
speak to our situation, sitz em Leben 40, and require an ahistoricalleap of faith from our 
phenomenological context to a noumena of nothingness where we are faced with our own 
universal obligation generated out of our own practical reason, which is predicated on 
moral autonomy. Along with the Cogito, the categorical imperative became integral to 
39 The Jesus Seminar reflects a revival of the second quest. Conservatives, like N.T. Wright and Ben 
Witherington, represent a "third quest" for the historical Jesus. 
40 German for "setting in life" or "context." 
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the construction of the modern self, a modern self which became an ontological sphere 
for many later ideologies, including Freudian psychology, phenomenology, and 
existentialism. 
In my efforts, I have sought to trace a systemic ontological deflation that has 
correspondingly resulted in an epistemological inflation of rational constructs that are 
designed to hold the center. With Kant this process takes a moral turn into practical 
reason, which is propped up to bear the heavy metaphysical weight. Under the load of the 
critical, metaphysical foundations begin to buckle, allowing for the weight of authority to 
shift to purely rational constructs, while at the same time the increase of authority 
becomes demanding on such constructs. Autonomous will and reason uphold the entire 
modern experiment of Western civilization with their new found authority, while at the 
same time under the load they begin to deform and give and ultimately give way to 
nihilism and the despair and angst of that very freedom, as seen in existentialism.41 
Thus in modernism one can trace a collapse of ontology into epistemology, and in 
turn, a crisis in epistemology, which helplessly seeks certainty in its own constructions, 
while all along asserting its authority in the geo-politics of applied scientism and 
technology. Existentialism would arise at the end of modernism to critique the privileged 
autonomy of reason and expose its humanity and subjectivity preparing the way for 
postmodernity. 
41 Wolthart Pannenberg offers a thorough critique of the development of self consciousness and subjectivity 
from Descartes to Heidegger in the light of metaphysics in Metaphysics and the Idea of God (Pannenberg 
1990) 
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The Existential Critique of Modernism 
One of the major critiques of the Enlightenment came out of later modernism 
through the Existentialist movement. It is probably not fair to call Existentialism a 
"movement" or school. It would make it too intentional, united and parochial. Walter 
Kaufmann says that "Existentialism is not a philosophy" but a label for several widely 
different revolts against traditional philosophy" (1975: 11). Thus, it has no academic 
center, such as Tubingen or London. It has no official tenets or doctrine. It is more of an 
anti-philosophy, and the philosophy it was primarily against was the Enlightenment's 
version of the absolute and certain nature of reason. 
Although it is almost impossible to catalogue and package Existentialism into any 
reducible definite form, one can attempt to characterize its many expressions. First, it is 
helpful to list some of the thinkers that have been frequently labeled as existentialists. 
They include Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), Martin Heidegger (1889-
1976), Jose Ortega y Gassett (1883-1955), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), Herni 
Bergson (1859-1941), Albert Camus (1913-1960), Samuel Beckett (1906-1989), and 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) among others. Some of the characteristics of existential 
thinking are a focus on the irrational (Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Camus, and Beckett), the 
anxiety and dread of existing (Sartre), the absurdity and meaninglessness of existence 
(Beckett and Camus), human freedom and choice (Sartre and Heidegger), despair 
(Heidegger), commitment (Kierkegaard and Bergson), authenticity (Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Ortega y Gassett and Sartre), and subjectivity (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, 
Sartre). 
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Of the many critiques afforded by Existentialism, the most pronounced may be 
the humanistic critique. It is not to say that the Enlightenment was not humanistic, for it 
certainly celebrated and even exaggerated the status and achievements of humanity, but 
many of the exponents of Existentialism in bringing the subjective, the experiential, the 
existential, and the volitional (freedom as opposed to determinism) dimensions of reality 
back into epistemology have allowed us to see the humanity, that is, the limitations, of 
our epistemic context. Reason could not claim a privileged position of objective 
autonomy or claim its own ontological ground. Existentialism provided a corrective to a 
blind spot in rationalism, blindness to the human condition. Knowledge is contingent as 
are we. 
Whereas the Enlightenment saw reality as ordered on a great chain of being, and 
all of nature running smoothly by the watchmaker's laws, including humanity, which 
operates by moral law and the laws of reason, Existentialism saw the world as an 
absurdity without meaning or purpose, and humanity was not only out of sync with 
nature but also itself. Alienation is a common theme to describe an existentialist' s view 
of humanity. Humanity just finds itself here as a happenstance without an essence or a 
direction, a nothingness that is forced to choose its own meaning from a world of 
meaninglessness. It is this aspect of humanity that Existentialism exposed and explored 
beneath the fa~ade of the fine-tuned rational machinery of Western civilization. 
Existential prophets discerned that our knowledge claims were "human, all too human." 
As a whole the spirit of existentialism sought to swing the pendulum of philosophy 
away from the mechanics of reason and back to "man' s inner life, his moods, anxieties, 
and his decisions that are moved into the center" (Kaufmann 1975: 13). Existentialism is 
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clearly a form of humanism, not so much in a classical sense highlighting the grandeur of 
humanity, but more so the dark side of humanity in its weakness, fallibility, alienation, 
irrationality, and contradictions. Existentialism, as opposed to the Enlightenment, 
revealed human limitation (not progress), and it revealed human pain and suffering (not 
satisfaction). Existentialism put the human back in knowledge. While the Enlightenment 
allowed humanity to see outside of itself, often to a fault, Existentialism allowed 
humanity to see itself and its struggles in the process of knowing. 
Just a cursory look at Existentialism provides one with a starkly contrasting 
perspective of human nature and the universe than that of the Age of Reason. The 
existentialists saw that humanity is not in control of nature. Humanity cannot even 
understand itself and control its own actions (Exemplified by the absurd characters in 
Camus' work, namely The Stranger, the Plague, and the Myth of Sisyphus and Beckett's 
work, specifically Waiting for Godot, The Endgame, and The Unnamable). 
With Existentialism, reason is dethroned from her Enlightenment seat of power. 
Reason is not absolute and exhaustive but struggles with its own inner absurdities and 
outer contradictions. Pure objectivity cannot be obtained because humanity always 
perceives from its own subjective conditions, which are often filled with anxiety and 
passion. Kierkegaard exemplifies this in The Concept of Anxiety in which he roots human 
sin and the existential human condition in the dread caused by the awareness of the 
infinite choices of our freewill as finite beings. The writing came as a response to his 
study of Hegel, Leibniz and Descartes and the issue of freedom (Kierkegaard 1980:vii-
viii). For an existentialist like Kierkegaard, there is no tension between fact and value. 
When "truth is subjectivity," everything is value (Kierkegaard 1941: 170-224). Virtually 
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every point featured by Bosch in an Enlightenment worldview is turned on its head by the 
existentialist. 
One of Kierkegaard's critiques of the Enlightenment is the human factor at the 
base of epistemology. We do not understand things as pure "knowers" who observe 
reality as an object within the subject-object scheme of the Enlightenment. We are a part 
of that reality. Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript are to some extent responses to Hegel's system of dialectical idealism, a 
crowning achievement of Enlightenment thinking. 
Hegel's work is one of the last modern attempts at a purely rational ontology. 
Hegel's philosophical system of history sought objectively to systematize the 
concretization of the absolute spirit's movement in the world - the ultimate ontological 
connection between God and human reason. This system would seek to not only provide 
rational demonstration of the validity of the Christian faith, but also a historical 
demonstration of the reign of this spirit of reason (the absolute spirit) in the world (Hegel 
1991 and Harris 1995). Hegel's philosophy captures the spirit of the Enlightenment with 
its focus on absolute reason, objectivity, the application of science to other fields (i.e. 
history and philosophy), the justification of Western supremacy, and the reign of ideas 
over creation/matter. 
Of course Kierkegaard takes issue with the whole project. And in Postscript, he 
tackles the idea of objectivity and its impossibility, especially in a historical system due 
to its "approximate nature" (Kierkegaard 1941 :25-47). Since any so-called objective 
historical system is an approximation looking backward and incomplete looking forward, 
then the nature of the task is impossible (1941: 75 and 98) For Kierkegaard, truth was not 
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something objectively ascertained, but its was a subjective commitment and leap of faith 
whose veracity bore witness inwardly. He writes, "Truth is inwardness; there is no 
objective truth, but truth consists in personal appropriation" (1941:71). Kierkegaard 
echoes somewhat of the epistemological fiduciary tradition of Paul, Augustine and Luther 
which we later see recovered in scientist turned philosopher, Michael Polanyi. 
Kierkegaard identifies a subjective and human dimension to knowing which cannot 
create an absolute system, primarily because one is not philosophy in the abstract but an 
existing, thinking individual and a part of the reality sought to be systematized 
(1941 : 108-109). Humans are participants in the knowing process not apart from it. 
Humans are existential factors in existence. They cannot systemize about it, as if outside 
of it. Kierkegaard protests that Enlightenment speculative philosophy has abolished the 
individual human (1941: 113). Kierkegaard lifts off the Cartesian blinders and reveals the 
contextual dimensions of autonomous, absolute reason and its assumed and privileged 
ontological position. 
In a scene in the futuristic movie The Matrix Reloaded (II), Neo, the protagonist, 
reaches the heart of the Matrix to find the Architect. The Architect wrote the program for 
the computerized world called the Matrix and sits in a fully white room filled with 
monitors viewing everything in the Matrix at one time. The Architect is almost an 
allegorical figure for God or pure reason. He created all, is outside of all, above all, sees 
all and knows all. He is able to enjoy a position outside of everything. All of life ' s 
happenings, even the thoughts of people are seen objectively before him on multiple 
screens. 
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This is a kindred picture to the lofty image that Hegel and the Enlightenment had of 
the autonomous individual. Hegel is the Architect of a system that comprises everything. 
Yet, Kierkegaard is saying there is no white room for any individual, except God. There 
is no privileged epistemic position of absolute certainty. There can be no epistemic or 
cognitive detachment from being. 
The notion expressed by Kierkegaard is similar to Heidegger 's understanding of da 
sein (being-there) (Heidegger 1961:8). We are already in existence and aware of it. We 
begin with this fact. We are not outside of it or attain to it. Sartre sums it up in his famous 
dictum "existence precedes essence," reversing the Platonic notion that the essentia 
precedes existential.42 This suggests that human existence comes before any assigned 
meaning, and thus that meaning is what humans choose to make it (Kaufman 1975:37). 
There is a human factor in knowing, which can not be mechanized and reduced to 
pure reason or objectivity. It begins with our existential location, which for Sartre begins 
with the phenomenology of human consciousness as a starting place, instead of pure 
reason or universal essentia. Existence is a non-derivative category, a prime datum, from 
which we begin. Sartre says our existence, our being here, is "de trop" - just there - or 
"gratuitous." For Sartre, existence trumps reason, as he owns what Descartes denies, that 
is, that an ontology detached from transcendence is an ontology of subjective 
consciousness and phenomenology and not pure reason (Sartre 1956:8-12,17-24). 
As Sartre critiqued Descartes ' Cogito, he recognized the personal and existential 
nature of knowledge. The Cog ito was not a divine revelation or an epiphany of pure 
reason that is the foundation of all reality or even the product of rational deduction. In 
Being and Nothingness, Sartre uncovers that Descartes ' Cogito is a "pre-reflective" 
42 Latin for "essence" precedes "existence." Sartre claimed that existence precedes essence. 
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cogito stemming from consciousness itself and not a deduction made out of reflective 
consciousness (SartreI966:13) The Cogito had emerged directly from consciousness, a 
human and existential context. For Sartre, consciousness is not neutral or in vacuum but 
is always consciousness of something, a transcendent object, even itself (Sartre 1966: 13). 
After the Cog ito, Descartes had to infer the rest of the world from the thinking self, 
even to the point of inferring God. For Sartre, the perceiving ego and the world arise in 
correlation, since consciousness is always consciousness of something (Copleston 1965: 
vol 3:347). Sartre' s pre-reflective Cogito shifts the primacy ofknow1edge in Descartes to 
the primacy of existence, but he also reveals the ontological locus of modern and 
postmodern thought, the perceiving subject (Sartre 1966: 17). Sartre recognized that the 
epistemological problem of modernism in Descartes was an ontological one. 
Nietzsche, who also chose life over knowledge, understood the human context of 
knowledge through his notion of the "will to power." For Nietzsche, truth, knowledge, 
and morality are not something objectively to be found by human reason in nature or in 
God, but rather are a product of the will, and are used as a means of power (Nietzsche 
1939: 122-125). 
What the Enlightenment considered unbiased truths of reason and science, 
Nietzsche called the will to power, pointing out the human, subjective, self-serving and 
exerting dimensions of knowledge. Hence existentialists like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, 
Sartre, and Nietzsche sought to disclose the human dimension, and often the depraved 
human dimension, in philosophy, a dimension that was grossly ignored by the Age of 
Reason. With Nietzsche, all knowledge is suspect and value-laden. Nietzsche takes his 
critique of modern ontology deeper than Kierkegaard or Sartre. Not only does he 
33 
recognize its human, contextual locus, but he also identifies its volitional potential as a 
super-actualization, ubermensch, power as a priori. Postmodern thinking would get much 
mileage out of Nietzsche. 
A Counter Critique of Ontology in Existentialism 
The existential critique unmasked the Enlightenment illusion that reason holds a 
privileged ontological position of absoluteness and objectivity. Existentialism reveals the 
socio-existentiallocation of knowledge in the human context. Consciousness of the 
phenomenological becomes central to the existential vision of reality. Yet in its 
discovery, the movement still operated out of an imploded ontology that rests in the pure 
subjective experience. Existential ontology is the experience of the object-directed 
consciousness and in the acts of consciousness.43 Existence, although contingent, is 
treated as necessary. Such a focus can easily become ahistorical,44 idealistic, fideistic45 , 
or solipsistic. Solipsism46 seems to be an inevitable nemesis of the existentialist. In all 
cases knowledge loses any referential mooring outside of one's field of consciousness. 
What existential phenomenology would call the "object of consciousness" would 
serve merely as a means for the passion and inward drive of the ego to construct an inner 
world of one's own meaning which potentially has no significance outside of oneself, 
making communication, intelligibility and action with other minds and the rest of 
creation an impossibility in terms of an external reference. Subjectivism is a strong 
charge and argument against Existentialism. 
43 Sartre was heavily influenced by Edmund Husserl ' s form of phenomenology. 
44 For existential theologians such as Tillich and Bultmann, it meant demythologizing, de-historicizing and 
reinterpreting the Christian faith through existential experience. 
45 In the case of Kierkegaard 
46 Solipsism is the philosophical position that only the self exists (metaphysical solipsism), and that 
knowledge cannot transcend one's own conscious mind. All one knows is the content of one's own mind 
(epistemological solipsism). 
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One can see a form of this problem of radical subjectivity in Kierkegaard's 
critique of historical knowledge, which served as a response to Hegel's system. In 
Postscript, Kierkegaard opens the book with a chapter that analyzes the "historical point 
of view" in terms of Christian faith. His thesis, borrowed from Gotthold Lessing (1729-
1781), is that "anything historical is merely an approximation. And an approximation, 
when viewed as a basis for an eternal happiness, is wholly inadequate, since the 
incommensurability makes a result impossible" (Kierkegaard 1941:25). I alluded to 
Kierkegaard's contention earlier. 
With this thesis, he looks at the historicity of the Scriptures and the Church and finds 
that any scholarly inquiry for truth based on these sources is incomplete and inadequate 
and at best an approximation, and hence faith and knowledge cannot trust the objective 
approach. When looking to the historical to substantiate a truth claim, "the 
approximation-process begins; the parenthesis is launched, and no one can say when it 
will end; for it is and always remains only an approximation, and this has the remarkable 
property of being able to continue indefinitely (Kierkegaard 1941:41). If the science of 
knowledge claims to give thorough explanations and formulas of objectivity, then when 
does the project end, and since it never ends, we cannot have scientific knowledge, 
especially of the content of faith. We must then choose to leap over this ditch by faith, 
and in our inwardness of mediating revelation, we have found truth. 
The authenticity of the person found in commitment is valued as truth over and to the 
exclusion of any transcendent, rational, referential, correspondent, coherent, 
propositional, or external values, not that commitment and these adjectives are 
incompatible. In essence, Kierkegaard is demanding that unless historical or objective 
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knowledge is full, certain, and absolute, then one cannot employ it for religious 
knowledge. Since some qualifier or disclaimer has to be put on historical truth, then it 
must be rejected altogether, and an inward leap of faith must be made to secure 
knowledge, all or nothing. It means that partial knowledge is no knowledge at all, which 
is itself a fallacy. So often this is the legacy of both modern and postmodernism, that is, 
that once knowledge is qualified and limited in some way, as historical, phenomenal, 
textual, perceptual etc., it is thereby disqualified or reduced.47 The truth is that knowledge 
can be properly qualified but not totalized. 
Yet this is the case of a collapsed ontology which puts the full weight of justification 
on epistemology. The requirements are unbearable. For certain types of modernism and 
postmodernism, justification is all or nothing. However, under a creational ontology that 
participates in God, God and not human knowledge upholds all things. 
In the case of Kierkegaard, neither Hegelian logic nor history can yield full proof 
justification, and the only alternative is a fideism which is radically subjective and 
inward, even solipsistic. We find the consequence of this type of existential fideism in 
some of Kierkegaard's successors, like Tillich and Bultmann, with whom the whole 
historical question is demythologized. The historical Christian faith as witnessed in the 
Scriptures and the Church is an existential analogue for personal experience that is 
outside of external critique. Truth, regardless of referent or content, is anything we 
experience and that gives us meaning. 
This problem of subjectivity is magnified greatly when brought to the realm of ethics, 
in which Existentialism often delves. Existential anti-heroes, like Meursault in Camus' 
The Stranger, often commit unethical acts against humanity and are not portrayed as 
47 Reductioni sm 
villainous but favorable due to their acts of authenticity. Every act is self-justifiable 
because it is a personal honest expression of one's commitment or non-commitment. 
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Even Sartre ' s borrowing of Kant's "act as if you are acting for everyone" type of 
categorical imperative, if not situated in a framework that finds meaning external to self, 
is deflated of any ethical import and can merely be a device for self-service. Without any 
external mooring, Existentialism has an inherent flaw of self reference without sufficient 
reason to explain itself. Self authentication becomes its only means of validation or 
justification and homo mensura 48 its ethic. 
Thus the positivism of modernism has failed to recognize the human and contextual 
dimensions of knowledge, creating the fallacy of pure reason, which had been the engine 
for the hegemonic drive of colonialism and Christian mission globally. Existentialism 
stands as a corrective to this problem with its recognition of the human location of 
knowledge. However, in its radical subjectivity, existentialism has lost any external, 
referential mooring for any of its claims. Both problems are a case of an ontology 
detached from transcendence and closed within itself, not allowing for a participation of 
being beyond the empty self reference of existential consciousness or closed 
hermeneutical systems, where everything hangs on nothing. This leaves nihilism as the 
only valid option for modernism. Ahead, we will see that is the only logical conclusion 
for postmodernism also. 
The Postmodern Critique of Modernism 
Postmodernism is as elusive a term as Existentialism. Walter Truett Anderson 
calls it a "makeshift word we use until we have decided what to name the baby" 
48 Latin for "man is the measure" (of all things) as applied to ethics. 
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(Anderson 1995:3). There is no official school of postmodernism or doctrine that defines 
all postmodernists. There is no originator of postmodern thinking, though a case can be 
made for Nietzsche fulfilling that role. The word "postmodern" is almost as elusive. The 
word was first used by English painter John Watkins Chapman in 1870, who referred to 
the avant-garde painting of his time as "postmodern painting" (Best and Kellner 1991 :5). 
David Harvey "defined postmodernity as the situation in which the world finds itself after 
the breakdown of the Enlightenment project, which lasted from the latter part of the 
eighteenth century until well into the twentieth" (Anderson 1995:4). The term first gained 
major expression in structural/post-structurallinguistics and anthropology and later in art, 
architecture, semiotics, literary criticism, psychology, philosophy, and social and culture 
theory. 
Since the term has been so broadly used, many simply use the term to denote 
"after" modernism (Best and Kellner 1991:4-5). Following modernism both 
chronologically and consequentially, postmodernism can be construed as hyper-
modernity (extreme modernism). Many of the consequences of modernity's 
epistemological breakdown from Descartes to Nietzsche are inherited by Postmodernism. 
One finds many similarities between the two, especially with late modernism, i.e. 
Existentialism. Some of the similarities between postmodernism and existentialism 
include a rejection of metaphysics, metanarratives,49 and rational foundationalism and an 
acceptance of truth as subjectivity, and a focus on experience. 
Like Existentialism, Postmodernism is more of a sensibility than an official 
school, so locking down its "beliefs" is difficult. However, the following could 
49 lean-Francois Lyotard defined postmodernism as the incredulity towards metanarratives or grand 
narratives - that is narratives that totalize. 
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characterize a postmodern sensibility: plurality, locality, narrative, contextual knowledge, 
deconstruction of texts, hermeneutics of suspicion, voicing marginalization, and a 
rejection of metanarratives, totalizing theories or texts, discursive hegemonies, unified 
field theories of knowledge, and logocentrism.5o Much of the latter are constructs which 
flourished during the Enlightenment but are now rejected by Postmodernism. 
One of the primary critiques of Postmodernism leveled against the Enlightenment 
concerns its claim that reason is autonomous, neutral, and unbounded or context-free and 
is qualified to construct metanarratives about reality. Postmodernism does not look at 
reason as innocent, but with suspicion it applies discourse theory which: 
analyzes culture and society in terms of sign systems and their codes and 
discourses. Discourse theory sees all social phenomena as structured semiotic ally 
by codes and rules, and therefore amenable to linguistic analysis, using the model 
of signification and signifying practices. Discourse theorists argue that meaning is 
not simply given, but is socially constructed across a number of institutional sites 
and practices . . . Discourse theory also interprets discourse as a site and object of 
struggle where different groups strive for hegemony and the production of 
meaning and ideology (Best and Kellner 1991 :26) 
Thus, according to Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924-1998), any belief in the ability of 
reason to construct a metanarrative that applies to all people is suspect. Postmodern 
thinking is not so much interested in "what" reason has to say, but "why" it says it. There 
is a "hermeneutics of suspicion," linked to a concern to expose hegemony and resist 
power. The voice of reason, that is all discourses, needs to be interpreted with an ear for 
motive. We see this clearly in Michel Foucault (power-knowledge), Jacques Derrida 
(reality as the text), and Jean Baudrillard (reality as the sign). Foucault, who studied 
modern institutions like hospitals and prisons (Foucault 1984: 141-166) and through the 
50 That is the "ism" formulated by Jacques Derrida that describes the Western predilection towards speech 
and metaphysical systems of presence, such as "the Logos" in Scripture, "the Idea" in Plato, "the Cogito" 
in Descartes and "the System" in Hegel. At the center of Western thinking is the metaphysical presence of 
the word, according to Derrida. 
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genealogical and archeological tracing of social systems, saw knowledge as a product of 
power structures and coercive social and political forces (Foucault 1980:131-133). 
Reason in creating a culture's norms creates a socio-political hegemony and a power-play 
to marginalize. What the Enlightenment may have understood as the Age of Reason, in a 
Foucauldian sense was an Age of Power for the West. 
For Derrida, the suspicion is toward the nature of knowledge. Reason is really 
only the use of language. Reason and all reality are in the text, and nothing is outside of 
the text, as philosophy makes the 'linguistic turn' (Anderson 1995:89). The 
Enlightenment, and even most of Western civilization, tried to propose a metaphysics of 
presence (a transcendental signified), a logocentric view of reality. Derrida understands 
this attempt at logocentricity as a cover for a metaphysical absence. For Derrida, since 
everything is in the text, words and writing are necessary not because of metaphysical 
presence but because of an absence. Cunningham holds that Derrida is claiming that 
language and even textual reality do not have an outside (Cunningham 2002: 155). 
Cunningham claims that "The Derridean text is without being" (Cunningham 2002: 158). 
Due to the metaphysical absence in reality and language, there is no inherent meaning but 
an infinite deferral of meaning from sign to sign while an interminable play of 
differenceldifferance takes places1 (Powell 1997:42). 
Derrida' s method of deconstruction discovers the inherent differance found in a 
text that dismantles its intended meaning, as meaning is deferred and plays interminably 
with alternative and marginal readings. Thus, language is both a hermeneutic and an 
instrument of power. Later, subaltern hermeneutics would use it as a method of textual 
51 Derrida was heavily influenced by the French structuralist Ferdinand Saussure. Saussure derived that 
signifiers are based on difference not on identity. I.e. A is not B, as opposed to A is A. 
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subversion. This is a far cry from Cartesian rationalism which naively thought it found 
the Archimedean point. The text plays an ontological role in this form of reduction. In 
fact, most reductions in postmodern thinking take on transcendence. Yet the taking up of 
such a role is futile, since nothing is outside of the text referentially. There is no 
signification. The text is everything, and yet the text is nothing. Derrida echoes Kant as a 
significant ontologist of the transcendent nothing. 52 With Descartes, ontology fell to 
epistemology. With Derrida, epistemology is reduced to textualism as a meta-
hermeneutic. 53 
For Jean Baudrillard, it is not the text of Derrida which sets the ontological 
boundary but the sign. Reality has not been a Hegelian evolution of the Idea, but an 
evolution of simulacra. In the Enlightenment, sign equals referent. In the Industrial 
Revolution sign is exchanged for referent. In postmodernity, sign is exchanged for sign 
(Baudrillard 1983:83). With simulacrum, the real gets transferred and copied from 
medium to medium, so that meaning is destroyed ("implosion of meaning") and the real 
becomes the hyperreal (a type of fetish of the real). Simulation replaces reality in a 
52 What is meant here is that both Kant's critical philosophy, and Derrida's pan-textualism leave 
"nothingness" as transcendent. Being in terms of the transcendent is unknowable and left outside of what is 
known, the text. 
53 When everything is said to be the text and in the text, and there is no transcendental signified or a 
meaning or referent above everything or outside of the text, then such a view can be called textualism 
(Rorty's term) . Some use the term "pantextualism." I do not believe that this result was Derrida's intent, 
but I do believe it is a consequence of his hermeneutics. Derrida's hermeneutics are twofold. First, he 
supplants writing over logocentric language or speech. Derrida uses Saussure to show that language is 
merely a play of differences in the symbols used for language, and so is speech. Meaning is all text with an 
interminable interplay of difference. I believe this is his recognition of text as "metaphysical" (my 
assessment), though it is a metaphysics of absence and not presence, a type of negative theology. Second, 
in this metaphysics of absence and deferral of meaning via the vacuum of "differance" in the text, Derrida 
seeks the "other" in the text, the other that is marginalized from the center of interpretation. Alternative 
readings and justice are the goals of his hermeneutic of deconstruction not necessarily "destruction" or 
nihilism. However, the result can be the same. The end that Derrida has in mind is admirable, but the means 
do not justify the end here. The presupposition in deconstruction is no "being" outside of the text; no 
transcendental signified of reference to our text. We, the text, stand alone in binary opposition wrestling 
and warring for the power of meaning - an apiori warfare, nihilism. 
hyperreality or reification through signs (Baudrillard1983: 138-152; Best and Kellner 
1991: 119-121; Appignanesi and Garratt 2003:54-55). The sign or the code replaces 
Enlightenment metaphysics and the real. 
41 
Baudrillard combines semiotics with Marxist critical theory to construe the sign 
as a commodity with value consumption. The economy follows the ever-moving sign 
which produces consumption and capital. The code of production not the mode of 
production controls the economy and society (Lane 2000:69-76). Hyperreality is a 
product of advanced capitalism, where experience is commodified in signs and 
consumed. With Baudrillard, reality is not ratio-empirical but sign-driven capitalism 
which leads to nihilism (the implosion of meaning in the sign). Hyperreality is the 
transcendence of the sign to nothingness. The simulacra has swallowed the real and 
yields nothing but itself, leaving us in a universe of virtuality where digital ghosts of 
simulacra are disembodied from the real and are in competition one with another seeking 
a host server that will enable commodification, which is the incarnation of the sign, and 
consumption. 
Other movements with a postmodern sensibility have also further contextualized 
knowledge within different fields . In the world of science, Kuhn recognized that 
scientific revolution and innovation comes through paradigm shifts which are ultimately 
social products of the scientific community (Kuhn 1962). Peter Berger also introduced us 
more formally to the social construction of reality, which has been influential in the 
social sciences and in missiology (Berger and Luckman 1966). These postmodern 
thinkers have far removed us from the autonomous, neutral reason of Descartes, Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Locke or Hegel and have brought us to a place where the motive for knowledge 
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is uncovered and qualified by its context, that is its power structures, social institutions, 
language and signs. 
Conclusions on Modernism and Postmodernism 
Throughout my critique of modernism and postmodernism, I implicitly employed 
a sort of ontological type of transcendental argument that presupposes the basic 
framework in which experience reality and construct knowledge. 54 In an Enlightenment 
worldview, such a presuppostional ontology is replaced by the foundationalism 
established of epistemological constructs, such as rationalism and empiricism. 
Epistemological theory is given the primary function of justifiable authority. The 
Scientific Revolution and the use of new technology and the discovery of nature's laws 
gave knowledge a degree of empirical authority it did not have before. Rationalists like 
Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the Cogito, Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), the Monad, and 
Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), the One, gave reason great authority to explain the 
philosophical universe with attempts at a grand theory of everything. John Locke (1632-
1704), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) laid the 
foundation for the modern-state relocating political authority in the laws of nature which 
lie in the individual. In a postmodern worldview, rather than finding new ways to 
legitimize authority, all authority is questioned and deconstructed for its internal 
contradictions, contextual biases and self-serving assertions. 
54 Formal transcendental arguments have been used ever since Kant. These arguments begin with accepted 
common experience, knowledge, or belief, and posit a necessary a priori condition, category that allows for 
such an experience, knowledge, or belief. Kant posited subjective, rational categories that were a priori 
synthetic knowledge of experience. Others, such as P.P' Strawson and Kenneth Westphal have offered 
variants of the transcendental argument, while philosophers, such as Barry Stroud have sought to refute it. 
While Kant by his transcendental dialectic rejected ontology, I presuppose it as a condition for existence. 
My attempt is not so much a "formal" argument but a presuppositional vision of faith that has its 
confirming reasons concerning the ontological framework of creation as a moderate transcendental realism 
that conditions the construction of our knowledge. 
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However like Existentialism, Postmodernism leaves one with few alternatives but 
nihilism. The three postmodern thinkers that I have investigated have qualified or even 
reduced knowledge in terms of power, the text, and the sign that seek transcendence in an 
evacuated ontology, evacuated of reference. For many within and without 
postmodernism, ontology is an imaginary field of reference. There is no escape from the 
field of text and signs and the interpretations we manufacture. But can all things truly 
hold together or fall apart under the power of the sign, or is another ontological implosion 
into nihilism? 
Later we will be examining how Radical Orthodoxy provides an insightful 
critique of postmodern ontology and epistemology. In preparation, though, it needs to be 
said that even though postmodern thinking has uncovered the ontological skeletons in 
modernity's closet, the problem is not solved but is exacerbated by a hyperrationalism 
that still shakes with Cartesian anxiety for certainty and finds it in closed system 
reductions, like the text, that float on ontologies of nothingness. Reality is reduced to text, 
signs or fields of power that hang from nothing. Nothing holds up meaning or meaning's 
deferral. 
Nihilism with its imploding ontology of violence and closed hermeneutical 
systems of survival win the day. And their fruit of radical pluralism and relativism are 
given democratic and equal truth warrant by reason of their voice as long as they play 
rightly by their own rules of the language games they have established from their 
tradition. These conclusions strike at the root of Christian claims to the revelation of God 
and creation as the true ontological vision. Also epistemological genealogies that stem 
from a univocity of being and give expression to differential violence are not acceptable 
44 
or congruent with a Christian revelation that recognizes a benevolent Creator of all things 
(including "difference") who redeems and sustains life from death through the person of 
Jesus Christ. In the next chapter, I will explore an option that seeks to reestablish a vision 
based on this theological revelation. Yet, first I will apply my examination of modernism 
to the theology and practice of mission. 
The Impact of Modernism on Mission 
Shifting to modern mission, I will illustrate some of the negative impact that modern 
thinking has had on mission theology and practice. First, it is important to point out that 
all of the work and sacrifice of those dedicated to spreading the gospel does not deserve 
the ensuing critique. Much of the work was done out of a pure heart and a sincere desire 
to fulfill Christ's command. Missionaries and mission societies were subject to their own 
times, at least in part. 
However, in many cases significant achievements were attained, nonetheless, like the 
work for peace and justice ministered by Bartolome de Las Casas (1484-1566); the 
evangelical and exemplary work of Hudson Taylor (1832-1905) through the China Inland 
Mission, especially during the purges of the Boxer Movement; the ecumenical mission 
movement beginning with the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh in 1910; the 
incredible rise of African Independent Churches; and the indigenous ministry among the 
Masai by Vincent Donovan (1924-) are some highlights of God's grace in mission. Often 
educational efforts, language studies, and medical and technological advancements 
throughout the two-thirds world have been helpful to ameliorating the quality of life. 
Modern mission has made a positive impact on the world, as well as advanced the 
Kingdom in the world. 
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Yet, modern mission has also had a negative impact on the status of many two-thirds 
world countries as well. One of the themes of this research is that some of the negative 
impact sterns from the Enlightenment ideologies and epistemologies that were borrowed 
from this period and from the fact that modern mission was carried out in the context of 
political and economic oppression. Bosch comments "that the Enlightenment would 
profoundly influence mission thinking and practice, the more so since the entire modern 
missionary enterprise is, to a very real extent, a child of the Enlightenment" (Bosch 
1991:274; see Stanley 2001). The two go together. 
Rationalism applied to the scientific revolution, which advanced technology, in the 
process created national hegemonies in the West, who thought it their manifest destiny to 
expand their territories into those of others and civilize and colonize those people with 
their culture and customs. This geo-political effort often went hand in hand with the 
missionary enterprise (Bosch 1991:275). The colonial efforts in Africa, Latin America, 
Asia and North America by the English, German, French, Dutch, and Spanish were 
coupled by a missionary thrust to Christianize those same people, exhibiting a symbiosis 
of church and state (1991 :275). 
Much of the confidence and sense of destiny of these endeavors carne from a 
sense of cultural superiority based on the achievements of ratio-empiricism in a capitalist 
society, the scientific calculus of wealth. Reason becomes architectonic in terms of 
building a base of power. Such exploitation of autonomous realms of power is a product, 
at least in part, of the development of the univocity of being in terms of rationalism, 
scientism, capitalism, and nationalism as a natural progression. The univocity of being 
provides space for autonomous realms outside of God to be birthed and to self actualize 
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into destinies of control. In the humanism of the Renaissance and the advancement of the 
Enlightenment many of these realms were seized and exploited for power. As mentioned, 
these realms include rationality, scientism, capitalism and nationalism, including the 
national church. The univocity of being creates space for secular autonomous institutions 
like nation-state and national churches. 
Reason became its own basis of authority to validate these other realms. With the 
break up of the Empire and the spread of the Reformation, the spirit of individualism and 
autonomy was fostered and inspired the birth of nationalism and national churches, which 
were grounded in their own raison d'etre. 55 The contention for global control was birthed 
out of these national hegemonies striving for land and power. There was a race to 
conquer. In fact, Anders Stephanson identifies the westward and southern expansion of a 
young America as "geographical rationalism" (Stephanson 1995:43). 
Missiologists Bevans and Schroeder remark "One of the consequences of the 
development of nationalism was the idea of manifest destiny" (Bevans and Schroeder 
2004:207). The forging of America seems to best exemplify this phenomena. Historian 
Sydney Ahlstrom states that "manifest destiny as an American idea is probably as old as 
the 'sea to shining sea' charters of the earliest colonies" (Ahlstrom 1972:877). The 
church also fostered this vision since the Puritan 's sense of divine mission in the new 
world (1972:877-878). Ahlstrom continues, "In the antebellum decades evangelical 
dreams of a vast Christian republic brought prophetic certainty to the idea. Manifest 
Destiny became the catchword of an epoch" (1972:878). Ahlstrom cites The New Era; or, 
The Coming Kingdom written in 1893 by the general secretary of the Evangelical 
Alliance Rev. Josiah Strong as a prime example of "manifest destiny" in which 
55 French for "reason of being" or "reason for being" 
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Christianity and the process of civilizing are tied together with imperialism and racism. In 
this work, Strong proclaims the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race with its pure form of 
Christianity and its privileged destiny to dispossess the weaker races (Ahlstrom 
1972:849-850). Stephanson confirms the strong ties between manifest destiny and 
Christianity: 
When "manifest destiny" was coined in 1840s, apocalyptic Protestantism and utopian 
mobilization had actually reached a level unmatched since early colonial times. So it 
is no surprise that the expression should have been heavily suffused with religious 
overtones. Its origins, in fact, lay directly in the old biblical notions, recharged 
through the Reformation, of the predestined, redemptive role of god's chosen people 
in the Promised Land: providential destiny revealed. (Stephanson 1995:5) 
The church based its theologies on the same rational grounds as the forging nations 
had, and together "became agents of the Western imperialistic enterprise as the three 
"Cs" of colonialism, became Christianity, commerce and civilization" (2004:207). In 
implementing the three Cs, the national powers and Christianity had to wipe out the 
conquered cultures in order to build and civilize, i.e. the doctrine of tabula rasa emerged 
to serve the purpose and keep the argument rational. Again the justification for cultural 
extermination was architectonic reason - cultural superiority. Totalization and hegemony 
stem from an ontology of differential violence, in which difference cannot mean peace or 
unity but competition. 
Bevans and Schroeder comment that the Enlightenment fostered a division in 
civilization based on ethnicity and race to determine superiority (2004:208). It became 
the white man's "responsibility" to civilize as the superior race. From the Enlightenment 
into the modern period, national powers raced throughout the globe to subjugate 
"inferior" peoples to their hegemonic brand of culture and civilization. From the 
conquistadors in Latin America to manifest destiny against the Indians in North America 
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to British control of India, to the French, German, Belgian, British, and Dutch carving up 
of Africa and Southeast Asia cultural imperialism spread out of a manifest destiny 
inherent in an ontology of violence. 
In examining the impact of the Enlightenment on modern mission, I want to consider 
three cases that touch on three problems that stem from a univocity of being and an 
imploding ontology. The problems are differential violence, rational hegemony, and 
closed systems. In Asian Biblical Hermeneutics and Postcolonialism, Indian theologian 
R.S. Sugirtharajah tells the story of how postcolonial India had to recapture its own 
hermeneutics from colonial influences. This is a case of differential violence. How does a 
culture encounter a different culture? The British had to decide how to remove the Indian 
identity from the people in order to re-identify them within the British Commonwealth. 
The hegemony of reason cannot tolerate difference for it disrupts the power structure. 
Difference means opposition in a totalist scheme. India has a rich history and identity 
which actually encompasses diversity, including religion, ethnicity, and language. The 
goal in colonization is enculturation to the new culture, beginning with changing the 
identity of the people and how they see the world, hermeneutics. 
Sugirtharajah identifies three phases of hermeneutics that were applied to biblical 
interpretation and define mission postures: the Orientalist mode, the Anglicist mode, and 
the Nativist mode. The Orientalist mode, following Edward Said's work, sought to revive 
"the lost Golden Age of Indian civilization based on ancient Sanskrit texts and Sanskrit 
criticism" (Sugirtharajah 1998:5). This movement venerated Sanskrit and the Vedic texts 
and sought to make connections between the Vedic and biblical texts (1998:5). 
Sugirtharajah remarks that "Orientalism provided educated and urbanized Indians a new 
sense of social and communal identity" (1998:7). The problem with this selective 
interpretation of the Indian people through textualization was that it reduced India to 
"Hindu-Aryan privileged Sanskrit texts over vernacular, and negated the Indian native 
and folk traditions" (1998:8). 
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The next attempt at creating a hermeneutical tradition for the Indian people was 
through the Anglicist mode. This mode sought to counter Orientalism by replacing 
indigenous texts and learning with Western science and modes of reason (1998:8). There 
is no need to expound on the results of this mode, for it characterizes much of what has 
been said. Foreign forms of reason and criticism were superimposed on a culture who had 
little orientation or identity in such traditions, creating a sense of inferiority and violation. 
The third attempt came as a Nativisitic mode, which sought to revive vernacular 
traditions, especially Tamil culture, literature and philosophy (1998: 12). This movement 
"promoted an awareness of neglected indigenous traditions," but it also created a 
particularism and isolationism that reduced the polyphonic culture of India (1998: 14). 
Sugirtharajah ' s work in this book is a movement towards a postcolonial hermeneutic, 
which seeks to unmask the power-plays behind Western texts and liberate texts to allow 
them to speak on behalf of the marginalized and to allow them to speak equally along 
side other texts and not hegemonic ally (1998: 17).The illustration in the case of Indian 
hermeneutics is that an ontology of differential violence could only perceive of difference 
as oppositional. One tradition excluded the other. And more importantly it was the 
colonizer who decided which hermeneutic would be applied to most benefit those in 
power. 
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I find a similar case in Kenya with the work of N gugi wa Thiong' 0 in his 
Dec%nising the Mind. This book exposes a case of rational hegemony. The book 
addresses the hegemony of the English language imposed on the people of Kenya which 
sought to wipe out the indigenous culture and replace it with a foreign one, what Ngugi 
calls an "imperialist tradition" (wa Thiong'o 1986:2). This tradition is made up of a neo-
colonial bourgeoisie, which is multinational. This imperialist tradition exercises political 
and economic control over the restive population, which represents the resistance 
tradition, who is controlled by force and culture (wa Thiong'o 1986:2-3). 
Ngugi identifies the "cultural bomb" as the most lethal of all of the weapons 
wielded against the resistant population (1986:3). Ngugi claims that the "effect of the 
cultural bomb is to annihilate a people' s belief in their names, in their languages, in their 
environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately 
in themselves" (1986:3). Ngugi locates the origin of this imperialist tradition with those 
European powers which originally came to Africa to colonize with "bible and sword" 
(1986:4). One of the main weapons within culture that has been used against the people 
has been language. 
N gugi believes that language is "central to a people's definition of themselves in 
relation to their natural and social environment, indeed in relation to the entire universe" 
(1986:4). Similarly to the case in India, a colonizing culture seeks to purge the "inferior" 
culture in order to control it, and it uses language or text to do it. In both cases the 
language and textual tradition defined the people and their worldview. Control over these 
areas was imperative to controlling the people. English ideas and language created a 
rational hegemony over the people. Again, these are some of the cultural consequences of 
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a hegemony of reason within a univocity of being. Difference is seen as competition and 
opposition that must be eliminated to fulfill the destiny of hegemonic control. The 
eschatological future of univocal being is always nihilistic and destructive. 
Ngugi and the resistance tradition sought to recapture the culture by recapturing 
the language and ideas of the African people expressed in their own oral and literary 
traditions. For N gugi language is a primary carrier of culture (1986: 13). The liberation of 
language would liberate the mind and begin to liberate the culture. He calls this process 
decolonizing the mind (1986:13-18). After recapturing the language, specifically the 
written language, then the language can be applied to other art forms like theater and 
fiction. In this way, the resistance tradition is using the same weapon of culture and 
language to liberate the mind from colonizing affects. In the last chapter of this work, I 
will discuss critical contextualization which is a tool that fosters the gospel in indigenous 
forms . The reason is that an ontology of participation that understands all of creation as 
rooted in God can inherently facilitate diverse cultural forms, whereas an ontology of 
differential violence cannot. 
A final example of the impact of the Enlightenment on modern mission comes 
from a much different source. Charles Kraft is a professor, missionary and cultural 
anthropologist who resides in the West. His story goes back to 1982 when he was sitting 
in on a class at Fuller Seminary entitled Signs, Wonders, and Church Growth. There in 
the class he saw people get healed. He was taken back, as an Enlightenment-oriented 
evangelical, who had his mind made up about such practices. In that class he observed 
not only healing but deliverances and manifestations of the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Kraft 
1989:2). This class was an eye opener for this former missionary. 
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Kraft tells of his experiences in Nigeria where he and other missionaries were ill-
equipped to assist the Nigerian church leaders who had strategized to conquer the evil 
spirits that were in that area through the authority of Jesus Christ (1989:4) . None of 
Kraft's training in Bible, theology or anthropology prepared him for such encounters. He 
felt powerless. However, the Nigerian leaders and the people knew about spiritual power 
but not from Christianity. They were convinced that "whatever power Christianity 
brought it wasn't adequate to deal with such things as tragedy, infertility, relational 
breakdowns, and troublesome weather" (1989:4). Kraft and the other missionaries did not 
know the power of God, and thus could not call on God to deliver from the influences of 
evil spirits. 
After Kraft returned from Nigeria, he often remembered his inability to help the 
Nigerian people in the area of spiritual power and evil. At times God would nudge him 
through contacts with Pentecostal and charismatic churches. He began to believe that the 
reason why these churches grew was because they satisfied a need people had for 
spiritual power (1989:6). All of this prepared Kraft for the class he would sit in on under 
John Wimber in 1982. This class would forever change his perspective on Christianity 
beginning with a change in his own worldview. Kraft attributes his lack of understanding 
of the spiritual world was due to the fact that he was educated within an Enlightenment 
worldview which was a closed natural system that did not allow for supernatural 
phenomena. Kraft claims that this worldview is dominant in the entire West (1989:26-35) 
The case of Kraft is common in Protestant Christian circles that have inherited a 
ratio-empirical worldview that is closed. It does not need transcendence to explain 
anything or to operate sufficiently. It contains observable and quantifiable laws of nature 
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that regulate and control all of reality. Reality is reduced to the natural or sensible-
intelligible realm, and reason is able to comprehend fully its processes. There is no room 
or need for the supernatural. Hence, many Western missionaries when confronted with 
spiritual issues and problems in cultures that operate out of a more spirit-based 
worldview are confounded and powerless. 
The case of Kraft's early theory of mission fits into our analysis as a missiological 
case of a closed hermeneutical system. Closed hermeneutical systems are the result of an 
ontological structure that is deflated of reality and meaning and is collapsing on itself. 
The reason it is deflated is because it is filled with nothing. It is "resting" 
on non-being and cannot sustain itself without the assistance of transcendental being. It is 
a closed system seeking to operate on the myth of pure reason. Within Kraft's particular 
closed system, which is symptomatic of many modernist missionaries, there is no 
interaction with a transcendent spiritual realm. Kraft believed in a transcendent God, but 
in his worldview God does not interact in supernatural ways such as healings or 
deliverances. Kraft operated as many Christians still do, as dualist deists. 
In the last chapter I will discuss the work of the Spirit in an ontology of 
participation. Such an ontology is open to God. God's grace regularly infuses life and 
power into the created order and especially in his church. A worldview that accounts for 
the spiritual dimension of reality will recognize both demonic powers and the power of 
God and their influences in creation. A holistic theology of mission will have a 
comprehensive vision for the cosmos and a fully-orbed pneumatology that understands 
the person and work of the Spirit in the church to minister salvation, healing, deliverance, 
and blessing of the world 
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A Proposed Solution from Critical Realism of the Modern-Postmodern Problem 
Through the preceding critiques one can see that modernism and postmodernism 
are in one sense at odds with each other, and in another sense they represent a continuum 
of hyperrationalism that continues to reduce reality, ontologize nothingness, and justify a 
violent hermeneutic of difference as the only epistemic possibilities. As mentioned 
earlier, one of the difficulties that give rise to these issues is the collapse or implosion of 
ontology on top of epistemology leaving epistemology in the center with the entire 
weight of reality, truth and meaning bearing down on it. As a result, modern thinking 
must rest on ratio-empiricism within a closed system of nature, while postmodernism 
rests on hermeneutics within a closed system of semiotics. 
A viable solution must examine and address the ontological problem in these 
systems, as well as affirm and salvage their insightful contributions. One attempt is found 
in the philosophy of science with critical realism, specifically through Charles Peirce 
(1839-1914) who gave voice to several philosophers of science, including Ian Barbour 
(1923 ), Arthur Peacocke (1924-2006), and John Polkinghorne (1930 ). Missiologist 
Paul Hiebert (1932-2007) has built on their work and has addressed the problem of 
epistemology in modernism and postmodernism as it applies to missiology. He seeks a 
solution in a critical realism that acknowledges a real external world (modernism) that is 
apprehended and known contextually and symbolically (postmodernism). 
Hiebert points out the epistemological extremes in both the Enlightenment and 
Postmodernism cases. In Missional Implications of Epistemological Shifts, Hiebert 
critiques three existing epistemological systems: 
• Positivism from an Enlightenment-modernist worldview, and 
55 
• Instrumentalism from a postmodern worldview and 
• Idealism from a postmodern worldview. 
Hiebert notes that positivism acknowledges a real, external world, and that the mind is 
able to know that world as it is objectively, objective realism (Hiebert 1999:4). The way 
of knowing is found in the rational, empirical method of Western science. Through 
skepticism put to empirical observation and hypothesis, factual, certain and positive 
knowledge would be attained about the natural world. Anything outside of the empirical 
realm, such as metaphysics, religious transcendence, revelation or purpose, would be 
dismissed as inaccessible, irrelevant or enthusiasm. Ontological and metaphysical 
concerns are assumed by scientism. 
In the modernist paradigm, true knowledge would be value-free, neutral facts that 
were empirically verifiable. Also a shift of epistemic authority moved from tradition to 
the autonomous individual, who was seen as the foundation of reality in Descartes 
(Hiebert 1999:8). And finally the establishment of positive objective knowledge as the 
only true form of knowledge was a rejection of any form of "traditional" knowledge, and 
thus such cultures were seen as primitive, inferior, and uncivilized and fit to be colonized 
and exploited (Hiebert 1999:8,16). 
Within postmodern worldviews, Hiebert examines instrumentalism and idealism. 
Instrumentalism is a form of realism that posits a real, external world but concedes to the 
fact that it cannot be known in-itself (Hiebert 1999:38-39). All of our knowledge is a 
socio-cultural creation that functions pragmatically at solving problems. There are no 
facts or objective knowledge about reality. Our understanding is theory and value-laden. 
Knowledge of the external world is not available and no truth claims can be made about 
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the models that we construct concerning reality, and so we have no way of discerning 
between theories that reflect external reality and mere creations out of our own contextual 
paradigms. Instrumentalism is highly aware of the subjective and contextual nature of 
knowledge and abandons any traditional concept of truth (Hiebert 1999:40). 
Idealism, on the other hand, posits that reality only exists in the mind. There is no 
external world. One can only know ideas in terms of one's particular system of 
knowledge (Hiebert 1999:47). Like instrumentalism, there is no objective knowledge. 
Ideas are historically and contextually shaped. Language itself is the only thing real, 
language without a referent (Hiebert 1999:48). All of reality is within the text, and 
nothing is outside of the text and meaning is interpretation, which is found in the mind of 
the individual. This type of idealism is reflected in the deconstruction of Derrida or in the 
knowledge-power hermeneutic of Foucault. The problem with radical idealism is that 
there is no way to discern if the paradigm has any objective referent or which conflicting 
paradigms are incongruent with empirical observations (Hiebert 1999:48-49). 
Hiebert identifies the strengths that can be gained from Postmodernism as a 
response to the Enlightenment. Postmodernism seeks to dismantle the hegemonies of 
reason, metanarrative, scientism, rational government, and cultural imperialism by 
understanding the contextual nature of knowledge. However the common problem that 
both idealism and instrumentalism share is the danger of pluralism to the point of 
relativism (Hiebert 1999:53-54). From the instrumentalist perspective, when all 
knowledge, including theology, is shaped solely by cultural and historical contexts, "the 
result is a theological relativism that denies any claim to the truth" (Hiebert 1999:58). 
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The implications for missions is that since "all religions are seen as autonomous, 
incommensurable paradigms, and because we have no privileged position from which to 
judge them, we must affirm them .as subjectively true," a claim which undermines 
mission itself (Hiebert 1999:60). Instrumentalism seeks a pluralistic theology of religions 
that puts all religions on equal truth grounds (Hiebert 1999:62). 
Likewise from the idealist perspective, if the nature of truth is in the mind and 
apart from contextual factors , including theology, then there is no way of objectively 
testing truth claims. Any theological claim is as valid as the next. There are no ways to 
test competing paradigms. In regards to instrumentalism and idealism, Hiebert claims that 
they employ reason selectively. The two systems "collapse under the weight of their own 
internal contradictions. Both use reason to discredit rationality. Both absolutize 
relativism" (Hiebert 1999: 66) . 
Another problem with idealism is that it claims knowledge in pure forms apart 
from cultural forms, rendering the Gospel as an abstraction that can never be received 
contextually but must be received in its ideal form. This can lead to cultural imperialism, 
dogmatism, and split-level Christianity. People groups that hear the gospel will always 
hear it in a specific context. A gospel that is left in the context of the missionary and not 
contextualized for the hearer, leaves the receptor people group with the form of the 
gospel wrapped in meaning that is alien to their worldview. If the gospel does not 
penetrate the worldview, it will not penetrate the culture and will not bring lasting 
change. 
Critical realism offers ballast to these two contrasting views by acknowledging a 
real, knowable, external world (positivism) which is apprehended subjectively, 
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contextually, truly, partially and fallibly (instrumentalism). Critical realism as an 
epistemological system is sympathetic to both a real world and to the personal and social 
dimensions of knowing. As a system it is comprehensive, descriptive and flexible and so 
is being employed across a variety of disciplines, including missions, theology, science, 
and the social sciences. Critical realism also embrace epistemic humility (we do not know 
as God knows); as well as being compatible with Scripture (we see through a glass 
darkly). 
Hiebert feels that critical realism strikes a balance between positivism' s emphasis 
on objective truth and postmodernism's stress on the subjective nature of knowledge 
(1999:69). It recognizes that knowledge is both subjective and objective. This claim 
stems from the fact that critical realism sees the connection between epistemology and 
ontology, although it does not specify the nature of that connection. There is a real, 
external knowable world (ontological reality), and one can know that world in part 
through subjective and contextual means (epistemological reality). Van Huyssteen, a 
critical realist theologian, says it this way: 
Without losing the validity of the facts that all our knowledge us always socially 
contextualized, critical realists - with good reasons, but not on compelling 
grounds - claim reference for their tentative proposals. A critical realist viewpoint 
is indeed realist because, in the process of theological theorizing, this model 
enables us to recognize the cognitive and referential nature of analogical language 
as a form of indirect speech. (Van Huyssteen 1997: 43) 
Critical realism does not claim to know the world exactly as it represents itself but 
in terms of maps or models that correlate and approximate the world. Approximation 
means that the knowledge is not complete, exhaustive or at times even exact, but it is real 
and true and not relative. Van Huyssteen describes knowledge as a metaphysical and an 
empirical claim that is experientially adequate (Van Huyssteen 1997:41-42). 
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Critical realism is similar in some ways to instrumentalism in that it distinguishes 
between reality and our knowledge (1999:71). Like positivism, it recognizes that the 
world can be known and knowledge can be true, as well as evaluated (1999:71). The 
assertions made in critical realism are subject to critique and change (1999:70). Such 
critical reflection is often done in hermeneutical communities that "set the standards, 
define proofs, and integrate one or more theories into a comprehensive system of 
knowledge (Hiebert 1999:94). Members of the community hold each other accountable 
by examining each others research and claims in search of agreement on theories 
(1999:95). So even though critical realism asserts that knowledge can be real, it is also 
limited, subject to critique and provisional. 
Van Huyssteen recognizes that critical realism "makes a proposal about the 
provisionality, but also the reliability, of theological knowledge (Van HuyssteenI997:43; 
see also Pannenberg 1991). In its provisionality, knowledge reveals its human constraints 
and limitations. However, in critical realism this is not a detriment but the impetus for 
creativity and exploration. Van Huyssteen notes that critical realism acknowledges "both 
the creativity of human thought and the existence of structures in reality not created by 
the human mind" (1997: 134). This personal creative factor in the knowing process is 
located clearly in Polanyi with his fiduciary program of knowledge - "The personal 
participation of the knower in the knowledge he believes himself to possess takes place 
within a flow of passion ... we recognize intellectual beauty as a guide to discovery and 
as a mark of truth" (Polanyi 1958:300). Other philosophers of science, such as Arthur 
Peacocke, Ian Barbour and John Polkinghorne, have also found the system of critical 
realism to an effective working epistemological model to take on the challenges of the 
Enlightenment and Postmodernism. 
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Hiebert's critical application of critical realism offers epistemology a real external 
world and a place for contextual and semiotic apprehension of knowledge, which are vital 
components of an ontology and an analogical epistemology. In fact, much of the 
conclusions of critical realism can be adopted to solve the dilemma between modern and 
postmodern epistemology. All that said. Critical realism, as it is often expounded, lacks 
development in a few important areas. First, the critique posits solutions to the problems 
of positivism, idealism, and instrumentalism without really engaging the struggles and 
challenges that are inherent in movements that seek epistemic certainty under an 
imploding ontology. For example, in the Hiebert text there is no wrestling with Derrida or 
Foucault and the intricacies of their claims. A world outside of the text is simply 
assumed. He merely posits an external real world which is expressed scientifically in 
symbols and models. 
What is his basis for an external, real world? Hiebert's work implicitly draws 
from Charles Peirce. Hiebert was not a philosopher, so I will not examine his 
philosophical position or claims concerning ontology. Hiebert and other scientists from 
the critical realism school draw heavily on Peirce who lays the philosophical foundation 
for many critical realists. Thus, in keeping with the methodology of philosophical 
genealogies as I employed earlier, I will briefly examine Peirce's ontology, which is the 
root ontology for critical realism. 
Peirce was clearly a realist and not a nominalist (Copleston 1967 vol.viii:313). 
However, Peirce ontologicaUy did not tie his realism to God as a realist like Aquinas 
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would, not that Peirce did not believe in God. Peirce held the "humble argument" or the 
"neglected argument" for God which was based more along the lines of pragmatic 
religious experience rather than on an ontological vision (Anderson 2004: 177). Peirce's 
argument was based on "instinctive or commonsensical belief," which was a type of 
direct experience or perception (Anderson 2004: 177). Impulses and perceptions of God 
were subordinated, as are all beliefs, to empirical verification. The practice of religion is 
tested by its conformity to the good life and love. 
For Peirce, the purpose of religion is to conduct ourselves according to such 
common sense beliefs for the amelioration of human life (Anderson 2004: 179). The 
practice of religion was an open experiment in the good life, beginning with an internal 
religious impulse that is carried out in conduct and developed and perfected as an 
experimental science (Anderson 2004:178-181). Peirce was opposed to theology which 
he felt sought to stifle this process because it did not allow for the experimental nature of 
the spirit of religion, which in Peirce's mind should function as a science always under 
experimentation, critique and adjustment, while theology was rigid and dogmatic 
(Anderson 2004: 181-185). Thus Peirce avoided a vision of reality that was theologically 
constructed, including a theistic ontology. Religion was to be subordinate to science and 
experience serve a pragmatic function. 
John Boler makes the argument that Peirce's scientific realism was influenced at 
some level by ScholasticlScotistic realism. Scotus, who held to the universals or "real 
generals," gave ontological priority to being as first substances within things (Boler 
2004:66 and 72). Peirce, working with Scotus ' notions of "common nature" or "first 
substances" and haecceity (individual differentiation), modified them into three modes of 
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being (Boler 2004:65-77). Peirce's realism combines "firstness," (pure 
possibility),"secondness," (actuality), and "thirdness," (mediation, potentiality) into a 
"three-categoried ontology" (Boler 2004:66 and 71-72). Peirce, influenced by Aristotle 
and Kant, reduced all reality and predication to these three categories. Peirce, like 
Scotus, understood intellectual concepts as universals that have a counterpart in reality, 
understood as laws (Copleston1967:313). The laws of reality reflecting the universals are 
derived from the essence or common nature as described by Duns Scotus, which stems 
from a univocity of being (Scotus 1987:2-4 and Copleston1967:313). In both Scotus ' 
version of realism and Peirce's version of realism, universals are rooted in a univocal 
experience of being. 
In Chapter Two, we will look at Scotus' problematic ontology. It is sufficient to 
say in the case of Scotus, and seemingly in Peirce, being is a natural object of the intellect 
and that the same being is shared by God, thus the univocity of being, which means an 
ontological foundation rooted in created being not dependent on transcendent being. This 
becomes the primary critique of the history of philosophy beginning with Scotus up until 
today by Radical Orthodoxy. 
In Scotus, ontology is detached from God and is rooted in a concept of being that 
hangs on nothing, which results in its nihilistic implosion. Univocal being that is 
attributed to God and the created order equally is no being at all. The created order 
cannot rest in its own being apart from God. Ultimately, ontology detached from a 
transcendent God is standing on its own. 
Peirce's ontology may be too connected to an independent evolutionary creation 
so that, like Hegel, he assumes a world process, an objective idealism that he mistakes for 
God. Such radical panentheism is a product of the univocity of being and may have a 
tendency to diminish the transcendence of God, which can be noted in some of the 
critical realist philosophers of science and religion (Peacocke 1984:55,64 and 79). 
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Critical realism needs to draw a clear connection between the human context, the 
external world, and an ontological mooring in the eternal, not in the univocal being of the 
cosmos. For an epistemology that will serve a theology of mission, a clear ontological 
connection needs to be made with the scriptural God of creation. In doing this, it may not 
be wise for critical realism to be wholly a correlationist project, where secular knowledge 
demonstrates some correlation with revelation and is baptized in a wholesale fashion. A 
good example of correlationism is the adoption of Marxism into the Liberation 
understanding of Scripture, salvation history and mission. Some circles of Christian 
mission have adopted critical realism wholesale (see Hiebert 1999). What I will propose 
following incorporates an analogical epistemology compatible to critical realism but with 
a larger ontological framework. 
In the next chapter, Radical Orthodoxy offers a sufficient theological critique of 
modernism and postmodernism and provides a post-secular solution to the problems of a 
detached ontology of violence and closed hermeneutical systems. Radical Orthodoxy 
goes to the root of the problem with a revelational understanding of the cosmos and its 
participation in God. Through this framework, the created order is reconnected to God in 
an ontology that will be fitting for a theology of mission. As we will find out in the last 
chapter, transforming mission is not the project of human enlightenment or progress, nor 
is it the work of the church, but it is the work of God (missio Dei/6 
56 Latin for "mission of God" 
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Chapter 2 
Ontology of Participation: A Radical Orthodox Critique and Solution 
2 Peter 1:4 Thus he has given us, through these things, his precious and very 
great promises, so that through them you may escape from the corruption that 
is in the world because of lust, and may become participants of the divine 
nature 
Radical Orthodoxy and the Secular 
Postmodernism has received criticism from a variety of camps within Christian 
circles, some of which have not done the rigorous homework necessary to deal with the 
complex issues that Postmodernism has placed on the table. However, some of the more 
serious critiques have come out of the Radical Orthodoxy movement, a theological 
sensibility that draws from Postmodernism and speaks its language in order to dialogue 
with it and respond to it theologically. My use of Radical Orthodoxy is limited to three 
interrelated functions, as a Christian apologetic against nihilism, as a critical 
methodology towards modernism and postmodernism, and as an insightful and profound 
"philosophical theology" that joins the two disciplines of theology and philosophy 
together to cast a vision of participation between God and the world. 
Radical Orthodox thinking still needs to wrestle with some basic theological 
disciplines, such as scripturally grounded dogmatic, systematic and biblical theology. 
Also, its methodology of genealogical critique can be criticized at times for making 
sweeping, big brush stroke interpretations of often nuanced and detailed contours within 
the history of philosophy and pronouncing them as canonical or the only interpretation. In 
this light, it is said by Laurence Paul Hemming that the Radical Orthodox hermeneutic is 
implicitly proclaimed as "inerrant" and refuses to be "apologetic," often leaving its 
theology with a lack of "self-reflexivity" (Hemming 2000:4,12). 
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My use of one of the Radical Orthodox critiques is not an endorsement of the 
project as a whole, nor is my use of one of their critiques a statement that that critique is 
the only way to understand modernism and postmodernism. I do feel its one of the better 
and more comprehensive critiques currently available. My use of Radical Orthodoxy is 
primarily theoretical as a critical apparatus and a prelude to an ontologically based 
epistemology. Radical Orthodoxy can be accused of making sweeping ideological 
generalizations of history, philosophy and various movements. However, I find its 
specific analysis of the ontological problem in modernism and postmodernism to be 
insightful and revolutionary. I see Radical Orthodoxy attempting to be a prophetic 
movement that is calling the church to repent and change its mind from a secular 
orientation to a theological one. The way that the church is to do this is to return to the 
point of lapse, in this case in the history of philosophy, and take an alternative route. I 
also envision it as potentially a renewal or revitalization movement within theology at the 
confluence where philosophy overlaps theology in this postmodern time. At this place 
there is a state of anxiety and disorder seeking a new "steady state" (Wallace 2003: 14). It 
is here where Radical Orthodoxy may be taking on the role of the prophetic that brings 
revitalization to theology. 
In my estimation, Radical Orthodoxy in all of its philosophical intricacies 
accomplishes something very fundamentally theological. It simply brings us back to 
Genesis 1: I and reestablishes its significance as the fundamental ontological reality - God 
revealed in and through creation. Philosophically and theologically we need to simply 
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return to this place, this revelation in which we now stand existentially. Radical Orthodox 
points out where we have deviated from this revelation and built our own revelation of 
nihilism, which instead of God and creation consists of no God and the created text. 
The methodology of Radical Orthodox critique, and one that I have adopted for 
this work, is employing "genealogical" analysis to the history of philosophy in the vein of 
Nietzsche and postmodernists in order to discover points of discontinuity, breaks, and 
alternative readings in the narrative of a history of philosophy. Radical Orthodoxy looks 
at a strand of history of philosophy and uncovers the genealogy of postmodernism and 
discovers its roots in the univocity of being proposed by Duns Scotus (1266-1308) in late 
medieval Scholastic philosophical theology. With the univocal expression of being, 
Scotus left the world in its own autonomy, creating the secular. The essence of original 
sin is when humanity seeks its own autonomous domain apart from God, grounding its 
existence in its own being and forsaking trust and dependence in God. The shift to a 
univocity of being is a reoccurrence of the original sin. Late Scholastic philosophy sought 
to give the created order its own independent autonomous ground. 
The primary problem uncovered by Radical Orthodoxy in the genealogy of 
modernism and postmodernism is its bad gene, the univocity of being. The secular realm 
possessing its own being apart from God is ultimately rooted in nothingness, since apart 
from God there is no univocal category of being. Cunningham makes the radical claim 
that the attempt at a univocity of being is truly the univocity of non-being (Cunningham 
2002). When attempting to do non-theologically based philosophy or even philosophy 
without ontological transcendence, such a gene collapses ontology into closed epistemic 
systems, whose signs cannot point beyond themselves and in the end result in nihilism. 
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Radical Orthodoxy proposes an ontology of participation as a solution to this problem. 
Due to its sufficient critique of both modernism and postmodernism and its return to the 
primacy of theology, this solution will be incorporated into this research in order to 
develop an epistemology for a theology of mission. 
Radical Orthodoxy is a movement that came originally out of Cambridge nearly a 
decade ago with the publication of Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology. However, the 
movement had been brewing nearly a decade prior, ignited by Milbank's Theology and 
Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (MilbankI990). At first the movement was 
fueled among Anglicans but since has become a "concrete ecumenical proposal" crossing 
many denominations (Smith 2004:65). Among the leading exponents are John Milbank 
(1952 - ), who is Professor of Religion, Politics, and Ethics at the University of 
Nottingham, Catherine Pickstock, who is Director of Studies in Philosophy and Joint 
Director of Studies in Theology and Religious Studies at Emmanuel College Cambridge, 
and Graham Ward (1955 ), who is Professor of Contextual Theology and Ethics at the 
University of Manchester. 
Milbank and the movements other scholars are well-versed in French post-
structuralism and Continental postmodern philosophy in general, and are strongly 
influenced by Catholic thinkers of the nouvelle theologie,57 such as Henri de Lubac 
(1896-1991) and Hans Urs Von Balthasar (1905-1988), as well as ancient thinkers, such 
as Augustine (354-430 A.D.), Gregory of Nyssa (ca.334-395 A.D.), and Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274). As its name indicates, Radical Orthodoxy seeks to critique the secular and 
57 This movement, that occurred in certain Catholic circles, was an attempt to correct the popular neo-
Thomist position that radically bifurcated reason and revelation or philosophy and theology by returning to 
the early sources ("ressourcement") of Christianity, for example Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus 
the Confessor, and Thomas Aquinas in order to situate the whole of Christian thinking in revelation. 
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bring theology front and center by returning it to its roots in revelation and by critically 
adopting premodern sources and early Christian tradition (2004:66). Radical Orthodoxy 
is orthodox in that "it seeks to be unapologetically confessional and Christian" (2004:65). 
In subverting the hegemony of the secular and going back to Scripture and the 
early traditions of the church, Radical Orthodoxy shares a "catholic vision of the Patristic 
period through to the high middle ages" (Milbank 2000:36, cited in Smith 2004:66). 
However in going back to premodern sources, Radical Orthodoxy does not become short-
sighted primitivism or remnant fundamentalism. In seeking to avoid the correlationist 
projects of modern and postmodernism, Radical Orthodoxy critically remixes and adopts 
premodern sources that share a common ontology in creation and the God of creation. 
The thinking is that an epistemology that is not dependent on an ontology that is 
"suspended" from the transcendent God is a secular autonomous construction. When 
theology adopts such an epistemology it resorts to the method of correlation. 
One of Radical Orthodoxy' s major polemics is against the program of correlation. 
Correlation is what occurs when Christian theology feels it can best communicate its 
message through secular voices rather than through revelation. , James Smith, Reformed 
philosopher and professor and Radical Orthodox contributor, defines the correlationist 
project as "formulating the claims of Christian revelation in terms of given cultural 
frameworks (sometimes masking as the human condition) aims at ultimately making 
sense of revelation in terms that are (supposed to be) universally accessible (Smith 
2004:35). According to Radical Orthodoxy, there is no neutral universally accessible 
reason or autonomous science that speaks purely. No field of knowledge holds a position 
of privilege that is untouched by theory or uncommitted to belief. 
69 
Too often theology has believed that revelation can be best spoken in terms of a 
universally accepted language, like Newtonian physics, Cartesian foundationalism, 
Kantian critical philosophy, Marxist social theory, Freudian psychology, or 
Wittgensteinian lingustics, as seen in liberal, post-liberal and fundamentalist theologies 
that have uncritically accepted such frameworks (2004:148-150). The results have been 
bifurcations such as reason and revelation, secular and sacred, fact and value, and science 
and faith. 
Radical Orthodoxy attributes these bifurcations and correlations to the creation of 
modern secularity. Milbank's Theology and Social Theory demythologizes the 
metanarrative of scientism, specifically social science, as it describes Christianity in 
terms of social theory, rather than on its own terms. Christianity has often seen itself 
through such a social correlation. While such a metannarrative has claimed neutrality, 
the fact is that no discourse is uncommitted. Such metannarratives have a genealogy in 
secularism. Secularism is a sphere that has claimed objective reality but in essence 
always assumes a standpoint. 
Milbank says, "Once, there was no secular" under the domain of Christendom 
(Milbank 1993:9). However with the coming of Scholastic nominalism through to the 
Protestant Reformation, and to seventeenth century Augustinianism, Christianity had 
"completely privatized, spiritualized, and transcendentalized the sacred, and concurrently 
reimagined nature, human action and society as a sphere of autonomous, sheerly formal 
power" (Milbank 1993:9). Modern secularity is an illegitimate birth from the womb of 
Christian theology. 
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Smith understands that the secular - "as neutral, objective, and universally 
rational- is a modern invention intended to secure a universal reason that could ground a 
public politics" (Smith 2004:50). In light of the fact that Radical Orthodoxy considers 
modern secularity as a Christian heresy, Radical Orthodoxy traces the modern state as 
well to its secular origins as a simulacrum or false copy of the church, offering an 
alternative soteriology to that of the church, i.e. Hobbes ' Leviathan (Cavanaugh 
1999: 182,186-188). Thus as the Christian faith is a theology embodied and lived out in 
the polis of the church, so secularity is a heretical theology lived out in the polis of the 
modern state. 
Radical Orthodoxy understands all discourses as essentially theological, even 
political ones, and when theology commits idolatry, it syncretizes with secular reason and 
connects knowledge of God with some particular immanent field of 
knowledge - 'ultimate' cosmological causes or . ultimate , psychological 
and subjective needs. Or else it is confined to intimations of a sublimity 
beyond representation, so functioning to confirm negatively the questionable idea 
of an autonomous secular realm, completely transparent to rational understanding. 
(Milbank 1993: 1) 
Secularity in relation to orthodox Christianity is a heresy (1993:3). When secular reason 
speaks metadiscursively, it speaks as a "secular theology" (Smith 2004: 144-147). 
Ultimately, Radical Orthodoxy traces the institution of modern secularity back to Duns 
Scotus and the univocity of being. 
Radical Orthodoxy, the Univocity of Being and Nihilism 
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Radical Orthodox thinker and University of Nottingham Lecturer, Conor 
Cunningham identifies the Western ontological crisis and its descent to nihilism in his 
work Genealogy of Nihilism. In the descent to nihilism, there have been two strands of 
ontology, one that answers every question with an infinite regress of somethings, that is 
ontotheology, and another that does not seek to regress back to a something but a 
nothing, which is construed as something, meontotheology - grounding being in non-
being (Cunningham 2002:xiii). This is Cunningham' s primary critique in his Genealogy 
of Nihilism. Ontotheology grounds all being in prior being. Meontotheology grounds all 
being in nothing. Cunningham says that the first leads to nihilism, and the second is the 
realized logic of nihilism (Cunningham 2002:xiii). 
In his book, he traces the latter, the "nothing as something philosophies" which he 
calls "philosophies of nothing," or meontotheology, from Plotinus to the Medievalists 
(Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham) to the Enlightenment (Spinoza, 
Kant and Hegel) to Existentialism and Postmodernism (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, 
Deleuze and Derrida). These meontotheologies or expressions of univocal non-being 
represent an attempt at hypostasizing nothingness. Cunningham notes that each construal 
contains a dualism of an ontic assertion and a negation, which form a nihilistic monism 
(Cunningham 2002:250). For example: 
Heidegger grounds Being in das nicht; Deleuze, sense in nonsense, thought in 
nonthought; Hegel, the finite in the infinite; Fichte, the I in 
Non-I; Schpenhauer, representation in will; Kant, the phenomenal in 
the noumenal; Spinoza grounds Nature in God, and God in Nature. 
Each of these dualisms collapses into a Monism as each dualism resides within a 
symbiotic unicity ... (Cunningham 2002:236) 
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Cunningham identifies the primary dynamic in these dualistic monisms58 as attempts 
at creation out of nothing, creation ex nihilo (2002:254). Yet what is created is nothing. 
Systems with univocal non-being in their genealogy are ultimately philosophies of death, 
specifically death to differences and particulars, in Cunningham's estimation (2002:254). 
Univocity is non-differentiation from pantheism to nihilism and everything in between. 
Both pantheism and nihilism are systems of non-differentiation. Pantheism says all is 
God. Nihilism says all is nothing. Univocity as an ontological descriptor is ultimately 
unified in voice and results in totalization. Theology, however, finds unity in a primal 
triadic difference from which is suspended a creation of particulars, a differential unity 
made possible and driven by love (2002:264-265). Theology can do what nihilism 
cannot, and that is give space to difference. 
In my opinion, Cunningham, wittingly or unwittingly, employs transcendental types 
of reasoning to this problem of meontotheology (nothing as something). The nihilist 
would give ultimate validity to nothingness, while operating out of a position of 
"something," that is a positing nihilist employ arguments that use language and reason. 
Also, nihilism is always an annihilation of "something." Nihilism presupposes 
something, and thus admits some justification for being. Cunningham notes that nihilism 
seeks to establish nothing as something, and hence again justifies being. It seems that 
nihilism, and all of the modern and postmodern epistemological constructs and c1osed-
systems cannot help but presuppose some ontological structure, even in their own self-
reference. Nothing seems to hold together without an ontological and transcendent vision. 
Along with Cunningham, it is also the common assertion of Radical Orthodox 
theologians that Western philosophy has taken the train of univocal non-being to its 
58 Basically a oneness made of a dichotomy 
73 
nihilistic destination. Radical Orthodox genealogical accounts usually begin with Duns 
Scotus. As mentioned prior, he posited a univocality to being in that being becomes 
something predicated to and thus transcendent to both God and creation, and something 
which they both share. Being becomes a common predicate for God and creation. 
Creation exists as God exists, in the same way. The problem is that, apart from God, 
being has no grounds and thus is rooted in nothing. Scotus' univocity of being is 
ultimately a univocity of non-being. The created world, ultimately a hypostatic 
nothingness, is now an autonomous realm hanging from an ontology of non-being. 
The univocity of being made room for the "creation" of the secular. The world no 
longer participated in God but had its being apart from him. Thus the secular is born, and 
its authority is found in autonomous reason and in the modern state both of which lead to 
the nihilism and ontological violence found in Nietzsche (Cunningham 2002; Milbank 
1993:278-32; Smith 2004:87-103). 
Concerning the univocity of being, in Radical Orthodox genealogical studies there 
is a noticeable break in metaphysics between Aquinas and Scotus and William of 
Ockham. This break marks a major transition in the history of philosophy and initiates an 
epistemological crisis. Radical Orthodoxy locates the origins of nihilism and 
Postmodernism ultimately at this break. Aquinas proposed a philosophical theology of 
analogia entis, which describes more of a "participatory metaphysics" in which creation 
"participates in the being of the Creator" (Smith 2004: 96). In an ontology of 
participation and its corollary analogy of being, creation cannot be uprooted from its 
grounding in the Creator and given any separate status. 
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James K.A. Smith also locates a break with Thomist metaphysics beginning with 
Scotus who "asserts that to be is predicated univocally; that is both the Creator and the 
creature exist in the same way or in the same sense," placing the concept of being higher 
than God and creation and providing a metaphysically grounding for creation apart from 
God, which opens the door to a fully secular realm suspended by nothing (Smith 
2004:97). "A univocal ontology that denies the depth of things, shutting us up in a 
suffocating immanence" ends up resulting in nihilism and the closed hermeneutical 
systems of Postmodernism (Smith 2004: 103). 
A similar case within Radical Orthodoxy can be made against the nominalist 
William of Ockham (1287-1347). Ockham, who disregarded the notion of eternal ideas, 
believed that universals are in name or in terms only, termini concepti (Cunningham 
2002:17-20). There are only particulars or individual things for which the terms signify 
and represent in propositions (Ockham 1990:33 and Copleston 1962 vol. 3:56). 
Universals need not be established to explain particulars, which stand on their own 
without mediation (Ockham's razor). Because being is not a universal, existing and being 
(existence and essence) become synonymous. Being is univocal (Copleston 1962 vol 
3:78). It is predicable to both God and creation. Creation then has its own reference in 
being which is in its own particulars. Thus like the Radical Orthodox Scotus, the Radical 
Orthodox Ockham offers a secular world with its own internal grounding apart from God, 
opening the door to nihilism, a groundless world, a nothing purported as a something. 
Scotus and Ockham bifurcate ontology from theology setting the stage for a 
further ontological breakdown that would collapse the detached, univocal being into a 
deflated view of reality that can no longer accommodate for the remaining void without 
reducing and nihilating. The implications of the Radical Orthodox critique of univocal 
being and its impact on the modern period is profound. I will now add their ontological 
critique to my own from the previous chapter concerning modernism. 
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Following the nominalists, the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment 
greatly advanced the implosion of ontology and increased the desperate attempt to place 
the weight of warrant and proof on reason. Of course scientific philosophy as a whole 
would seek to create a unified field theory of knowledge that would explain everything 
by the universe's own internal causes and religion in like fashion would resort to deism. 
In philosophy, Descartes is forced to prove the universe and God visa vis 
proving his own existence through methodological doubt, which would have been foreign 
to Aquinas. With Descartes, being is reduced to a cognitive act, birthing the secular 
foundation of autonomous reason and also creating an unnecessary mind-body dualism 
with priority given to the former, which is no longer contingent on God or universals but 
upon itself. With Spinoza theology is collapsed into ontology by a panentheistic Unity, 
which would provide inspiration to Hegel's absolute Idealism, all attempts by pure reason 
to totalize. 
The ontological breakdown and epistemic inflation ensuing from the separation 
of ontology from theology occurs also in the empirical philosophies of Locke (sense-
based representational knowledge) (Locke 1964:89 and 320), Bishop George Berkeley 
(esse est percipi - to be is to be perceived) (Berkeley 1929: 124-126), and David Hume 
(causality as a cognitive ordering principle that does not exist in the nature of things) 
(Copleston on Hume's Treatise 1963:3:269-271). An empirically based closed-system 
ontology begins to implode on itself as it attempts to totalize through subjective modes of 
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apprehension - representational ideas, perception, and cognition. The more being deflates 
the more the ratio-empirical structures inflate or are given importance. 
For Descartes, being is reduced to thinking. With British Empiricists, reality is 
reduced to impressions or perceptual based ideas. Disconnected from a metaphysical 
backing in God, Locke 's understanding of reality as sense-based ideas has no way of 
offering assurance that it is delivering what it claims by representation. In the end, he 
resorted to a fideistic explanation that God would not create a world that is not the way 
that it appears (Gilles 1987: 129). 
For George Berkeley (1685-1753) things exist only as they are perceived. He goes 
further than Locke. Ideas are not representative of reality but are reality. Like Berkeley, 
David Hume (1711-1776) felt that our perceptions of the world are reality, and these 
perceptions are impressions that become ideas, including causality. Ultimately, "there is 
neither matter nor mind in the universe; nothing but impressions and ideas" (Copleston 
1963 3:366). 
The skepticism that concluded British empirical philosophy was taken to its 
logical conclusion with Kant. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) somewhat synthesized his 
predecessor movements by uniting the innate ideas of Rationalism with the sense formed 
ideas of Empiricism. Knowledge becomes a product of the wedding of sense perception 
in experience to pre-existing categories and structures in the mind. However, that which 
is known is the phenomenal world. The noumenal world, the transcendent - the thing in-
itself, is unknowable (Kant 1990:158). 
Copleston, who is not a Radical Orthodox thinker but a Jesuit historian of 
philosophy, posits that "if the thing in-itself is eliminated, it follows that the subject 
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creates the object in its entirety" (Copleston 19633:431). Kant bifurcates the 
transcendental from the empirical, where the former is inaccessible. All we have are 
phenomena that are shaped by the creative intellect via transcendental Ideas which are 
not connected to the objects themselves but the mind. Internal cognition is totally 
disconnected from ontology within a realm of phenomena that intimates the contextual 
construction of knowledge that we have come to see in Postmodernism. It was an 
advance in thinking to identify creativity in scientific knowledge, but such a discovery 
would become too difficult to bear in such heavily hermeneutical based methods as 
Derrida's deconstruction. 
Autonomous reason (the transcendental ego) and morality (categorical 
imperative) are the result of a Kantian collapse of ontology found in his dualism of 
noumena and phenomena. These notions would later influence idealist totalizations in 
thinkers like Fichte and Hegel. These systems would be the last attempts at a totalizing of 
reason before the arrival of Nietzschean nihilism to put all of the theological and 
ontological import back into a univocal being of nothing. As noted earlier in Kierkegaard, 
a totally rational system is not possible, and in fact such tyranny elicits the radical 
backlash of a Nietzsche and his brand of nihilism which would be one of the biggest 
influences in postmodernism. 
Moving to postmodernism, Milbank "treats the writings of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Deleuze, Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida as elaborations of a single nihilistic philosophy" 
that demonstrate an "absolute historicism,,,s9 a nihilistic genealogy which claims an 
objective and positivist account ofits predecessors will to power (Milbank 1993:279-82), 
59 Milbank accuses Nietzsche of "absolute historicism," meaning that Nietzsche thought that only his 
reading of history was the right one. 
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an "ontology of difference," an ontology of opposition or violence stemming from the 
will to power, (Milbank 1993:279), and an "ethical nihilism" as a consequence of an 
ontology of violence (Milbank 1993:278-82). 
For Milbank, postmodernism posits a positivistic metanarrative of nihilism that 
precludes any narrative from claiming outside status as a narrative or ontology of peace, 
like the Christian faith. Yet, due to a selective account of facts within its historical 
genealogy and its pretension to objectivity rather than interpretation, this metanarrative of 
nihilism is more of a myth for Milbank (Milbank 1990:280-281). For Radical Orthodoxy 
nihilism stands as an illegitimate possibility or choice (Cunningham 2002: 169-170). 
According to James K.A. Smith nihilism is the logical consequence of Scotist 
ontology which leads to a closed- system world without divine reference. 
Nihilism is a consequence of the ontological flattening of the cosmos by 
the univocity; in other words, once immanence was unhooked from its 
suspension from transcendence and granted an autonomous self-sufficiency, it 
also enclosed itself within a closed system. We can think of it this way: Nihilism 
is obviously linked to the nihil of nothingness. According to a Christian 
theological understanding, creation in itself is nothing; that is, created things 
depend so radically on God for their existence that "without God, created things 
can only be perceived as nothing since they are, indeed, in themselves nothing." 
With the advent of Scotist ontology, created things were unhooked from their 
participation in God, such that they are now taken to be independent realities. 
(Smith 2004: 102) 
Nietzsche' s nihilistic critical suspicion has been adopted as a hermeneutic by many 
postmodernists. Nihilism has become the DNA of much of Postmodernism' s 
deconstruction, hermeneutical suspicion, and knowledge-power critiques, which see 
difference as violence. 
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Eastern Orthodox theologian and former student of John Milbank, David Bentley 
Hart has some sharp insights into the problem of postmodernism's predilection toward an 
ontology of violence which is in direct opposition to Christianity's ontology of peace: 
A certain current within contemporary philosophy, however, asserts that violence 
Is - simply enough - inescapable; wherever Nietzsche's narrative of the will to 
power has been absorbed into the grammar of philosophical reflection, and given 
rise to a particular practice of critical suspicion, a profound prejudice has taken 
root to the effect that every discourse is reducible to a strategy of power, and 
every rhetorical transaction to an instance of an original violence. From this 
vantage a rhetoric of peace is, by definition, duplicity; subjected to a thorough 
critique, genealogy, or deconstruction, evangelical rhetoric can undoubtedly be 
shown to conceal within itself the most insatiable appetite for control; the gesture 
by which the church offers Christ to the world, and bears witness to God's love 
for creation, is in reality an aggression, the ingratiating embassy of an omnivorous 
empire ... the difference between two narratives: one that finds the grammar of 
violence inscribed upon the foundation stone of every institution and hidden 
within the syntax of every rhetoric, and another that claims within history a way 
of reconciliation has been opened up that leads beyond, and ultimately 
overcomes, all violence. (Hart 2003:2) 
Scotus ' move to a univocity of being detached reality from its participation in the 
transcendent (God) and has given reality it its own shadowy reference, a vapor of what 
was. Nietzsche uncovered the roots of Western thinking, and his followers have grown 
their philosophies from this bed of nihilism, whether it is Derrida' s deconstruction of the 
text based on metaphysical absence and the "differance" played out in the inherent 
absence of meaning, or in Foucault's reduction of knowledge to power games. 
Whether reality is located strictly in the text, the power play, the sign, or in social 
construction, a closed hermeneutical system is created apart from external or transcendent 
reference. Such a closed hermeneutical system seeks to stand on its own without a 
sufficient internal description, explanation, warrant or substantiation for its own claim 
about itself or the ultimate reality to which it claims to reduce. Closed hermeneutical 
systems are liable to reductionism and the fallacy of self reference. Postmodernism' s 
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reductions are characteristic of the breakdown of the univocity of being as it exists in 
reality apart from God, who holds all things together. Being begins to shatter into textual 
or semiotic pieces which mean nothing ultimately apart from God. Almost every 
epistemological reduction of reality takes on ontological proportion and form, claiming 
transcendence, though in actuality being nothing and hanging from nothing, 
meontotheologies to use Cunningham's term. 
Postmodernism' s critique of the Age of Reason holds only when it holds to a God 
who holds all things together. Radical Orthodoxy recognizes this need for the 
transcendent, an ontology of participation. Without the transcendent to suspend60 a 
creational ontology, the ontological structure of univocal being collapses within its own 
self-referenced closed hermeneutical systems into a nihilistic plunge. A heavy charge is 
that the genealogy of nihilism and all of its ancestors and offspring represent a 
philosophy of death, which is not compatible with a narrative of life as expressed in the 
gospels. 
Unfortunately, theologies of correlation are also trapped in this endgame as they 
seek to express scriptural truth in a postmodern world through ontologies that 
nihilistically bottom out under the guise of radical pluralism, relativism, or scientism. Yet 
another problem that is created by the ontology of nihilism is the issue that every 
discourse, regardless of its claims, is a ruse for violence. Violence is the assumption of 
every discourse of difference in a knowledge-power hermeneutic. Violence is an a priori 
to knowledge. In this sense there is no real difference in discourse. The end result is the 
same a, will-to-power. 
60 James K.A. Smith's frequently used metaphor 
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Radical Orthodoxy and an Ontology of Violence 
Nietzsche' s will-to-power analysis of Western metaphysics surely is descriptive 
and warranted at some level, and at best penultimate, but Milbank notes that this analysis 
is proposed as a genealogy claiming absolute historicism (Milbank 1990:280). The 
implications are that it absolutely describes all knowledge claims excluding its own. It 
becomes its own "discourse of universal reason," a new positivism" (Milbank 1990:264). 
Within the nihilist' s genealogy of knowledge, there is one thought - power is 
knowledge. Everything else is difference, and that "difference is defined as oppositional 
difference, a difference which enters the existing common cultural space to compete, 
displace, or repel" (Milbank 1990:289). In a univocity of non-being, difference cannot be 
understood in any harmonious composition, as in an analogy of being, but has to be 
understood as oppositional. Warfare becomes a universal a priori (Milbank 1990:289).61 
Conflict and violence become primordial categories that describe the actus, human action 
in general , and depict reality. 
Although postmodernism speaks frequently of difference, within a collapsed 
ontology on a flattened monistic plane of immanence, philosophies of difference become 
either philosophies of sameness or philosophies of opposition (Smith 2004: 195). 
Sameness here takes on total and fascist forms, and opposition means warfare within an 
ontology that speaks a non-analogical language. 
Discourses from this perspective are the same in that they all exude violence in 
their difference. Discourses are also all the same in that they are all only interpretation. 
With Nietzsche and Foucault all knowledge is interpretation and not fact, excluding their 
61 Milbank means that if all claims of knowledge are acts of power and violence, then violence or warfare is 
presupposed by post-Nietzscheans in every knowledge claim. 
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own genealogical history (Milbank 1990:281). Milbank grants that will-to-power can be 
one possible interpretation but not the only one (Milbank 1990:281). As we have noted, 
when theology correlates with pure reason and scientism Nietzsche's charge is valid, but 
as we will see later it is not the only possibility for theology. 
Is then Nietzsche ultimately correct about Christianity in itself being a power 
regime? Milbank says that for Nietzsche "every denial of power is a ruse of power" 
(Milbank 1990:286). If that is the case, then Christianity as an absolute denial of power 
through self renunciation and a renunciation of ultimate allegiance to earthly rule must be 
the final ruse of absolute power (Milbank 1990:286). However, Milbank does not grant 
Nietzsche's claim metaphysical status but calls it another mythos (Milbank 1990:279). 
In turn, Milbank offers a counter-ontology, an ontology of peace (Milbank 
1990:279). As will be explored later, an ontology of peace stems from an analogia entis 
which "conceives differences as analogically related, rather than equivocally at variance" 
(Milbank 1990:279). Here, Milbank is employing Scholastic thinking about predication, 
or how to say something about God or about something. Equivocal predication is pure 
difference. With Nietzsche, such difference is oppositional. However, with analogical 
predication difference and similarity work together. Analogy harmonizes likeness and 
difference. For Milbank an ontology of peace or affirmative difference is just as valid as 
an alternative narrative as an ontology of violence (Milbank 1990:289). Since for Radical 
Orthodoxy all claims are theological, an ontology of peace is a more just alternative. 
Analogy provides a more just framework for difference, and a creational ontology of 
peace and goodness reveals the ultimate intentions for the cosmos discursively and 
eschatolo gicall y. 
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In theology proper, we find multiple and differential unity and goodness best 
expressed in the three different hypostases united relation ally in love in the same ousia. 
The Trinity and original creation express a differentiation and particularity that is whole, 
at peace, and good (Hart 2003: 179-183; 250-259). In Christian revelation we do not have 
an original violence that is to be ontologized, creating an eschatology of cosmic death. 
Likewise, Milbank sees Augustine (Civitas Dei/2 as offering a counter-history "which 
reads war as an absolute intrusion, an ontological anomaly" (Milbank 1990:294). 
Such a reading has not always been the story for the church, Orthodox, Catholic, 
and Protestant, as it has divided and excommunicated its fragments into anathema. Also 
such a reading has not always been the story for mission, as a crusade model of 
evangelism has been frequently implemented out of an ontology of violence. Many 
crusaders and conquistadors have executed holy war,jihad, as a political and religious 
solution to difference. People like Las Casas are often the anomaly in mission. In the next 
section, an onto-epistemological solution from the Radical Orthodox critique will be 
presented as a basis for the development of an epistemology for a theology of mission. 
Radical Orthodoxy, Participation, and Analogia Entis 
At this point I will summarize where I have been in my implementation of 
Radical Orthodoxy. In critiquing modern and postmodern thinking, Radical Orthodoxy 
traces the problem with these systems to Scotus' univocity of being. With the univocity 
of being, the created order became a detached and separated order from the Creator, the 
transcendent. Being became an equal predicate for both God and the world. The world 
became its own autonomous reality grounded in being in itself. Radical Orthodoxy 
62 Latin for "City of God" 
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understands this autonomy as the making of the secular. With the univocity of being and 
the making of the secular, the ontological structure of reality, which was once suspended 
from the transcendent, is now collapsing on itself. 
As the world is unhooked from the transcendent and being is given univocal 
status, being no longer is suspended from God. Being is grounded in nothingness, a 
univocity of non-being. We have a deflated immanent ontology which now relies on pure 
epistemic structures for meaning and certainty. These epistemic structures in a closed 
univocal ontology become closed systems themselves. Taking on ontological roles, these 
epistemic structures become reductionistic in their attempt to totalize. Also stemming 
from a univocity of non-being, they are nihilistic in nature. Finally, being nihilistic in 
nature they operate out of an a priori of violence, in which all knowledge is forged to 
eliminate opposition. 
The Christian revelation seeks to offer a counter-ontology, an ontology of peace. 
The harmonious differentiated structure of the Trinity and creation, whose motion is 
relationality in unity, provides a model and a basis for difference which is non-violent 
and analogical. Radical Orthodoxy describes its counter-ontology as an ontology of 
participation (methexis) (Milbank, Pick stock, and Ward 1999:3-4). With methexis, 
creation assumes no autonomous order of its own but is suspended from the transcendent, 
and the nature of the relationship of being is analogical. The univocity of being becomes 
an analogy of being which understands difference in non-violent terms. Also the nihilistic 
vortex that collapses a detached ontology is replaced in an ontology of participation in 
God by an eschatological hope of pleroma, fulfillment or fullness, as the cosmos fulfills 
its telos in the divine Logos. Hence, epistemology is then reconnected to ontology 
through the analogical-participatory logos structure of the cosmos. 
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Radical Orthodoxy recovers this creational ontology by evoking Plato. Radical 
Orthodoxy frequently calls upon classical sources and remixes them in a new context. 
Catherine Pickstock' s After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy 
takes an alternative look at Plato, especially in the Phaedrus. While Plato is often seen as 
a dualist, Pickstock ' s claim is that "Plato does not wish to drive a wedge between form 
and appearance, the strongly positive view of methexis (participation) in the Phaedrus 
frees him from the charge of otherworldliness and total withdrawal from physicality" 
(Pickstock 1998: 14). Her reading of Plato detects a celebration of physicality in its 
suspension from the transcendence. 
In Pickstock' s After Writing, Plato is seen as a theurgical philosopher in the 
Neoplatonic light of Iamblichus and Proclus. In Pickstock' s estimation, Plato values the 
body, beauty and materiality, as opposed to a dualist as he is often interpreted as in 
Phaedo (Pickstock 1998:12 and Smith 2004:104-105), Theurgy, which literally means 
"divine-working," often is used to describe the NeoPlatonic rituals and operations 
whereby the soul ascends various emanations to reach the transcendent God. Pickstock is 
using theurgy in a general sense in that there is a participatory connection between God 
and creation, thus bringing value to creation as opposed to disregard. Pickstock' s Plato 
as theurgical philosopher becomes a philosopher of embodiment valuing materiality in a 
sacramental or liturgical fashion, restoring a doxological, liturgical worldview to 
creation, which had been removed following Scotus (Pickstock 1998:135-157). 
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Where Scotus ' politics, through univocity of being, legitimized spatialization that 
created autonomous and totalitarian regimes, an ontology of participation reconnects the 
polis to the transcendent. A positive valuation of the body in an ontology of suspended 
materiality has an impact on our politics and our social construction of reality that 
prohibits a dualistic and reductionistic devaluation of the body (Smith 2004:104). Hence 
a Radical Orthodox ontology of participation claims a creation that is not secular but that 
is sacramental, incarnational, liturgical and doxological, embracing the theological import 
of all things. 
It will later be examined how this positively affects a theology of mission. 
However in anticipation, we look to James Smith who highlights the importance of an 
ontology of participation (Smith 2004: 189-204). First, it respects both materiality and 
transcendence. Extreme views of docetism, Gnosticism, or ex opera operato that rely on 
a false dualism have no place in a true analogical ontology. Since creation participates in 
the transcendent, it is given value. However this embodiment is non-reductive since it is 
suspended from the transcendent. A valuation of the material is not a reduction to 
materialism. Matter is more than itself and finds its reality and significance in the 
immaterial and transcendent. Methexii3 stresses the dependent nature of creation upon 
the Divine (metousia Theoul4 Thus, all of creation is graced nature, revelatory and a gift 
(Smith 2004: 192). 
Second, as mentioned above, an ontology of participation, specifically in the 
Trinity, is an ontology of peace even in difference. Differential ontology or an ontology 
of violence is the consequence of a nihilistic ontology. In an ontology of participation 
63 Greek for "participation" 
64 Greek for "participation in God" 
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difference is not necessarily oppositional within an analogical framework. With both the 
Trinity and creation as models of differential unity such harmony can be an 
eschatological realization in the polis (the church and the world). 
Third, creation is good. It is good because it is incarnational and participates in 
the Divine analogically (Smith 2004:199). This does not mean that creation is 
incarnational in the same way and to the same degree that God was incarnate in Jesus 
Christ. Creation embodies or is an "embodiment" of the creational Word of God and 
reflects the nature of God analogically. Creation is a physical expression of God's 
creative Word. 
Since Incarnation in its various usages is descriptive of creation, Jesus Christ, and 
even theosis or new creation, Incarnation becomes central to the shape of our 
epistemology and our theology. The creative Logos gives life and meaning to all things. 
All of creation is sacramental as God manifests his will in and through it, especially in 
the incarnation of the Logos. Later, it will be observed in Maximus how God fulfills his 
liturgical purpose for the cosmos as a doxological space for theosis. The goodness of 
creation and physicality reaffirmed in the incarnation and resurrection anticipates an 
eschatological hope for an embodied existence in the new creation (Smith 2004:202). 
I have added a fourth benefit to Smith' s list. An ontology of analogical participation 
provides a framework for epistemology which transcends the modern and postmodern 
tendencies towards nihilism, totalization, reduction, and closed-systems, which are all 
characteristic of a univocity of non-being. 
Analogical reasoning avoids the nihilism of univocal reasoning because of its 
relation to being. A univocal ontology seeks greater and greater certainty in its 
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epistemological expression only to find greater reduction and more discursive or textual 
slippage into non-being. Nothing sustains. Eschatologically, an ontology of participation 
does not anticipate a nihilistic collapse into the void, but being purposefully suspended 
from the divine, it finds the pleroma of God in the new creation through the resurrected 
Christ. A full ontology suspended from the transcendent does not find nihilism a 
necessity, but makes a choice to participate in God (metousia Theou) and fulfill God 's 
purpose. 
Also the language of analogy knows no totalization, as it experiences ceaseless 
intervals of likeness and difference. It is an infinite striving or epektasis; 
language, drawn on by the beauty of the Word who is the distance 
containing all the words of creation, traverses the analogical interval 
between God and creation (of which God himself is the distance), between 
creation's proportions and the proportions of peace that belongs to God's infinity; 
and so there can be no end to the progress of language toward God. (Hart 
2003:301) 
David Bentley Hart describes Gregory of Nyssa' s understanding of the analogia entis in 
its infinite expression of both likeness and difference as: 
the actual movement of analogization of our likeness to God within an always 
greater unlikeness is the event of our existence as endless becoming ... 
However even though becoming is thus a kind of crisis, especially for sinful 
creatures, it is more originally peace, birth and life . .. Thus our likeness to God, 
which is all that makes us to be (to share in the Logos' s eternal standing forth, 
in the light of the Spirit, as the likeness of the Father' s being) is, in the difference 
between finite and infinite, always embraced in a greater unlikeness - and this is the 
difference that lets us be ... The doctrine of creation, however, in saying that all things 
live, move, and are in God not because they add to God or can in any way determine 
his essence, but as gracious expressions of the plentitude of his his being, knowledge, 
and love, frees metaphysics from any nihilistic destiny: the maior dissimilitudo of the 
ontological analogy means that the similitudo between God and creatures, rather than 
dwelling in a thing's flawed likeness to some higher essence, distorted in space and 
time, subsists rather in that synthesis of transcendental moments and particular event 
that constitutes each things in its being. Each actuality, in its difference, shows forth 
God's actuality in its fullness . Indeed, the "greater unlikeness" in proportion of the 
analogy means that the "likeness" in the analogy is ever greater the more fully 
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anything is what it is, the more it grows into the measure of its difference, the more 
profoundly it drinks from the transcendent moments that compose it and allows all its 
modes of disclosure to speak of God's infinite goodness. (Hart 2003:243-246) 
In describing the inability to totalize within the analogia entis, David Bentley Hart 
continues that the "Christian narrative fixes analogy' s proportions within an infinite (not 
a total) hierarchy of mediations, which can never become a taxonomic index of the world 
or an economy of epistemic correspondences" (Hart 2003:307). An epektasis of 
analogical transcendence in ecstatic desire is continuously fulfilled but never consumed 
and is left wanting and desiring in the apophasis. The flight is both cataphatic and 
apophatic. Analogy as a proportion always has an 
analogical interval that separates and unites its "objects;" and this is 
its peculiar beauty and elusiveness. A proportion is neither an essence 
nor a negation; analogy is that form of discourse that is apophatic and 
cataphatic at once. .. (Hart 2003: 306) 
Analogical reasoning not only does not totalize, but it also does not reduce. Its 
apophatic dimension of unknowing will not permit reductionism. The analogical interval 
or diastema of likeness and difference allows for cataphatic and apophatic dimensions of 
knowing.65 Thus no discourse is ever complete. God himself, who is beyond the infinite 
of the created order, is the boundary. Hart again complements the balance of apophasis 
and cataphasis: 
Analogy saves apophasis from assuming the form of a mere systematic 
privation of attributes, a mystical ascent toward annihilation in the divine 
silence, and saves cataphasis from becoming an absolute pronouncement 
65 Cataphatic and apophatic knowledge of God is a designation commonly found among Eastern Orthodox 
theologians. In simple terms, cataphatic knowledge is that which can be known and stated about God. 
Apophatic knowledge, or negative theology, is what cannot be known or is unknown about God. Often in 
Eastern Orthodoxy God is defined by what God is not. Gregory Palamas made the distinction between 
God's essence and his energies. We know God through God 's energies, God 's working in human history. 
God's essence, or often called God's hyper or super essence, is how God knows God' s self. God 's 
hyperessence remains apophatic. It is a mystery. Apophasis is also a safeguard against reducing God and 
even theology to what only human reason can grasp and express. 
that attempts to reduce God to a principle or object; analogy is that lambent 
interval between the two dreamt-of poles of totalizing metaphysics. (Hart 
2003:310-311) 
An analogical epistemology stemming from an ontology of participation in the 
Logos is also not a closed system but open-ended in two ways. It is open-ended 
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ontologically because there is an utter and infinite dependence on the eternal God. God is 
the boundary. It is open-ended in infinite signification and analogical expression of both 
God and creation. 
As for the mode of knowledge apprehension in participation, since there are no 
secular or autonomous domains in an ontology of analogical participation, faith and 
reason are not bifurcated. All of creation is graced and revelational. In the Radical 
Orthodox remix of Aquinas, Milbank and Pickstock note that "reason and faith in 
Aquinas represent only different degrees of intensity of participation in the divine light of 
illumination and different measures of absolute vision" (Milbank and Pickstock 
2001:xiii). 
Fides et ratio66 in Milbank and Pickstock' s Aquinas are not mutually exclusive 
but "faith involves an intensification of participation in divine intellectual intuition" 
(2001 :23). Reason and faith are "construed by Aquinas as successive phases of a single 
extension always qualitatively the same" (2001 :24). Thus an onto-epistemology of 
participation is compatible with a faith that seeks to understand (fides quarenes 
intellectum) a universe that purposefully participates in God in a way that is understood 
and expressed through the semiotics of analogies (Holcomb 2005:248; Hart 2003:307). 
Similarly, contemporary types of critical realism seek to depict the truth about 
reality in terms of analogies, models, metaphors and maps, as we noted earlier in our 
66 Latin for "faith and reason." 
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discussion about Paul Hiebert. Much of these sorts of discourses revolve around the 
nature of truth and theories of truth. Critical realism recognizes the symbolic nature of 
truth specifically in models. Critical realism, as well as other recent epistemologies, seeks 
to distance themselves from modem correspondence67 theories of truth within naive 
realism. Milbank and Pickstock recognize that "modem theories of correspondence are 
grounded in epistemology rather than ontology" and thus their failure (Milbank and 
Pickstock 2001 :5). 
Both modem and postmodern ontologies have frequently been collapsed and 
flattened into epistemic systems which have had to take the transcendent role left behind 
by ontology but which can never transcend their own self reference. Thus 
epistemological attempts to correspond textual or discursive reality to anything external 
have been futile. Radical Orthodoxy revisits and remixes Aquinas to "show that the 
notion of truth as correspondence is in crisis only because it is taken in an 
epistemological rather than ontological sense (2001 :xiii). 
Aquinas' theory of truth is correspondent only in the sense that it "depends 
entirely upon the metaphysical notion of participation in the divine Being" (2001 :4). 
Truth has to do with analogization and participation in the Logos. Thus "to be in the truth 
is 'to correspond' to God in whom we participate" (2001:4). For Aquinas correspondence 
(adequatio; adequation) is relational, as it joins being and knowing. It is not a passive and 
objective mirroring of the external world in epistemic terms, but it is an "event which 
realizes or fulfills the being of things known, just as much as it fulfills truth in the 
knower' s mind" (2001:5). 
67 The correspondence theory of truth is basically that a certain belief is true if it mirrors or "corresponds" 
to the facts or reality. 
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In this sense, truth is a mode of existence and is convertible with being (2001: 6). 
Truth is not tested by the exact relatedness of a perception, idea, or sign to the thing itself. 
Milbank and Pickstock understand truth according to Aquinas as neither epistemological 
nor analytical (propositional) but that it is convertible with being, a mode of existence 
that corresponds to its telos in God (2001:9). In other words truth is not reduced to a 
modernist notion of correspondence to empirical data and rational constructs. As opposed 
to being subsumed within strict epistemological categories, truth primarily belongs to 
existential and ontological categories and then to epistemological ones. Truth relates to 
things as they participate in God. Truth is ontological and teleological in its analogization 
in that "the truth of a thing is taken as that thing fulfilling the way it ought to be" 
(2001:5). In other words, "a thing is fulfilling its telos when it is copying God in its own 
manner, and tending to existence as knowledge in the divine Mind" (2001 :9). Truth is 
first in the mind of God and second as things copy the mind of God in analogical 
proportion (2001: 10). 
This truth is primarily related to the divine and then secondarily related to things 
and then our knowledge of them. Unlike modem construals of truth, Aquinas ' 
understanding of truth is theological, relational, analogical, ontological, teleological and 
thus eschatological. Truth is a function of metousia Theou, and thus ultimately 
Christological, for Christ is true in his embodiment of the life of the Trinity. Truth is 
Christological and has a Christological mode of correspondence for us through our 
imitation of Christ as we participate in him (2001:2). As Milbank and Pickstock put it 
analogia entis becomes analogia Christi (2001 :61). Things are true as they participate in 
God and specifically as they participate in the incarnate Logos. 
Later it will be explored in Maximus and Wesley how this analogical metousia 
Theou becomes not only an epistemological framework but also a soteriological and 
missiological one as well. The analogia entis is a participation of the logoi of created 
things in the Logos with ultimate participation in the incarnate Logos (Hart 
2003:303,305). Metousia Theou in Christ is to bring humanity into theosis and to 
transform the entire cosmos. This is the mission of God. 
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immanent and often reductive. 
Key to the Graph 
1. Scientific Realism - It states that the world described by science is real. 
Ontologically, it holds to an external, objective world that can be known 
mathematically and experientially through the senses and technology. Scientific 
realism has a high view of reason similar to modernism. Often adhered to by 
foundationalists. E.g. Jarrett Leplin, Richard Boyd, and Philip Gasper 
(philosophers of science) 
2. Theological Fundamentalism - holds to a literalist view of scripture and 
interpretation, and a rational foundationalist view of reality and knowledge. 
Ontologically, fundamentalists acknowledge a transcendent God and a real, 
external creation. E.g. B.B. Warfield, J. Gresham Machen, John McArthur, Bob 
Jones University. 
95 
3. Theological Liberalism - does not hold to a literalist view of scripture and 
interpretation. Like a positivistic science, it only holds on to that which can 
sustain historical, cultural, and scientific critique. Theological liberalism is more 
apt to have an immanent view of God, rather than a transcendent one. Yet it holds 
to a real, external world in the way that modernism does. E.g. Union Theological 
Seminary, Harry Emerson Fosdick, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, John Shelby 
Spong, the Jesus Seminar. 
4. Critical Realism - Critical realism holds to a real, external world that is 
apprehended critically and contextually. Knowledge is contextual. Claims are 
made from a socio-cultural context, as well as from a hermeneutical community. 
Also knowledge is qualified. Knowledge involves a fiduciary commitment. 
Critical realism is an epistemology that is prominent in both science and theology. 
E.g Michael Polanyi, John Polkinghorne, Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, Alistair 
McGrath, N.T. Wright, Roy Bhaskar. 
5. Evangelicalism - Often difficult to define, evangelicalism, according to one 
formula, usually holds to biblicism (authority of scripture), crucicentrism (faith 
exclusively in Christ and his death and resurrection), conversionism (the call to 
born-again salvation), and activism (the mission of evangelism and 
transformation). Evangelicalism believes in a transcendent God and a real, 
external creation. Some evangelicals hold to a moderate view of reason that tends 
more towards critical realism and even postmodernism than would 
fundamentalism. E.g. Fuller Theological Seminary, Trinity Evangelical Divinity 
School, D.A. Carson, J.I. Packer, Millard Erickson, John Stott, and post-
conservatives like Roger Olson and Clark Pinnock. 
6. Post-Secular Ressourcement - The pronouncements of postmodernism have 
helped to usher in a post-secularity in which the modern wall separating fact and 
value and reason and religion have been torn down, and doors have been opened 
up to religion and spirituality. There have been attempts to reclaim a Christian or 
theological vision for the whole of reality. Also, there has been a return to 
"classical" or "consensual" Christianity to reclaim an authentic and orthodox faith 
and vision amidst postmodern pluralism. It is often conservative in theology but 
goes beyond the epistemological questions of foundationalism or modernist 
inerrancy. It presents an ancient-future cosmic vision of the faith according to 
Scripture as lived out in the early tradition of the church. It is a return to the 
transcendence and mystery of God, the doxo-liturgical, the tradition of the church, 
and the ancient consensus of faith and practice. It comprises a diverse group, e.g. 
Hans Urs Von Balthasar, this author, David Bentley Hart, some tendencies within 
Radical Orthodoxy, Thomas Oden, Richard Foster, Thomas Torrance, Alasdair 
Macintyre, John Zizioulas, and Robert Webber. 
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7. Neo-Pragmatism - A diverse camp of thinkers following the pragmatism of 
William James, John Dewey and at times Charles Peirce. Usually they are non-
foundationalists, and hold to some form of instrumentalism in science and 
naturalism in epistemology. W.E. Quine. Hilary Putnam, Donald Davidson, Susan 
Haack (neo-classical pragmatism). 
8. Socio-Political Pragmatism - It is difficult to find a category for these two 
unique thinkers, Jurgen Habermas and Richard Rorty. It seems even more 
difficult to put them together, but I have. They are both pragmatists and non-
foundational. They both seem to focus their work towards the transformation of 
the socio-political realm. They also both seek to use communication or 
communicative rationality to arrive at a more just and progressive society. The 
difference is that Jurgen Habermas, a neo-Marxist originally from the Frankfurt 
school, tends more towards revisiting modern values and institutions and 
rebuilding them around rational-critical communication. Richard Rorty, on the 
other hand a proponent of liberal democracy, tends more towards postmodernism 
in his dismissal of analytic philosophy and any sort of foundationalism or 
modernist notion of knowledge. Rorty considers himself a pragmatist in the vein 
of John Dewey. 
9. Post-Liberalism - Seeking to replace the cognitive-propositional and 
experiential-expressive models of religion, George Lindbeck, Hans Frei, and 
others from the "Yale school," offer a cultural-linguistic model influenced by the 
work of Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan, Neo-Orthodoxy, Wittgenstein and 
sociology of knowledge and religion. Post-Liberalism rejects foundationalism and 
is more of a bottom-up framework then a top-down ontological framework. Other 
post-liberals whose theologies somewhat reflect the Yale tradition are Stanley 
Hauerwas, R.R. Reno, David Ford, James William McClendon Jr., William 
Willimon, and William Placher. 
10. Radical Orthodoxy - Radical Orthodoxy is a movement that responds to both 
modernism and postmodernism, as it seeks to place theology and revelation at the 
center of academic study. It holds to a transcendent view of God and more of a 
postmodern view of reason. E.g. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham 
Ward. 
11. Postmodernism, specifically semiosis, textualism, and hermeneutics. 
Postmodernism is a diverse and ambiguous movement crossing many disciplines. 
Ontologically, it often locates ultimate reality in language, i.e. the sign, the text, 
or hermeneutics. In terms of epistemology, it is anti-foundational. E.g. Jacques 
Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard, Jean Lyotard, and Gilles Deleuze. 
12. Emerging Church - The Emerging Church is a movement that is heavily 
influenced by postmodernism. It is often "post" everything, i.e. post-conservative, 
post -evangelical and runs countercurrent to fundamentalism, evangelicalism and 
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liberalism, as it seeks to express the gospel in postmodern terms, i.e. narrative. It 
uses both ancient (candles, prayer labyrinths) and future forms (multi-media). It 
seeks to be non-dogmatic and prefers to express faith in community, conversation, 
and social action. In the diagram above, it is closer to postdmodernism than it is to 
most other forms of Christianity. E.g. Brian McClaren, Dan Kimball, and Stanley 
Grenz. I did not place post-conservatism (evangelical left) on this graph, but it 
shares some characteristics with the Emerging Church movement. Though I 
would place it to the left of the Emerging Church. E.g. Roger Olson. 
Chapter 3 
Participation in the Logos (Metousia Logo) in the Theology 
of S1. Maximus the Confessor 
1 John 1:1 We declare to you what was from the beginning, what we have 
heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched 
with our hands, concerning the Word of life 
In James Smith's essay "Will the Real Plato Please Stand Up? Participation 
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versus Incarnation," he challenges Pickstock's and Radical Orthodoxy's version of Plato 
as a sacramental philosopher. He agrees with Pickstock' s reading of several passages 
within the Phaedrus but has doubt as to whether such a theurgical reading can be carried 
out through the entire corpus of Plato. Within the corpus, Smith cites references that 
exemplify the more traditional reading of Plato as dualist (Smith 2005:71). Smith's 
critique questions the whole project of remixing Plato into a "Christian" ontology of 
participation. Smith suggests employing more "Christian" metaphors such as incarnation 
or covenant rather than Platonic participation. 
I agree with responses from John Milbank and Justin Holcomb that participation 
does not exclude ideas like covenant as if one had to pick and choose between two 
mutually exclusive ideas (Smith and Olthuis 2005:30,244). Radical Orthodoxy claims a 
philosophy of participation and a theology of incarnation (Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward 
1999:3). Although the creation accounts in Genesis chapter one and John chapter one and 
the en Christo ontology in Paul do not use the particular word "participation," or 
koinonos, the idea and dynamic is clearly there. In responding to Smith's critique, I will 
turn to an ancient theologian-monk named Maximus the Confessor (580-662). Maximus 
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could be the link between the Platonic or Neoplatonic concept of participation as 
methexis and participation within Christian revelation, the incarnate Logos. 
Life of Maximus the Confessor 
Maximus was born in Constantinople in AD 580 during a time of dramatic 
transition. Early Christianity was shifting to what would be its medieval period. The 
Western Roman Empire was falling, and the Eastern Byzantine Empire was peaking, 
while Islam in the background was soon to be on the rise. Most of the Christological 
heresies had been settled by this time except for the Monothelite controversy,68 which 
would eventually find Maximus in the middle. 
Much of Maximus' life originally comes to us from the Greek Life of St. Maximus 
which was composed by the Studite monk Michael Exaboulites in the tenth century 
(Louth 1996:4 and 6). A Syriac version of the Life, which gives some conflicting 
accounts, was discovered this past century. Maximus came from a noble family and 
received a classical education (Louth 1996:4) (Sherwood 1955:6). His studies in 
philosophy were primarily based in Plato and Aristotle along with various commentators 
including Neoplatonists like Iamblichus and Proclus (Sherwood 1955:6). Following his 
education, Maximus was appointed first secretary to the Emperor Heraclius. Later, 
Maximus left his post and became a monk at Chrysopolis across from Constantinople. 
After ten or eleven years, Maximus moved to the monastery of St. George at 
Cyzicus (around 624-625), where he composed his earliest writings, including the 
Ambigua, The Ascetic Life, and Centuries on Love (Louth 1996:5). In 626 
Constantinople was seized by the Persians, and Maximus fled to Carthage in North Africa 
68 The controversy centering around the debate whether Christ had two wills (divine and human) or one 
will. 
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(630) with stopovers in Cyprus and Crete. While in North Africa, Maximus was under 
the mentors hip of Sophronius, the head of the monastery called Eucratas and who was 
later patriarch of Jerusalem (Sherwood 1955:10-11). In his first years in Africa, Maximus 
wrote the larger Amhigua and his Questions to Thalassius (Sherwood 1955: 11). 
It was at Carthage in 645 that Maximus publicly debated and defeated the 
Monothelite ex-patriarch Pyrrhus, who, following the debate, accepted orthodoxy (Louth 
1996: 16). This debate inspired a constituency of African bishops along with the 
Byzantine ex arch Gregory to seek a bid for African independence from Constantinople, 
which failed (Blowers and Wilken 2003: 15). Maximus participated in the Lateran 
Council (649) in Rome and allied himself with the papacy and the African bishops, 
concerning the Monothelite controversy. 
When he returned to Constantinople, Maximus and Pope Martin I were arrested 
by imperial forces as enemies of the state (Blowers and Wilken 2003: 15). Prior to this 
event, in 638, the imperial edict, the Ecthesis, which adopted the doctrine of 
Monothelitism and later the Typos which forbade further debate on the issue, set the 
Patriarchs of Constantinople and the Emperors Heraclius and Constans against the 
papacy and other sympathizers (Louth 1996:15-17). 
Maximus was put on trial in 655 and was later exiled. His right hand was cut off 
and his tongue was cut out. Maximus died on August 13th 662 at Lazica off the southeast 
coast of the Black Sea (Louth 1996: 18). 
Theological Influences of Maximus 
Earlier I stated that James Smith made a claim that Radical Orthodoxy's Plato is 
really Neoplatonism. I will not debate this claim either way in this research, but assuming 
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that it is I will seek to locate the concept of participation in a more "Christian" source, 
i.e., Maximus. Maximus is useful in this research because he modifies the Neoplatonic 
and early Christian understanding of participation along incarnationallines and employs 
it onto-epistemologically in his cosmic theology. 
In addressing the problem posed by Smith concerning the Radical Orthodox 
identification of Plato as a "sacramental" philosopher and its adoption of Plato as a 
proponent of participation, it is important that we identify the connection between 
Neoplatonism and Maximus, on the one hand, and between Origen and Pseudo-
Dionysius, who mediated the Neoplatonic tradition to Maximus. Smith questions Radical 
Orthodoxy' s interpretation of Plato, and the appropriateness of applying a Platonic 
concept to a Christian ontology. Smith attributes the Radical Orthodox Plato to 
Neoplatonism rather than to the actual corpus of Plato ' s writing. If that be the case, 
Maximus the Confessor of orthodoxy may stand as a corrective to the Neoplatonic 
elements inherited by Origen (ca. 185- ca. 254 A.D.) and Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagite (an anonymous theologian of the 5th century). 
Maximus was a receptor of tradition, but he did not receive it uncritically. In 
many cases he rejected aspects of it, for example, in his reading of Origen. In other cases 
he synthesized elements from many sources including Alexandrian Christology, the 
Cappadocians, and Neoplatonism via Pseudo-Dionysius. Maximus was fundamentally a 
champion of orthodoxy locating the heart of his theology in the Incarnation and basing it 
in firm Chalcedonian logic. He critically analyzed and received tradition upon these 
bases. His correction of Origen, specifically his cosmology, and his correction of Pseudo-
Dionysius and his vision of cosmic emanations and hierarchies fall in line with this 
thinking (Louth 1996:66-68; Balthasar 2003:115-136). Let us briefly look at the 
traditions critiqued and adopted by Maximus. 
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Andrew Louth identifies three traditions found in Maximus ' theology, the ascetic, 
the dogmatic and the cosmic traditions (Louth 1996:23-32). As a monk, Maximus traced 
his lineage back to John the Baptist, the prophets Elijah and Elisha and even further back 
to Moses and the Patriarchs who often wandered in the desert as they followed God. Near 
his own time, Maximus was influenced by the spiritual life of Evagrius, a monk from the 
4th century who dwelt in the Egyptian desert. Evagrius interpreted the Christian life 
through Clement of Alexandria and Origen. Origenism was condemned by the Emperor 
Justinian (543) and again at the fifth Ecumenical Council (553). Origen's thinking still 
had its influence in monastic circles as the metaphysical background for the ascetical 
wisdom of Evagrius (Louth 1996:24). 
Maximus critically incorporated Evagrius' ascetical wisdom while removing the 
Origenist metaphysical elements with its myth of the cosmic fall and reversing Origen' s 
cosmic triad of stasis, kinesis, and genesis to genesis, kinesis, and stasis. 69 Maximus' 
correction of much of Origenism, specifically the nature of his cosmic vision, ended up as 
a correction of Neoplatonism. Louth (1996:67) and Von Balthsar (2003:127-131) both 
make the case for Maximus' correction of Origenism. Along with Evagrius, Maximus 
was also influenced by the ascetic traditions in the Macarian Homilies and in the writings 
of the Carthaginian bishop Diadochus, who represents a synthesis of Evagrius' analysis 
69 Stasis, kinesis, and genesis are Greek words for "steady state," "movement," and "beginning." 
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of human nature and apatheia70 and the Macarian focus on the experience of 
sanctification (Louth 1996:26). 
From the dogmatic tradition, Maximus inherited his Christology from the 
Alexandrians, Athanasius and Cyril, and the Cappadocians. As a defender of orthodoxy, 
Maximus fought against the prevailing Monothelitism of his day. He did so out of the 
Christological tradition that he adopted from Cyrilline Chalcedonianism (Louth 1996:28). 
Gregory of Nazianzus provided Maximus with the ontological framework and language 
to work out his own understanding of perichoretic dynamics within the logic of 
Chalcedon (Thunberg 1995:26 and Louth 1996:27). 
Even though Gregory of Nyssa' s speculative metaphysics and cosmic 
anthropology attracted Maximus (Louth 1996:27), he also critically examined the 
Cappadocians dogmatic tradition. Maximus' Amhigua71 look at the writings of Gregory 
of Nazianzus, dealing with problematic passages that were interpreted by Origenists in 
monastic circles as supporting Origenism (Blowers and Wilken 2003:22). Maximus' 
Amhigua serve as a clarification to the reader of Gregory's work by bringing orthodox 
interpretations to Gregory' s more difficult passages. 
The third influence is the tradition of cosmic theology which came to Maximus 
through the writings attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite which where transmitted 
through the editing of John of Scythopolis. It was through Pseudo-Dionysius that many of 
the concepts and language of Neoplatonism were introduced and developed in Byzantine 
theology, including the apophatic and cataphatic dichotomy in theology (Louth 1996:29-
70 Greek for "without feeling" and is used in ascetic traditions to refer to denying oneself to the point where 
one is indifferent to the passions of the flesh . 
71 Greek for "ambiguities" or "difficulties" in terms of Maximus' handling of difficult passages from the 
writings of Gregory of Nazianzus. 
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30). Pseudo-Dionysius ' cosmic hierarchy is a vision that depicts the glory of God 
descending to the whole created order and returning back to him in liturgical praise. This 
vision echoes the theurgy of Neoplatonism (Iamblichus and Proclus) and offers the 
cosmic framework for Maximus ' theology (Louth 1996:30-31 and Luibheid 1987: 145). 
However as mentioned prior, Maximus often provides a corrective to certain 
Neoplatonic elements in the traditions he receives. In this case, Maximus alters the 
ontological status of Platonic "ideas" in Pseudo-Dionysius' cosmic, scheme. Pseudo-
Dionysius works the Neoplatonic emanations from the One into "principles of being and 
life" and then into a "graduated hierarchy of personal beings" (Balthasar 2003: 115). John 
Scythopolis, the primary editor of the Areopagite's corpus, identifies these principles and 
hierarchy of beings as "ideas" or "God's thoughts" (Balthasar 2003: 115). Balthasar notes 
that in doing this John is identifying these ideas ontologically with God's essence, Being 
itself (Balthasar 2003: 115). 
In the process of adapting Pseudo-Dionysius and his somewhat Neoplatonic brand 
of participation in God into a more Christian scheme, Maximus corrects this sort of 
emanationism that identifies the general principles of created being with the ideas of God 
which are identified as God's essence. Maximus did not want to identify the general 
principles of created being with God's ideas. Instead, Maximus understood these general 
principles not in a Platonic sense of ideas but more in an Aristotelian sense of universals 
which he held in tension with particular being (Balthasar 2003: 116). Maximus still held 
to a view of ideas (logo i), but they were not created universals or even God's essence but 
God's "energies" expressing his will and plan for the cosmos. 
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Maximus would develop his doctrine of participation around the logoi in the 
Logos according to God's plan of cosmic theosis.72 As opposed to Pseudo-Dionysius, 
Maximus did not understand the general principles of participation in terms of basic 
principles within created being but in terms of a supernatural participation in the 
redemption offered by God through grace (Balthasar 2003: 124). Balthasar recognizes that 
"Maximus happily transposes the Platonic notion of participation, which Pseudo-
Dionysius applied to created being as such, to the sphere of the supernatural - of grace" 
(Balthasar 2003:124). 
This shift from a Platonic notion of participation to a Christian Logos notion of 
participation is anticipated in earlier Christian tradition. Thunberg in his bibliographic 
notes traces the Logos doctrine in the Stoic logos spermatikos,73 Philo, Origen, 
Athanasius, Pseudo-Dionysisus and Evagrius and finally Maximus (Thunberg 1995:73). 
Maximus incorporates Alexandrian constructs of the Logos as the locus of the divine 
ideas and ultimately the unitary divine Idea that unfolds in the world and brings the world 
back to its original Idea in God (Balthasar 2003: 117). For Thunberg, Maximus develops 
the doctrine in a more "deeper" and "systematic" way as the incarnate Logos takes center 
stage in his whole theological vision (1995:73-74). 
According to Balthasar, Maximus "represents the Incarnation of the Logos and 
the whole historical course of the world's salvation as both a primeval idea of God and as 
the underlying structure of his overall plan for the world and that he designates the 
mystery of the Cross, grave and Resurrection (of Christ) as the basis and goal of all 
72 Maximus believed it was the plan of God through the Incarnation of Jesus Christ to transform the whole 
cosmic order into the image of Christ. 
73 Greek for the "seed of the word," "seed of reason," or "seminal reason" that is shared by everything in 
the universe. 
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creation" (Balthasar 2003: 120). Thus the cosmic theologies of Origen and Pseudo-
Dionysius are critiqued and transformed into a cosmic liturgy where all of creation moves 
according to its own logoi and finds its purpose and destiny in the incarnate Logos in an 
ascent to theosis. In the case of humanity that purpose is fulfilled by the grace of God in 
the soul that chooses freely (gnomic will) such grace. 
Participation and the Theology of the Logoi 
James Smith was concerned about the Radical Orthodox evaluation of Plato as a 
sacramental philosopher, one that values materiality. Smith felt that Pickstock's version 
of Plato was derived more from a Neoplatonic interpretation. Also Smith was concerned 
about the movement' s employment of a Neoplatonic form of participation. Without 
challenging Smith's claims one way or another, this writer sought another locus for the 
doctrine of participation beyond its alleged Neoplatonic form. 
Although early patristic theology could never transcend the contextual structure 
of its own time and its ideas (can any period?), Maximus brought Christological meaning 
to reworked Neoplatonic forms, where the reigning ideas were purged and/or reshaped by 
Christian revelation. Maximus the Confessor purged the traditions he received of 
unnecessary Neoplatonism and other error as they diverged from orthodoxy (Balthasar 
2003 :60-61). Smith has a fundamental concern that an ontology of participation based on 
Plato may not affirm materiality and the goodness of creation in the way that the 
Christian faith should. However, Von Balthasar champions Maximus as "the most world-
affirming thinker of all the Greek Fathers; in his basically positive attitude toward nature 
he goes even beyond Gregory of Nyssa" (Balthasar 2003 :61). Maximus ' notion of 
participation as an ontological structure is given specific meaning in his doctrine of the 
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Logos and the logoi. For all created being participates in the divine through its logoi 
which are grounded in Christ the incarnate Logos. Maximus' ontology of participation is 
a metousia Logo, which is centered on the Incarnation. 
At this point, we will go into further detail concerning the doctrine of the logoi 
and its relationship with participation. From von Balthasar, we learn that the logoi are not 
universals within the created order nor are they the essence of God. Maximus will not 
allow for Neoplatonic emanationism or pantheism. Eastern Orthodox theologian Vladimir 
Lossky (1903-1958) identified the logoi in Maximus' work as "divine willings," "the 
creative ideas of things" (Lossky 1998:98). The logoi are God's pre-existent ideas 
concerning all created being. As God's ideas or divine principles, the logoi pre-exist in 
God as his will, plans and providence and are expressed best as his energies or workings 
rather than his essence, noting later the Pal amite distinction between the two. Gregory 
Palamas (1296-1359) made dogmatic what had been taught in the Eastern Church for 
some time that God's energies are what can be known about God as opposed to his 
essence which is apophatic. 
Patristic scholar Andrew Louth defines the logoi in Maximus as the principles that 
lie behind the natural created order as established by the Word of God, the Logos (Louth 
1996:37). Blowers and Wilken define the logoi in Maximus as "the providential 
principles of creation and Scripture" (Blowers and Wilkens 2003: 17). The logoi are 
ultimately rooted in Christ the Logos in that the logoi of creation and the logoi of 
scripture are in a sense "incarnations" of the Logos and point to Jesus Christ, who is the 
full and true Incarnation of the Logos (2003:21). The Logos is the Divine Mediator 
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through creation, scripture and the Incarnation, and the created order participates in God 
through this mediation (2003:21). 
God's ultimate purpose in the mediation of the Logos is to deify creation through 
the Incarnation. This is a universal and rational principle of created being within the logoi 
of creation (2003:23). The logoi serve as the raison d' etre for things as they exist in the 
Logos. Blowers and Wilken continue that "all created things are defined, in their essence 
and in their way of developing, by their own logoi and by the logoi of the beings that 
provide their external context" (2003:57). As well, all created things are purposed to 
move according to their own logoi, their divine purpose, towards each created being's 
own end (telos) (Maximus 2003: 92). Thus the logoi of creation express God's will for 
cosmic deification through the incarnate Logos. 
The logoi become the point of contact and means of participation in the divine 
Logos for creation. Maximus believed that "every created thing has its point of contact 
with the Godhead; and this point of contact is its idea, reason or logos that is at the same 
time the end towards which it tends" (Lossky 1998:98). The Word is the causal principle 
and end of all things, and thus it is participation in the Logos which brings the realization 
of God's will for the creation. In contemplating (theoria) the logoi of things, one finds its 
causal and teleological reason in the one Logos. 
Maximus explains that one discovers this truth of the differential unity of all 
things in the Logos through contemplating creation (i.e. Romans 1: 19-20). Upon 
contemplating the differences in creation as they exist by nature, one is drawn to the logoi 
or eternal purpose of things. And in the logoi one finds the model or archetype the Logos, 
which contains and holds together all of the logoi. It is the Logos in creation that wills the 
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purpose of each created thing in its logoi. Each logoi in expressing the purpose of God 
implicates motion (kinesis) and direction (skopos) in accordance with that being' s logoi 
or divine purpose (Meyendorff 1987: 135; Maximus 2003:57). In this sense, the Logos 
serves as a divine nexus or threshold from which the logoi flow into creation, and it 
serves as the center toward which all created beings tend in recapitulation according to 
their logoi (Lossky 1998:99). Thus, through participation, the "Logos is (in) many logoi, 
and the many logoi are (in) the one Logos" (parenthesis are mine) (Maximus 2003:54, 
57). Participation flows from creation to Incarnation to theosis via the logoi and the 
Logos. 
Of course, the participatory relationship is analogical. Meyendorff quotes 
Maximus from Ambiguum 7, "all things participate in God by analogy, insofar as they 
come from God" (Meyendorff 1987: 135). There is no danger of pantheism with 
Maximus. Transcendence or God's hyper-essence74 and apophaticism play too 
significantly in Maximus religious epistemology to allow for any total immanence of God 
or full transcendence of creation (Thunberg 1995:76-77). Also Maximus ' strict 
Cha1cedonian logic will not permit the nature of the Logos to be mixed or confused in 
participation or union. Participation is a hypostatic union that maintains distinction in 
natures. 
Maximus, as he does in all of this theology, allows his understanding of 
participation ultimately to be shaped by the Incarnation. The union of God with creation 
is central to his thinking, not just hypostatic ally with humanity but also with the entire 
cosmos (Blowers and Wilken 2003:21 and Maximus 2003: 100,124). Maximus 
74 In Eastern Orthodox theology God's essence is beyond (hyper) or transcends our rational capacity to fully 
understand and remains unknown (apophasis) and is left to our mystical union with God in theosis. 
110 
understood man as both microcosm of the universe and mediator to the universe 
(Thunberg 1995: 137). Yet humanity fell, but Christ supremely assumes both roles of 
microcosm and mediator in the incarnate Logos according to the plan of God. Through 
the microcosmic mediation of the Logos, all of the universe is enabled to participate in 
God and be transfigured (Thunberg 1995: 142). A primary role of the Incarnation in 
Maximus is mediation, cosmic mediation of all division. 
The telos of the Incarnation is the recapitulation of all things, as adapted from 
Irenaeus. Maximus' is a cosmic theology, a cosmic theology of participation and theosis 
through the Logos. For Maximus incarnation and deification are teleologically connected 
(Thunberg 1995:430). The hypostatic union in Christ enables us to be joined to God 
similarly. Maximus' ontology of participation is for cosmic deification through the 
incarnate Logos. 
Thus, Maximus ' metousia Theou is truly a metousia Logo in which all things 
participate by grace and love in the incarnate Logos. Participation occurs through the 
logoi which serve as the rational and teleological mediators for the Logos. The logoi 
serve as the providential "willings" of God in creation (logoi of creation) and into the 
logoi of revelation or Scripture, and the Logos of grace and salvation in Christ. The 
Logos is hid in the first two and revealed hypostatically in the latter (Christ) (Thunberg 
1995:78). Even in the logoi of commandments, whether by the natural or written law, the 
Logos is present in them and revealed in obedience. Maximus stated that "it is evident 
that every person who participates in virtue as a matter of habit unquestionably 
participates in God, the substance of the virtues" (Maximus 2003:58). 
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Thus the incarnate Logos is at the center of the cosmos and Maximus' theology. 
All things visible and invisible are made by the Logos and are in the Logos. Through the 
Logos all of creation participates in God through its individual and differentiated logoi 
(the intelligible principles of being) which are united hypostatically (without confusion) 
in the Logos. The motion of the logoi in all creation is purposed in the incarnate Logos, 
meaning that the reason of being for all things is to be joined in Christ through the 
Incarnation. The metousia Logo offers an ontology which holds all things together in the 
Logos, through creation, the Incarnation and theosis. All of creation participates in God 
by grace through the logoi. Out of love, God initiates motion towards himself through his 
purposes revealed in the logoi, and humanity out of its gnomic will (freewill) responds to 
God's grace on behalf of itself and microcosmically on behalf of the cosmos. God's 
purposes are revealed to all in creation, Scripture and in the Incarnation. 
This 'theo-ontology,75 has all of creation participating in God, specifically in the 
Logos, at some level, even though the tropos (mode of existence) of humanity has turned 
away in the fall from its original nature and purpose in the Logos. Thus the movement of 
God's grace through the Logos following creation initiates human synergy from the 
gnomic will. Maximus' system is not one of predestination or determinism. Choice 
allows humanity to fulfill its purpose in participation. Participation in God through a 
creational ontology is merely the initial motion in a cosmological process of deification, 
which requires choosing union with Christ. Thus Maximus' ontology of participation has 
a very specific purpose that is relational and incarnational and is carried out 
epistemologically in Christ, metousia Logo. 
75 A ontology directed and informed by theological considerations 
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The metousia Logo offers an epistemology in which things are known as they 
participate in the Logos. An epistemology of participation has to do with participating in 
the Logos and his eternal purpose for all things, as revealed in their logoi which 
ultimately are in the one Logos. Knowledge in Maximus ' participatory scheme has to do 
with knowing the purpose or reason of being of a thing according to its creation and its 
recapitulation (anakephalaiosis) in Christ. 
In his Ad Thalassium 60, Maximus references two types of knowledge. The first 
is relative knowledge based on reason and ideas (Maximus 2003: 126). The mind moves 
in relative knowledge from the sensible realm to the intelligible realm of ideas (Maximus 
1985:48). Often in modern thinking this is where we stop. Knowledge is abstract 
understanding. However for Maximus the goal is direct experiential knowledge which is 
through a participation by grace (Maximus 2003: 126). Participation in a known object 
brings one into direct experiential perception which "suspends rational knowledge," 
going beyond mere conceptualization (2003: 126-127). 
The ascent to true knowledge begins with ascetic practice (praxis) and then to 
contemplation (theoria) of the logoi leading finally to mystical insight and union with 
God (theologia), vita practica, vita contemplativa, and vita mystica. 76 This contemplation 
is not the "same as either empirical perception or mental comprehension" (Nesteruk 
2003:26). Contemplation or theoria is a type of spiritual vision which sees beyond the 
sensible world and into the ontological roots of things which are grounded outside of the 
empirical world (Nesteruk 2003:26). In an ontology of participation the nature of things 
are not fully revealed in what is seen or known. Things are more than what they appear. 
There can be no reduction or totalization in such a scheme. 
76 Latin for the "practical life," the ·'contemplative life," and the "mystical life." 
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Science takes from the empirical realm and expresses its findings in symbols. We 
understand and communicate the empirical realm in terms of symbolic language and sign 
systems. However this data does not reveal the meaning and purpose of created things. 
These are revealed in the logoi of created beings which are apprehended by the human 
hypostasis because it is fashioned in the imago Dei and is capable of theoria of God's 
divine intentions in the cosmos (Nesteruk 2003:26). Ultimately, God's intention is 
revealed in the incarnate Logos, in whom God desires that the whole universe inheres or 
participates in his hypostasis (the hypostatic inherence in the Logos of God) (Nesteruk 
2003: 114-116). 
From the spiritual contemplation of the differentiated sensible and intelligible 
creation, one arrives at the oneness of creation. The many logoi of sensible and 
intelligible things are united in their origin and purpose in the one Logos. The Logos is 
revealed in the contemplation of the logoi of creation (the "natural" law) and the written 
law in Scripture, which inspire ascetic praxis and virtue and deeper participation in the 
grace of Christ (Thunberg 1995:394). For Maximus, the revelation of the Logos in 
creation through contemplation and in the understanding of the Scriptures is a work of the 
Spirit by God's grace. (Maximus 1996: 109). This motion (kinesis) of the Spirit 
ultimately leads the universe mystagogically77 into a process of theosis which Von 
Balthasar calls a "cosmic Liturgy" (Balthasar 2003). 
At this point it is noteworthy to make a distinction and clarify a subtlety in 
Maximus concerning two senses of participation. In one sense, all creation by its nature 
77 In early Christian sacramental life and still in the Eastern Orthodox Church, the mystagogy involves the 
catechesis or teaching concerning the sacraments or mysteria and the practical life expected to be lived by 
the initiate into the faith . It also can refer in a broader sense to the teaching concerning the liturgical rites of 
the church, i.e. the Divine Liturgy. 
114 
or essence participates in being, and being comes from the energies or works of God 
(Maximus 1981:123-124). Participation in this sense pertains to the created order which 
begins its participation in being at its incipience. Creation in this sense is called 
"participant being" (1981:123-124). 
(Participant) being also comes to participate in the virtues of God which are 
infused by grace. These energies or works of God do not begin at the incipience of 
creation, for God's goodness, blessedness and holiness do not begin with time 
(1981:123). These energies are participated in or received by grace. Hence there is a 
participation by way of creation and a participation by way of salvation or deification 
through grace implanted in creation. This is not to dichotomize grace and nature which is 
foreign to Maximus and Eastern Christianity. It merely depicts a continuum or growth in 
grace from creation to new creation. Yet that growth is not a natural growth. It occurs 
through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
Similarly in epistemology for Maximus, participation at times refers to direct, 
experiential knowledge that is beyond mere conceptualization, but it also signifies that all 
things "participate proportionally in God, whether by intellect, by reason, by sense-
perception, by vital motion, or by some habitual fitness (Maximus 2003:55,126). As in 
the Radical Orthodox Aquinas, in Maximus' epistemology the truth of a thing is as it 
ascends in the participation of the Logos. Participation begins with creation and through 
grace moves on to theosis through the incarnate Logos (Meyendorff 1987: 136). 
Epistemology and truth become ontological functions involving relationality. 
Knowledge is not simply a matter of facts or objectivity. The project of scientism fails on 
faulty ontological premises. The knower is not outside of the sphere of participation to 
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understand objectively without commitment. And that which is to be known does not 
enjoy such a status either that it can be known outside of participation. In an ontology of 
participation, everything (all creation) is in relationship, and nothing is in isolation, in a 
vacuum, or enjoys the ontological status of pure reason. 
Within a relational structure, things are known as they are purposed in the Logos, 
giving knowledge a teleological dimension as well. Science has sought to know interior 
causes and effects but has often considered metaphysical questions as irrelevant or 
irrational, purpose being one of them. Yet in an epistemology that is closely connected 
with ontology, questions of ultimate purpose go hand in hand with issues of causality, as 
questions of eschatology go hand in hand with effect. Teleology brings an eschatological 
aspect to bear on knowledge. Until the God's purpose is fulfilled knowledge is 
provisional, yet truly knowledge nonetheless - "we know in part." 
Implications of Maximus' Metousia Logo 
In concluding this section on St. Maximus the Confessor and his doctrine of the 
logoi, it is important to recap a few points that were made. Smith's problem with the 
Radical Orthodox use of Plato or Neoplatonism in its borrowing of the ontology of 
participation is answered by Maximus. Maximus intentionally purged his theology of 
Neoplatonic vestiges that could not fit into his Christian ontology of participation, an 
ontology which I call metousia Logo (participation in the Logos). Maximus' Logos 
ontology supports the participation of all creation according to their logoi. Creation 
participates in the Logos for the purpose of cosmic transfiguration. This occurs through 
the Incarnation of the Logos. The hypostatic union between God and man is the 
foundation for the eschatological work of the Spirit in creation, which is primarily in 
theosis. 
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Like many of the early Greek fathers, Maximus did not separate his philosophy 
from his theology. Thus the Incarnation is central to Maximus' theology and is also 
central to his ontology of participation. Participation is not merely a participation in being 
or in God but specifically in the incarnate Logos, in Christ. Creational participation 
through the logoi indicates God's will and direction for creation, with its purpose fulfilled 
in a Logos-participation in Christ. In this scheme, creation is connected with and 
incipient to Incarnation and salvation. The Logos of creation is the Logos of salvation 
through Incarnation, and the logoi of creation are realized in the incarnate Logos. In 
Maximus then, ontology is shaped by creation and the new creation, specifically through 
the ontological framework of the Incarnation and its relation to theosis. Thus, Maximus' 
notion of participation is clearly theological, poignantly Christocentric, and in its 
orthodoxy beats the charges of James Smith. 
Maximus ' ontology of participation has epistemological implications as well. The 
two are inseparable for Maximus. Things are ultimately known as they are known in their 
original intention in the logoi. True knowledge is apprehending things as they are in God 
according to their participation, metousia Logo. Similar to Thomas' adequatio, Maximus 
understands that we know things as they ontologically participate in the Logos, and the 
nature of that participation is predicated analogically. Maximus ' notion of knowledge is 
at first empirically situated within a larger framework of transcendence, which is then 
apprehended spiritually, an epistemic ascent. The knower moves from the sensible realm 
of things to the intelligible realm of concepts and, even further, by ascetic practice and 
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deeper contemplation begins to understand the nature of things as they participate in the 
Logos. One comes to know that the logoi are one Logos and begins the experiential 
ascent of theologia until culminating in the unknowing of theosis. 
Knowledge is in a sense an ascetic or sanctifying and experiential process towards 
the ultimate nature and telos of things. Also the knowledge of things can be described as 
analogical and relational, as it relates to purpose in Christ. Our knowledge is always 
mediated by the Logos through the logoi. Knowledge is also provisional, teleological, 
and eschatological as the created order is lead more and more towards its original purpose 
in its logoi. Knowledge is "on the way" but is not yet fulfilled. Maximus' triad of genesis, 
kinesis, and stasis, which comprehended causality and motion as having Christological 
direction and purpose, envisioned the increase and ascent of knowledge as a product of 
the kinetic program of the Spirit, who leads the cosmos into the os is. 
With the fundamental nexus between the logoi of creation and the Logos of 
salvation, Maximus' theology has a high view of creation, as does most Eastern Christian 
theology. All of creation is a revelatory expression of grace. There is no strictly "natural" 
realm. The cosmos is a gift of God's grace and is redeemed and sustained by his power to 
reveal his purposes. In this sense, creation is doxo-liturgical and sacramental, housing the 
mystery of God. Materiality embraces the divine glory of God's splendor. Creation is a 
tabernacle of God's holy presence. Creation itself is incarnation aI, making knowledge an 
incarnational process as well. Hence knowledge within the created order is knowledge of 
the liturgical participation of all things in God's purpose and glory. 
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Maximus' metousia Logo stretches to cosmic proportions. Its scope is all of 
creation, and its depth is deification. Maximus ' version of the apokatastasi/ 8 is a 
restoration of all things as God had originally intended, a recapitulation in Christ. Hence 
knowledge is concerned with the ascetical, the virtuous, and the transformational, as it is 
tied in with the cosmic process of sanctification or theosis. In Maximus ' "cosmic 
liturgy," ontology, epistemology, theology, doxology, soteriology and missiology all 
conjoin in the crescendo of theosis. These themes expressed in Maximus' theo-ontology 
will serve significantly in a theology of mission, which will be explored in the last 
chapter. 
Next, I will explore John Wesley's theology of universal and prevenient grace as 
a type of participation and as a further description of Maximus' metousia Logo. Wesley's 
participation in grace will conclude the development of our onto-epistemological model 
for a theology of mission. Its strong and practical soteriological and missiological 
concerns bring completion to Maximus ' metousia Logo and his Incarnational theology. 
By filling in a vision for a theology of mission with Wesley's theology of grace, we will 
begin to see a more dynamic picture of the cosmo-drama of God's saving work. 
78 Greek for "the restoration of all things." The version taught by Pseudo-Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa 
was condemned by the church for it implied a necessary universal redemption. Scholars debate to what 
extent Maximus taught this doctrine. It is not always clear. It seems that Maximus probably understood the 
teaching of apokatastasis as God 's will but not as a necessity, since he clearly taught the freewill of 
humanity. I make reference in this work to Maximus ' belief in hell and God' s punishment of the 
disobedient. The author does not hold to a view of universal salvation but universal atonement. 
Chapter 4 
Metousia Chariti: 
Participation in Grace in John Wesley' s Theology 
John 1:16 From his fullness we have all received, grace upon grace. 
Wesley, Eastern Christianity and Maximus the Confessor 
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In looking to develop more of the soteriological and missiological details of an 
onto-epistemology of participation, I turn to John Wesley' s theology of grace, 
specifically its universal and prevenient expressions. A movement from Maximus to John 
Wesley (1703-1791) is not as far-fetched as it first appears. There are many similarities 
between the two. Recently, theologians have shown the influences that Eastern 
Christianity had on Wesley. 
Albert Outler (1908-1989), an eminent American Methodist theologian, noted that 
Wesley inherited his vision for the normative pattern for Christian living, perfection, and 
the divine-human synergism from his patristic studies, specifically from Pseudo-Macarius 
the Egyptian (Outler believed Gregory of Nyssa was the original source), Clement of 
Alexandria, and Ephraem Syrus (Outler 1964:9-10,119 and 1991:105). Wesley was a 
primitivist and in seeking to restore New Testament apostolic Christianity he returned to 
the early church fathers who were the closest in time to the apostolic church (Outler 
1991 :103). 
Outler argues, convincingly, that one of the most significant features of Eastern 
Christianity in Wesley is metousia Theou, participation in the grace of God, which Outler 
understands in terms of synergism (Outler 1991 : 105). There are two energies at work. 
God takes an active role, and humanity takes a reactive or responsive role (1991: 105). 
120 
Within this dynamic humans have the freedom to resist grace, which is always a constant 
in Eastern Christian thinking. Outler attributes Wesley's "distinctive pneumatocentric 
view of grace," that is that God's active grace expressed by his Spirit moves upon the 
human heart, to the influence of the early church fathers (1991: 108). The dynamic of 
God's grace and human freewill response is foundational to the soteriologies of both 
Eastern Orthodox and Wesleyan thinking. 
United Methodist theologian, Ted Campbell continues the dialogue between 
Wesley and the early fathers. Campbell believes that for Wesley, the primitivist, 
Christian antiquity became a source, among other sources, contributing to a religious 
vision of the Christian life and how it could be lived in society (Campbell 1991:2). 
However, the transmission of Christian antiquity to Wesley is held in question by 
Campbell. He feels it is difficult methodologically to prove that those early sources 
actually shaped Wesley, or if they did, then how they shaped various doctrines for 
Wesley (1991 :3). If there is a dependence on these sources, often it is also difficult to 
demonstrate how they came to Wesley, either direct or mediated, and how Wesley 
understood them (1991 :3). Thus, Campbell examines the way in which Wesley conceived 
of Christian antiquity, and how he used these conceptions to depict and implement a 
vision for cultural change (1991:4). For Campbell, Wesley's utilization of Christian 
antiquity becomes programmatic for his vision for the Methodist societies (Heitzenrater 
2002:29). 
Richard Heitzenrater, one of the foremost Wesley scholars, set out to research 
and confirm Outler ' s conclusions only to find them wanting. Although Wesley' s literary 
corpus makes numerous references to the early fathers, those references were often 
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general, interpreted in a Western light, and probably not from primary sources 
(Heitzenrater 2002:30-31). Heitzenrater does not deny the influence that Christian 
antiquity had on Wesley but questions the transmission and interpretation of the ancient 
sources and believes that precise nature of that influence has yet to be fully researched 
(2002:31). 
On the other hand, United Methodist theologian Randy Maddox sides with the 
growing number of scholars who find a significant influence, whether direct or indirect, 
from the early Greek fathers on Wesley (Maddox 1994:23). Maddox sees Wesley as 
preferring Greek writers over Latin writers and thus tending to favor an Eastern 
therapeutic soteriology over a Westernjuridicial one (1994:23). In fact, Maddox traces 
the Eastern therapeutic and synergistic or co-operant dynamics of salvation throughout 
his systematic treatment of Wesley' s theology in his Responsible Grace (1994:92). 
However, I believe the connection between Wesley and Eastern Christianity is based 
more on theological analysis and comparison than historiographical analysis. 
In this light, this author would tend to agree with Maddox that although Wesley 
theologically is a via media between east and west, he seems to favor more of an Eastern 
picture of Christianity rather than a Western one, at least in terms of his view on 
sanctification. However, the one problem I have in Maddox ' s work is his reference to 
Wesley's similarities with Eastern Orthodoxy, which is a later development, when it is 
probably more appropriate to attribute the influences to Eastern Christianity. Besides 
these major scholars, other work has been done in a similar vein to Maddox. Several 
scholars from the Wesleyan Theological Society have made erudite efforts to draw 
122 
parallels between the Eastern view of theosis and Wesley's view of entire sanctification 
(Bundy 2004:104-136; Christensen 1996:71-94; King 2003:103-123). 
In terms of comparing Wesley to Maximus in particular there has not been as 
much research. It is doubtful whether Wesley ever read Maximus, but yet the comparison 
is worthy. Kenneth Carveley's essay entitled "From Glory to Glory: The Renewal of All 
Things in Christ Maximus the Confessor and John Wesley" is one of the few studies 
available. Carveley notes the typical similarities between Wesley and Eastern Christianity 
are found between Wesley and Maximus as well. Carveley cites numerous passages from 
both writers to show how they embraced a comparable vision of Christianity in terms of 
the love and grace of God bringing universal restoration through the incarnation and 
sanctification or deification. Carveley's essay picks up on the parallel themes that 
highlight the overall structure, movement and content of Maximus ' and Wesley' s 
theology. Some of those themes include: incarnation and deification, God's love, 
kenosis, 79 circumcision of the heart, perfect love, and salvation as a universal and cosmic 
process (Carveley 2002: 173-188). He finds that both theologians seek a religion of the 
heart that recapitulates all things in Christ (2002:173-174). 
I tend to agree with Maddox 's view that regardless of whether the connection was 
direct or indirect, Wesley shares a similar theological vision of grace, participation and 
sanctification with the Eastern fathers, especially Maximus. My own insights are similar 
to Carveley's. The parallels between Maximus and Wesley are striking. Both were 
compilers and interpreters of the traditions that they inherited. Maximus compiled, 
interpreted and edited Origen, Gregory of Nazianzus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Evagrius, 
79 A Greek reference to Christ's emptying himself of his heavenly glory in order to assume humanity. 
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while Wesley did the same with the traditions he inherited, including the early fathers, the 
Catholic mystics, the Puritans and others in The Christian Library as well as other works. 
Both served as theological bridges between the Christian East and the Christian 
West. As was noted above Maximus, an Eastern Christian, aligned himself with the 
papacy and fought to keep the East from slipping into Monothelitism. Wesley' s 
soteriology which draws from an Eastern framework of grace, participation, and 
sanctification and an Augustinian view of anthropology and sin serves as a via media 
between East and West (Collins 1997:31-38. Collins shows the Augustinian influence). 
Both men preached and lived disciplined lives of holiness. Both men were 
theologians as well as practitioners. Maximus was an ascetic monk and a defender of the 
faith whose theology was lived out in ascetic practice. Wesley was an itinerant evangelist 
and apostolic organizer whose "practical divinity" was done "on the way" in the form of 
journal entries, letters, sermons, essays, and everyday ministry. Both leaders were caught 
in the middle of theological controversy, especially in terms of debates between 
monergism and synergism. Maximus challenged the Monothelite view that Christ had 
one will. He agreed with Cha1cedonian logic that understood that Christ had both a divine 
will and a human will working together. Wesley's debate with monergism had to do with 
salvation. The Calvinists of his day held that God's sovereignty was solely at work in 
salvation, while Wesley recognized that human response was necessary for God's grace 
to be appropriated (see Coppedge 1987 John Wesley in Theological Debate). 
The most pronounced theme shared by the two theologians is the vision of 
recapitulation in the new creation. Maximus' theosis can be compared to some degree to 
Wesley's view of entire sanctification. Both visions are interested in the transformation 
of humanity into the full image of God. Both visions extend to the entire universe 
transfiguring it into a cosmic icon of God. 
124 
The fundamental similarity between the two that I will focus on and develop is the 
idea of participation as it relates to grace and sanctification or theosis. It is important to 
note early on that Wesley the theologian draws from a diversity of sources and is too 
complex to reduce to anyone or even a few sources or influences. There are as many 
Wesleys as there are Wesley scholars. George Croft Cell portrays a Calvinist Wesley. 
Lindstrom portrays a Lutheran Wesley. Cobb depicts a Process Wesley. Coppedge 
identifies a Holiness Wesley. Maddox highlights an Eastern Orthodox Wesley. Theodore 
Jennings favors a Liberationist Wesley. Borgen depicts a high church liturgical Wesley. 
And the list goes on and on. I do not feel this is always the culpa or fault of the Wesley 
scholar. Wesley was a synthesist and somewhat of an eclectic thinker. 
Ken Collins, a historical theologian and Wesley scholar, warns us not to view 
Wesley through anyone stream of tradition (Collins 1997:205-207). Yet, at the same 
time, we always approach reality with some interpretive framework and theory. Owning 
my theory-laden views, I recognize that I am looking for parallels between Maximus and 
Wesley and am assuming that there are, though my assumptions need to be proved. 
Thus in factoring in Collins' warning, I realize the polyvalence of Wesley and 
will try not to force him into an Eastern mold but will commit a venial sin and still look 
at "participation" in Wesley's view of grace. In my efforts, it is not that I seek to make 
Wesleyan Eastern Orthodox Christian, which he is not. But it is a theological effort to 
examine if Wesley's dynamic of grace can contribute to the discussion of participation. 
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Wesley and Participation in Grace CMetousia Chariti) 
In his systematic study ofWes1ey's theology, Ken Collins understands grace as 
the "key theme in Wesley' s theology" (Collins 1997:19). Collins sees the abundance of 
this theme from Wesley's treatment of creation to salvation to glorification and structures 
his study of Wesley around it (1997: 19). For Wesley grace is a primary theological 
category. 
Wesley, in part, held to the traditional Reformed view of grace as the "undeserved 
favour" of God (1997: 19). Yet he also understood grace in terms of "participation in and 
empowerment through the life of God" (Collins 1997:20). Wesley is often seen as a via 
media80 between the Protestant concept of grace and the Catholic understanding of 
holiness through participation in the life of God (1997:20) . 
Maddox also recognizes that Wesley' s view of grace holds this tension together. 
For Maddox, Wesley emphasized "the divine initiative expressed in Christ and the divine 
empowerment available through the Holy Spirit" that enables "responsible human 
participation in this gracious work" (Maddox 1994: 141). However Maddox does not see 
this tension as merely one between Protestant and Catholic view, but he sees the 
integration of Western juridical concerns with Eastern therapeutic ones (Maddox 
1994: 142). Salvation is not merely one-sided, that is depicting God's unilateral grace that 
results in legal righteousness. Salvation is also concerned with imparting grace to a 
responsive heart that results in transformation and holiness. 
Outler 's thinking, predating Maddox' s, is similar. He identifies the "forensic-
pardon" themes stemming from Latin Christianity and also found in classical 
Protestantism, and these are set apart from the Greek ontological vision of metousia 
80 Latin for "the middle way." 
126 
Theou (Outler 1991 :92-93). According to Outler, Wesley integrated the two themes in a 
"pardon in order to participate" motif or "faith alone, working by love aimed at holy 
living" (Outler 1991 :94). Outler notes that Wesley acquired his participation motif from 
the mystics like de Renty, as well as Scripture (Outler 1991:93). In fact, Wesley began 
the day of his Aldersgate experience with 2 Peter 1 :4, which speaks of being "partakers 
of the divine nature" (Outler 1991:32,166). 
In Wesley, grace requires participation, a response (Maddox 1994: 143). Outler 
calls this response "participation" and also uses the term synergism (Outler 1991:32,105). 
Maddox calls it co-operant or responsible grace and even participation (Maddox 1994:92, 
147-148). At times Collins uses the term participation, claiming that for Wesley all of 
creation participates in the natural image of God (Collins 1997:22). 
For Wesley all of creation participates in God's grace. Here metousia chariti, 
participation in God's grace is a theo-ontological category. Grace, often synonymous 
with the Holy Spirit in Wesley, has a universal ontological function. What I mean is that, 
in Wesley, grace seems to define ultimately the dynamics of reality, just as it does in 
Maximus ' understanding of grace working from the Logos through the logoi Of course, 
in Wesley, we do not find the strong philosophical orientation that we find in Maximus, 
but there is philosophical relevance in Wesley that I will briefly explore. 
Although Wesley by nature was not speCUlative but more practical, he did stress 
the proper and balanced use of reason along with revelation for example in his sermon 
"The Case of Reason Impartially Considered" (Wesley 1985:2:587). He was well read in 
philosophy, being trained in Aristotelian logic at Oxford, and he read the philosophy of 
his day, i.e. John Locke (Wesley 1985:2:589). 
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Thomas Oord claims that some of the philosophers that Wesley read were 
Aristotle, Augustine, Bacon, Berkeley, Boethius, Robert Boyle, Joseph Butler, Cicero, 
Samuel Clarke, Descartes, Jonathan Edwards, Erasmus, Hume, Francis Hutcheson, 
Leibniz, Locke, Malebranche, Cotton Mather, Newton, Pascal, Plato, Thomas Reid, and 
Voltaire (Oord 2004:155). Thus Wesley had some exposure to philosophy. It is more 
difficult to tell where he stood in terms of schools of philosophy. 
Epistemologically, Maddox sees Wesley as an empiricist in the Lockean tradition 
yet with a spiritual twist, holding to the idea of spiritual realities being apprehended by 
spiritual senses (Wesley 1991:154; 1991:339; Maddox 1994:27). 
Gunter agrees with the assessment of Wesley as an empiricist but with a "Platonic twist" 
(Gunter 2000: 135). Although empirical knowledge of the world is sensed based, 
knowledge of God is not restricted to the same. Gunter, like Maddox refers to the 
"spiritual senses" in Wesley (Gunter 2000: 137). Through the spiritual senses, we gain 
experiential knowledge of God. Gunter claims that for Wesley "the spiritual senses are 
the gracious work of God through the Holy Spirit" (2000: 137). The spiritual sight 
allowed by Wesley is the Platonic twist that expands the senses past the physical realm, 
enabling experiential knowledge of God (2000: 138). 
Rebekah Miles would agree. She identifies Wesley's empirical heritage rooted 
ultimately in Aristotle, but she notes Wesley's understanding of our "spiritual senses" 
that apprehend the transcendent realm gives him an appearance as a Platonist (Miles 
1997:86 and 91). Wesley' s "Aristotelian empiricist way leads to a Platonic destination 
(Miles 1997:93). Wesley is an empiricist because knowledge comes to the mind via the 
senses. Ideas are not innate. However, Wesley has a Platonic streak in him because the 
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nature of the senses is not only physical but spiritual as well. These senses come in 
contact with a transcendent realm accessing experiential knowledge of God. I would 
agree that Wes1ey seems to have elements of both Aristotelian empiricism and Platonic 
transcendence. 
I would propose prima facie that Wesley appears to hold to a position that can 
best be described as spiritual empiricism. In "An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and 
Religion," Wesley equates the spiritual senses with faith (1872:8:4). He states that faith 
IS: 
"the demonstrative evidence of things unseen," the supernatural evidence 
of things invisible not perceivable by the eyes of flesh, or by any of our 
natural senses or faculties. Faith is the divine evidence whereby the spiritual man 
discerneth God, and the things of God. It is with regard to the spiritual world, 
what sense is with regard to the natural. It is the spiritual sensation of every soul 
that is born of God. (1872:8:4) 
Thus for Wesley faith is the "eye of the new-born soul," the "ear of the new-born 
soul, whereby a sinner 'hears the voice of the Son of God and lives' ," the "palate of the 
soul; for hereby a believer 'tastes the good word, and the powers of the word to come' ," 
and "the feeling of the souL .. " (1872:8:4). When one is born of God, the ontological 
shift from death to life and from in Adam to in Christ brings about a parallel metaphysical 
shift from the visible world to the invisible world and an epistemological shift as well 
from our natural senses to our spiritual senses. It is not to say that creation is not of grace 
and only the new creation is of grace. For Wesley all is of grace, but the natural senses 
perceive the visible, and the spiritual senses perceive the invisible. 
Wesley further explains his spiritual empiricism whereby reason is illuminated by 
the knowledge of God from the invisible world through the spiritual senses: 
So you cannot reason concerning spiritual things, if you have no spiritual 
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sight; because all your ideas received by your outward senses are of a 
different kind; yea, far more different from those received by faith or internal 
sensation, than the idea of colour from sound. These are only different species of 
one genus, namely sensible ideas received by external sensation; whereas the 
ideas of faith differ toto genere from those of external sensation. So that it is not 
conceivable, that external sensation should supply the want of internal senses; or 
furnish your reason in this respect with matter to work upon. 
What then will your reason do here? How will it pass from things 
natural to spiritual; from the things that are seen to those that are not 
seen; from the visible to the invisible world? What gulf is here! By what 
art will reason get over the immense chasm? This cannot be till the 
Almighty come in to your succour, and give you that faith you have 
hitherto despised. (1872:8:13-14) 
For Wesley, his "spiritual empiricism" is of a totally different order than any 
natural empiricism that operates in the visible world strictly through the five senses. An 
ontological change in one's spiritual status initiates one into a new metaphysical reality, 
an invisible world that can be experienced empirically by faith. Faith becomes the faculty 
of perception in the new creation. We noted earlier a similar "transcendence," for lack of 
a better term, in Maximus who through contemplation ascended past the sensible and the 
intelligible realms. In Wesley, faith seems comparable to Maximus ' theoria or 
contemplation. Like Maximus' ontology of participation through the Logos, Wesley's 
theology of grace contains a similar relational dynamic where creation participates 
preveniently in God's grace through the unconditional benefits of Christ's atonement. 
Both reject any natural autonomy of creation but recognize its dependence on God's 
grace for creation to exist and to fulfill what God intended. God's grace is active in all of 
creation, whether one is spiritually asleep in the old or awakened in the new. 
While many see Wesley in the empirical tradition or even as a spiritual empiricist, 
Oord recognizes four other traditions with which Wesleyanism is often associated; Reid's 
common sense, pragmatism, Bowne's personalist school, and process philosophy (Oord 
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2004:158-159). Thus not only was Wesley not strongly philosophically oriented in his 
writings, which was probably more due to his makeup and context then his ability, it is 
difficult to locate him philosophically with certainty. Though it seems he favored the 
empirical approach yet with a spiritual component as referenced prior that allows for 
transcendental access and experience, a spiritual empiricism out of a theo-ontology of 
metousia chariti. 
In some ways Wesley anticipates the concern of Radical Orthodoxy in terms of 
reason and revelation in that these categories are not seen as mutually exclusive or 
separate realms. Wesley' s training in Aristotelian logic, his layperson 's interest in 
philosophy and science and his pietistic and experiential spirituality combined for an 
approach to the faith that integrated revelation and reason with Wesley's empirical 
approach. Reason was not an autonomous source of knowledge but was a "tool" or a 
"processor" of knowledge (Miles 1997:78; Maddox 1994:40). Wesley employed reason 
to organize and draw conclusions from revelation (Maddox 1994:41). Maddox states that 
for Wesley "When reason is construed in this regulative sense, the polarization between it 
and revelation breaks down (Maddox 1994:40). There is no inconsistency between reason 
and faith in Wesley (Miles 1997:79). Wesley recognized the severe limitations of reason 
even as believers, as exemplified in his sermon "The Imperfection of Human 
Knowledge," and at the same time he corrected those who undervalued the ability of 
reason in light of supernatural guidance in his sermon "The Case of Reason Considered" 
(Wesley 1985:2:590). In the latter sermon, Wesley brings a needed balance to the use of 
reason and revelation in which there is no inconsistency. 
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All of that said however, it is difficult to allow Wesley to speak purely in terms 
of philosophical categories as Maximus often does. Yet it is the contention of this writer 
that Wesley speaks of grace in primordial terms, with seemingly 'ontological' 
implications. In his sermon "Salvation by Faith," Wesley attributes to God's grace the 
bestowing of all blessings, forming man from dust of the earth, sustaining all things, 
working whatever righteousness may be in us, and even giving us salvation through faith 
(Wesley 1991:40-41). God's grace creates all things, sustains all things, and provides 
salvation for all things. 
For Wesley, as with Maximus, nothing exists in a pure state of nature or by its 
own merit (Lossky 1998:101). Even in our sin, we are not in a "state of mere nature; 
there is no man, unless he has quenched the Spirit, that is wholly void of the grace of 
God. No man living is entirely destitute of what is vulgarly called natural conscience. 
But this is not natural: It is more properly termed preventing grace" (Wesley 
1986:3:207). God's grace has given to all in some measure a universal knowledge of his 
being and attributes and the knowledge of the "difference between moral good and evil" 
(1986:3:199). He cites references from John 1:9 and Romans 2:14 to support his claims 
(1986:3:200). These claims come from his sermon entitled "Working Out Our Own 
Salvation" using as his primary text Philippians 2:12-13: "Work out your own salvation 
with fear and trembling: For it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do his good 
pleasure. " Wesley's thesis is that the grace of God goes before us and gives us the desire 
and the power to fulfill his will if we respond to the grace given to us - "God works; 
therefore you can work" (1986:3:206). This dynamic is often called synergy. I call it 
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participation, participating in God's grace, metousia chariti. The term synergy implies 
that both parties are working and often working equally. 
In this sermon, Wesley emphasizes how God's grace initiates salvation in our 
lives through the universal knowledge of his existence and attributes as well as the 
discernment between good and evil. Wesley employs the term preventing or prevenient 
grace which comes from the Latin prevenire which means "to come before." Most likely 
Wesley was previously exposed to the term through Augustine and Article Five of the 
thirty-nine Anglican Articles. Preventing grace is "the first wish to please God, the first 
dawn of light concerning his will, and the first slight transient conviction of having 
sinned against him" (1986:3:203). In his sermon "On Conscience," Wesley also 
subsumes conscience under prevenient grace, claiming conscience is "not natural, but a 
supernatural gift of God" or "that supernatural gift of God we usually style preventing 
grace" (1986:3:482,484). 
All of our knowledge of God is a revelation from God's grace, even the initial 
universal knowledge of God that comes through creation and conscience, claimes Wesley 
in "The Imperfection of Human Knowledge" (Wesley 1985:2:571 and Maddox 1994:28-
29). It seems with Wesley that to think of nature as a sphere devoid of grace is non-
existent or at best an abstraction. All of creation participates in the universal grace of 
God. Grace takes on a universal character and function, not in a classic sense of a 
"universal" or "particular," because God's grace is not created nature. Remember, for 
Maximus, universals were part of the created order. The universal character of God's 
grace is that it takes on a mediating function so all of creation can participate in God. 
Outler similarly refers to grace as a universal function in Wesley (Outler 1964:33). 
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As for Maximus, created being ontologically participates in God through the 
logoi, so for Wesley, creation participates in God through grace. In Maximian terms, 
Wesley's understanding of grace seems to be comparable to the logoi, which are the 
energies of God working his will in creation. In terms of Maximian kinesis and the 
dynamic initiative of the energies of God in creation, there seems to be a similar function 
in Wesley' s understanding of grace (possibly grace and wisdom would equate more 
formally with the logoi.). Outler says of Wesley that the Christian life "is empowered by 
the energy of grace: prevenient, saving, sanctifying, sacramental" (Outler 1964:33). 
Clearly the terms "grace" and "logoi" are not synonymous because Wesley did 
not think in the same terms as Maximus nor to the philosophical depth as Maximus. 
Nonetheless both have identified God's universal movement of love in creation that 
requires a response, and this universal motion or willing is not of nature but a gift of 
grace in which creation participates. Grace, like the logoi, relates to and expresses the 
primal will and motion of God in the world. 
The logoi, as the energies of God, express God's will and work in creation. In 
many ways, for Wesley, grace is similar. In the Palamite dichotomy, the energies of God 
are God (his presence) but not his hyper-essence. In Orthodox thinking, God's hyper-
essence is to know God's self as God knows God's self. Wesley does not operate out of 
this dichotomy but often uses grace synonymously with the Holy Spirit, giving grace not 
merely a universal function but an ontological character or presence in the person of the 
Spirit. In the sermon "The Witness of Our Own Spirit" grace is God's empowering 
presence in the Holy Spirit: 
By "the grace of God" is sometimes to be understood that free love, that 
unmerited mercy, by which I a sinner, through the merits of Christ, am 
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now reconciled to God. But in this place it rather means that power of God 
the Holy Ghost, which "worketh in us both to will and to do of his good 
pleasure." As soon as ever the grace of God in the former sense, his pardoning 
love, is manifested to our souls, the grace of God in the latter sense, the power of 
his Spirit, takes place therein. And now we can perform, through God, what to 
man was impossible. (Wesley 1984: 1 :309) 
If grace is a primary and ontological category for Wesley that has a universal 
influence on creation, then it may be possible to see Wesley' s understanding of grace as a 
type of participation. Participation is an ontological category and structure for analogous 
being, which Wesley held to as opposed to a univocity of being (Maddox 1994:49). Since 
the initial knowledge of God for Wesley did not come from autonomous ratio-empirical 
inferences drawn from a state of nature but from partaking of prevenient grace, which is 
shed in the hearts of all persons, then Wesley's religious epistemology is not an 
empirical, natural theology but an ontologically based epistemology of participation in 
the grace of God from which all things come - a spiritual empiricism that is rooted in 
participation in God's grace, a theo-ontology or even a onto-epistemology of metousia 
chariti. 
The Radical Orthodox charge of univocal, autonomous reason cannot be brought 
against Wesley's de facto epistemology. Wesley's sensory based empiricism is rooted in 
a creation that is an expression of and participates in the grace of God. As humanity 
responds to God's grace, it is awakened in its spiritual senses to the invisible things of 
God (Wesley1991:339). The spiritual senses apprehend the one who transcends all, the 
one who is invisible. Wesley' s empiricism is within a larger ontological and analogical 
relationship between God and creation which is facilitated through grace. As with 
Maximus, so it is with Wesley that epistemology is ontologically dependent. Maximus' 
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metousia Logo and Wesley's metousia chariti are examples of onto-epistemologies with 
their root in God, that is, theologically based onto-epistemologies. 
In examining participation in grace, it goes without saying that Wesley did not 
hold to the Reformed monergistic view of grace or a Pelagian view of natural human 
freedom. To repeat his statement in "Working out Our Own Salvation," "God worketh in 
you; therefore you can work" (Wesley1986:3:206). Although synergy is a word that is 
often avoided for this dynamic because it may imply equal effort from two wills as 
opposed to primacy given to God's grace, the point is that grace requires a human 
response, "responsible grace" (Maddox 1994). Human response does not originate from a 
natural human effort to do good, i.e. the charge of Pelagianism, but Wesley asserts in 
"Predestination Calmly Considered" that "there is a measure of free-will supernaturally 
restored to every man, together with that supernatural light which "enlightens every man 
that comes into the world'" (1872: 10:230). 
Human freedom to respond to God is restored in some measure to fallen 
humanity through prevenient grace through Christ. Hence participation in grace is not 
monergistic or of the natural human will, which for Wesley was depraved and only evil, 
but co-operant, a cooperative participation (Wesley1991:329; Outler 1964:33; Maddox 
1994:92). 
Participation in grace, epistemologically considered, is not merely rational, a 
matter of ideas or pure reason. Nor is it deontological, as was Kant's means of 
transcendence. Wesley considered "a religion of opinions; or what is called orthodoxy" 
and "a religion of works" to be "false religion" (Wesley 1987:4:66-67). In hi sermon 
"The Unity of the Divine Being," Wesley also warned against a "religion of nature," that 
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was gaining ground in his own day, or what we call natural religion, i.e. Hume (Wesley 
1987:4:67-69).For Wesley true religion is an experienced religion of a circumcised heart 
with "right tempers towards God and man" (Wesley 1987:4:7:66). 
Wesley on numerous occasions condemned the reduction of religion to systems of 
propositions or to outward forms and rituals (see Wesley's Character of a Methodist 
1872:8:340-341). Wesley' s understanding of the knowledge of God cannot be reduced to 
merely propositional, deontological or external categories. Outler identifies Wesley' s 
"theory of religious knowledge" as an awareness or experience of the presence of God's 
grace (Outler 1964:29). Like Maximus, Wesley understood the knowledge of God as 
experiencing or participating in God's grace. In Charles Wesley' s sermon "Awake, Thou 
That S1eepest," he asks "Dost thou know what religion is? That it is a participation of the 
divine nature ... " (Wesley 1991:90). 
Participation as an ontological category carries the understanding that any rational 
or episternic structure depends on and is preceded by a transcending ontic relationship. 
For Maximus it is a metousia Logo. For Wesley it is also a participation in God through 
Christ. As participation relates to the energies of God as in Maximus ' doctrine of the 
logoi, it is a participation in grace, a metousia chariti. Maximus understood the telos of 
participation to be theosis. Wesley also understood the purpose of participation in grace 
to be holiness or entire sanctification. For both the ascent to Christ-likeness was a growth 
In grace. 
Human response to grace will bring more grace (Wesley 1986:3:208). In the 
sermon "Working Out Our Own Salvation," Wesley lays out his ordo salutis (Some 
argue for a via salutis or "way of salvation"- Maddox 1994: 157-158). Prevenient grace 
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brings one into convincing grace, termed repentance. Following repentance and faith, one 
is brought into justification, which saves from the guilt of sin and restores the favor of 
God. Continued growth in grace and repentance of inbeing sin brings one into (entire) 
sanctification which saves from the power and root of sin and restores one to the image of 
God (1986:3:204). 
This growth and transformation in grace of course occurs in Christ. Being in 
Christ marks a new ontological status for the believer and ultimately for the new creation. 
In Christ is the new ontological status that realizes the new eschaton of the Kingdom. The 
believer has a new relative position of righteousness in Christ and is born of the Spirit. In 
Wesley's sermon "The New Birth" he describes the spiritual birth as being born of God 
(Wesley 1991:339). Just as a newborn child's senses begin to see and to hear, so one 
newly born of the Spirit has the "eyes of his understanding opened," and their ears are 
opened to hear the inward voice of God (1991 :339). The newborn believer is "sensible of, 
the graces which the Spirit of God works in his heart" (1991 :339). Prior to saving grace, 
one is blinded by a "thick veil between him and the invisible world," Wesley claims in 
"On Living Without God" (Wesley 1987:4: 171). One "tastes nothing of the goodness of 
God, or the powers of the world to come. He does notfeel (as our Church speaks) the 
working of the Holy Spirit in his heart" (1987:4: 171). 
Wesley uses sensory language to describe the experience or the inexperience of 
the knowledge of God. This knowledge is not abstract or ideal but spiritually tangible or 
perceptible (perceptible inspiration of which Wesley was often accused). Wesley can use 
sensory and empirical language because he is describing experience in a new spiritual 
world, the new creation, through a new ontological status in Christ. Since Wesley held to 
138 
more of an Augustianian and Reformed view of original sin and justification by faith than 
an Eastern view, he claims imputational righteousness and the relative change in status 
that comes from justification. Of course, Wesley also believed in a real change through 
regeneration and impartational righteousness as well. But in his ordo salutis, justification 
logically preceded such a real change, whereas in Eastern Christian terms justification is 
rarely discussed. 
The defining of markers is the primary soteriological difference between 
Maximus and Wesley. Wesley clearly marked points of process-crisis-process along the 
ordo salutis that integrate both Eastern and Western hamartiological and soteriological 
concerns. With Wesley's prevenient grace, from the sermon "Justification by Faith," 
persons participate in initial grace, but they still have not experienced pardon, 
reconciliation, and a change of status (Wesley 1991: 115). Regeneration has yet to occur 
even in a "rudimentary form" (Collins and Maddox 2000:73). Convincing grace deals 
with one's transgressions under prevenient grace and points to the need for saving grace 
in Christ. 
Maximus' marked points are more levels of ascension to theosis; praxis, theoria, 
and theologia. 81 They are not necessarily crisis points of salvation that deal with different 
aspects of and responses to sin, i.e. justification from sins committed and sanctification 
from inbeing sin. The Eastern view looks at the entire journey of salvation as an ascetic 
and sacramental participation in grace unto theosis. Rarely is justification mentioned in 
an Augustinian-Reformed sense. 
Nonetheless, for both Wesley and Maximus, the telos of the Christian life is 
holiness. Wesley said in his sermon "On Charity," "that true religion, in the very essence 
81 Greek for ·'practice," "contemplation," and "theology" 
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of it, is nothing short of holy tempers," or a holy heart, character and will ryvesley 
1986:3:306). "Holiness of heart and life," as the old Wesleyan holiness slogan goes, 
which is received through participating in God's grace is the teleological thrust of 
Wesley' s ordo salutis. Maddox stresses the participatory element in that "Wesley's holy 
tempers would not simply be infused by God's sanctifying grace in instantaneous 
completeness; they would be developing realities, strengthened and shaped by our 
responsible participation in the empowering grace of God" (Maddox 1994: 179). Much 
debate in Wesleyan circles has gone on as to whether Wesley understood entire 
sanctification to be crisis, process or both, but regardless of where one stands, though I 
believe it to be both, it is relational and participatory. Entire sanctification is in Christ. 
Participation and Recapitulation in the New Creation 
As holiness is the telos of the Christian life for Maximus and Wesley, it is the 
experience of God's transfiguring presence now and yet to come. Maximus ' cosmic 
liturgy and Wesley's ordo salutis are eschatological maps of the coming of the Kingdom 
into the universe, the participation of the cosmos in the divine. They are also strategies 
for the missio Trinitatis in the earth. Wesley's vision of holiness not only was intended 
for the individual but also for the whole of society. He created intense discipleship 
structures, i.e. societies, classes, bands, select bands etc., for each juncture of the 
Christian life to nurture growth in holiness, which he ultimately saw as social, that is, 
loving one's neighbor as one's self. In fact, Wesley saw the Methodist Society as a type 
of eschatological community, a new creation (Meadows 2004:74). 
Wesley understood the whole project of holiness as God's design and mission for 
the people called Methodists. He records in his "Minutes of Several Conversations," that 
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God's design for raising up Methodist workers is "to reform the nation, particularly the 
Church; and to spread scriptural holiness over the land" (Wesley 1872:8:299). Wesley 
sought to train and equip believers to live out and promulgate the message of holiness 
with the expectation that it would bring great transformation. 
His vision of holiness was not merely personal but necessarily implicated social 
holiness, which for Methodists originally meant that the Christian religion was expressed 
in koinonia in discipleship groups and not in isolation. However, Methodist societies also 
took social action and were responsible for opposing public ills like slavery and 
alcoholism and supporting prison reform. They also set up credit unions and systems for 
employment, schools, as well as dispensed medicine, food and clothes among many other 
services (See Marquardt 1992 and Jennings 1990). 
Wesley may not have had the sociological insights into systemic sin as we do in 
our day, but, in his sermon Divine Providence, he still was able to identify the 
"complicated wickedness" that affects humanity beyond the individual will. And as a 
response, he sought to apply the gospel's social ethics in a variety ofrealms within 
society (Wesley 1985:2:540). It is true that Wesley's political conservatism often 
inhibited thinking that would have initiated fully-orbed socio-systemic changes, and that 
Wesley believed that social transformation began individually; nevertheless his vision of 
holiness entailed an ultimate triumph of grace in cosmic redemption (Marquardt 
1992:123-134 and Maddox 1994:253). Like Maximus, Wesley understood that one of the 
primary purposes of the Incarnation was recapitulation, the gathering together of all 
things in Christ. In his sermon on "The Holy Spirit," Wesley penned that: 
When he was incarnate and became man, he recapitulated in himself 
all generations of mankind, making himself the centre of our salvation, 
that we lost in Adam, even the image and likeness of God, we might 
receive in Christ Jesus. (Wesley 1872:7:513) 
Thus, participation in Wesleyan grace is an eschatological crisis-process-crisis 
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into the new creation, where all things become new. In this sense, participation conveys 
the mission of God's grace to bring transformation to the cosmos. Wesley' s sermon "The 
General Deliverance" describes God's plan to redeem the whole of creation. Maximus 
made the connection between the transformation of humanity and the transformation of 
the rest of the cosmos. Humanity serves as a microcosm of the universe and in this 
priestly role would affect the cosmos. Wesley also states that "man was the great channel 
of communication, between the Creator and the whole brute creation; so when man made 
himself incapable of transmitting those blessings, that communication was necessarily cut 
off' (Wesley 1985:2:442) 
Wesley finds in Romans 8: 19-23 a promise of deliverance for the entire created 
order (Wesley 1985:2:445-447). Wesley enumerates the extent and scope of deliverance 
in "The New Creation." A new heavens including the stars, the atmosphere, and the 
climate, the transformation of the waters, a healing of the plant and animal life, and a 
deliverance of humanity from sin into holiness characterizes this cosmic transfiguration 
in Wesley (1985:2:502-510). 
Wesley does not specifically address millennial positions, but he appears to hold 
to some version of recapitulation through the universal spread of the Gospel. In his 
sermon entitled "The General Spread of the Gospel," Wesley envisions the leavening of 
the "pure and undefiled religion, of the experimental knowledge and love of God, of 
inward and outward holiness, will afterward spread" to "every nation under heaven," 
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resulting in "the times of universal refreshment from the presence of the Lord" (Wesley 
1985:2:493-494). 
Although Wesley recognizes God's plan for" a universal remedy, for a universal 
evil," in his sermon "Causes of the Inefficacy of Christianity," he sees "the disease still 
remains in its full strength; wickedness of every kind; vice, inward and outward, in all its 
forms, still overspreads the face of the earth" (WesleyI987:4:87). Sin, especially in the 
church, seeks to impede God's work. This is Wesley's explanation for the "Causes of the 
Inefficiency of Christianity," the title of this sermon. His homiletical focus here is on the 
people called Methodists. Their self indulgence and growth in wealth impeded the spread 
of scriptural Christianity among themselves and those around them (1987:4:90-95). 
Hence, Wesley understands this mission primarily as God's work, missio Dei. In "Causes 
of the Inefficiency of Christianity," he stresses God's work in the church, and how the 
church becomes God's instrument in the world (1987:4:87-90). Ultimately the church' s 
participation in the Trinity and transformation through the grace of God allows the Lord 
to work through the church to have an impact on the world. 
In the missio Dei of both Maximus (cosmic theosis) and Wesley (general spread 
of the gospel), God's grace is actively working in creation and specifically through 
humanity to bring cosmic transformation. The extent of God's work is not reduced to a 
"spiritual" salvation sometime in the distant future. Maximus' sacramental worldview 
prevents bifurcating spirit and matter. Wesley's realized eschatology advances the 
Kingdom at least in part into this spatio-temporal order as a personal and social reality. 
Both men hold to a worldview that is holistic, which is programmatic in their doctrines of 
theosis and entire sanctification. Salvation (soteria) involves total health in terms of 
physical, mental, emotional, spiritual, relational, social, and global. 
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As highlighted by Maddox, the nature of transformation for Wesley reflects 
Eastern themes. Salvation is not so much understood in juridical, legal or forensic terms 
but in curative, medicinal, and therapeutic terms. Sin is a sickness or disease that impedes 
health and vitality. It is an evil that destroys. Christ is then our healer and victor (Christus 
Victor) who cures our sin sickness and destroys the power of the devil and the power of 
injustice and evil in the world. In this sense evil is seen as the spiritual sickness that 
opposes health and shalom. Thus healing and warfare motifs can be seen as compatible 
with such a vision of mission and are themes that need to be researched more by scholars 
(see Boyd 1997). 
The theologies of both men are strongly Christocentric. Maximus' theology of 
incarnation drives nearly every category of his thinking, even his epistemology, which is 
Logos-based. Wesley's epistemology is indirectly tied to his Christology, in that the 
saving knowledge of God is available in Christ. However, Wesley spiritual empiricism is 
directly tied to the work of the Holy Spirit who regenerates the individual and opens their 
spiritual senses to the invisible world and the experiential knowledge of God. Together 
these themes in Maximus and Wesley could serve a Spirit-Word Christology in terms of 
religious epistemology in a theology of mission. There is ongoing debate as to the extent 
of the saving work of God in terms of universalist and particularist views (See Okholm 
and Phillips 1996; see also Knitter 2002). Also there is debate concerning the work of the 
Spirit in initiating salvation outside of or not restricted to Christocentric structures (see 
Karkkainen 2003). 
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A Spirit-Word Christology identifies Christ in terms of both the Logos and the 
Spirit, as opposed to only the Word. A Spirit-Word Christology that combines the 
epistemic work of the Spirit and the Word in creation through prevenient grace can serve 
as a global point of contact for the knowledge of God in mission. God's Spirit is working 
in creation preveniently to prepare persons for Christ. The consubstantiality of Spirit and 
Word recognizes the synthesis of the two working together (Zizioulas 1985:126-132). 
The Spirit gives birth to and fills Christ; Christ sends the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit leads 
persons to confess Christ, and bears witness to Christ. There is a mutuality of economies. 
Pinnock states that "Spirit Christology and Logos Christology are complementary, not 
antithetical" (Pinnock 1996:91). 
Such a Christology would recognize God's cross-cultural universal witness in 
various contexts as points of grace and contact for mission. Cross-cultural forms that 
would be outside of a Christocentric structure would be examined critically and 
analogically for their resonance and compatibility with a Spirit-Word Christology. For 
example, a Spirit-Wisdom Christology would critically examine wisdom traditions for 
analogies found in a culture's narratives, epics, proverbs, fables, etc. Such analogies can 
be made based on a few assumptions. Laurie Braaten' s essay, "The Voice of Wisdom: A 
Creation Context for Proto-Trinitarian Thought" (2001) lists several of them. I will list a 
few in my own order. 
First, Christ is the Wisdom of God as revealed in Scripture, specifically in the 
Christological hymns of John and Colossians and in the teachings of Jesus in the 
Synoptics (Braaten 2001 :52). As wisdom, Christ "proclaims and embodies God's work of 
ordering and sustaining creation, the bringing of order out of the chaos that disrupts and 
threatens life" (2001 :52). Creation represents the beneficent order established by God 
(2001:53). 
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Second, "if Wisdom is the revelation of God and God's way in creation, then the 
study of creation in and of itself is a worthy task" (2001 :43). In such a study one can find 
the revelation of God's wisdom and workings, since all truth is God's truth (2001:42 and 
44). Third, "Wisdom is a model for us of the freedom to expand our understanding of 
God by hearing the truth that others have found in God's good creation" (2001:54). 
Fourth, a critical listening to traditions of wisdom in creation provides a common ground 
wi th other cultures for mission (2001: 54). 
Examining wisdom traditions cross-culturally would be an example of how an 
onto-epistemology of participation could be used in a theology of mission. In the final 
chapter, I will look more in depth at the missiological implications of the findings of this 
research. At this point prior to applying the research, it will be convenient to summarize 
the development of an onto-epistemology of participation. 
Summary 
In the Introduction and in Chapter One, I took a cursory look at some of the 
problems found in modern mission. Split-level Christianity, syncretism, imperialism, 
colonialism, and other aberrant forms were cited. Among the multiple causes, one was 
discerned to be an epistemological crisis. Some of the problems in mission are directly 
connected to the epistemologies and views of reason that theologies of mission have 
incorporated. Examining the cause further, I felt that the issues in epistemology 
ultimately had their roots in ontological concerns. Modern and postmodern 
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epistemologies no longer had their mooring in any transcendent ontology, which resulted 
in autonomous structures that took on the form of hegemonies . 
In the Second Chapter, I critiqued modern and postmodern epistemology through 
the framework of Radical Orthodoxy. Radical Orthodoxy similarly recognized the 
problem located in a detached ontology, a univocity of being. The genealogy of univocal 
being gives rise to the increasing focus on epistemology and reason to bear the weight of 
reality, meaning and certainty. The problem is that a univocity of being detached from 
God leaves the created order with no transcendent reference. A univocal being in such a 
state becomes a univocal non-being. This ontological implosion into non-being leaves a 
wake of nihilism that leaves behind many modern and postmodern epistemological 
endeavors. 
Radical Orthodoxy suggests returning to a classic vision of reality that depicts 
creation participating analogically in God. Participation puts the created order back in 
connection with the transcendent through an analogy of being. In this way, creation is 
not seen as an autonomous realm, a realm that gives birth to the secular. With the 
construct of participation, epistemology is closely connected with an overall ontological 
framework in this case the created order participating analogically in God. The analogia 
entis is able to capture both the similarities and difference in predication. Analogy allows 
for cataphatic and apophatic knowledge. The latter is ballast providing epistemic humility 
in seeking knowledge, especially the knowledge of God. Reason is forced to take a 
subordinate role as it participates in a larger transcendent structure that informs and 
shapes it. It is the corrective of Radical Orthodoxy to bring autonomous realms, 
especially reason, into participation. 
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Radical Orthodoxy seeks to realign all truth within the domain of Christian 
revelation. It has a vision to comprehend all reality in a theological sense as participating 
in God. I used the Radical Orthodox evaluation as a critical apparatus to analyze modern 
and postmodern epistemology. I applied its conclusion that there are problems with 
modern and postmodern ontology (univocity of being and the detachment of ontology 
from the transcendent) to further critique these movements in terms of closed 
hermeneutical systems. I adopted the Radical Orthodox solution of methexis or 
participation to construct an ontologically oriented epistemology, which is based on the 
revelation of creation, in order to serve a theology of mission. 
In the Third Chapter, I developed the participation model of epistemology further 
than Radical Orthodox by integrating specific Christian sources, namely Maximus the 
Confessor and Wesley. In Maximus I found a more "Christian," or incarnational, version 
of participation that had been purged of its Neoplatonic vestiges. Maximus' 
understanding of participation is centralized in the incarnate Logos. Through the logoi in 
creation, all things in their order, meaning and purpose find their origin and destiny in the 
Logos, Jesus Christ. Ultimately, through the Incarnation, God seeks to gather all things 
unto him self in a cosmic transfiguration. 
In the Fourth Chapter, I found similar themes in Wesley as well. Wesley, who did 
not speak in the same philosophical terms as Maximus, seems in some sense of 
dynamism to have given a similar function to God's grace that Maximus gives to the 
logoi. Wesley understood grace in a universal sense in that all of creation and all 
knowledge of God spring forth from grace. Prevenient grace goes ahead of drawing us 
into greater grace with its goal entire sanctification. Grace even has ontological 
characteristics as Wesley often used the term synonymously with the Holy Spirit. 
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Through saving grace, one is born of the Spirit and receives a new ontological 
status in Christ. One's spiritual senses are awakened to an invisible world where the 
believer has access to empirical knowledge of God. Wesley' s spiritual empiricism 
through participation in grace is a type of onto-epistemology, like Maximus' metousia 
Logo, whose function is based on dependent relations with the transcendent. There are no 
autonomous rational structures. 
Through the conjoining of the constructs of participation of both Maximus and 
Wesley, it is possible to understand the nature and scope of God's cosmic plan of 
transfiguration, which serves as the basis for a theology of mission. God desires that the 
whole of creation experiences participation in the transforming grace of God through 
Jesus Christ in becoming a cosmic icon of God. This is the missio Trinitatis and the work 
of the church. In the next chapter I will be exploring the implications of participation for 
a theology of mission. 
Thus, my original contribution so far to this research is an ontological critique of 
modernism and postmodernism beginning with Descartes and ending with Baudrillard. I 
also applied Radical Orthodoxy's ontological conclusions about modernism and 
postmodernism and used them to critique these systems in more detail, describing what 
ontological detachment looks like in nominalism, rationalism, empiricism, idealism, 
existentialism, nihilism, and postmodernism. I also added an insight to the Radical 
Orthodox critique, and that is that when ontology implodes, epistemology takes a central 
place, resulting in closed hermeneutical systems that are often found guilty of 
reductionism. 
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My further contributions to this research are the integration of Maximus ' doctrine 
of the logoi and his cosmic vision to the Radical Orthodox construct of participation. 
Further I have integrated Wesley' s theology of grace into this same model of 
participation and its cosmic vision. Bringing together the work of Radical Orthodoxy, 
Maximus and Wesley for a theology of mission is an unprecedented and challenging 
integration. My final contribution is the application of this onto-epistemology of 
participation to a theology of mission, which will be in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Participation and Some Implications for a Theology of Mission 
John 15:5 I am the vine, you are the branches. Those who abide in me and I in 
them bear much fruit, because apart from me you can do nothing. 
Characteristics of an Onto-Epistemology of Participation 
As I explore the implications of participation for a theology of mission, it is 
important to identify some of the elements of an onto-epistemology of participation. In 
looking at the term onto-epistemology that I have designated to describe the nature and 
function of participation, I note participation does not serve an autonomous epistemic 
role. In fact, it avoids all modern and postmodern constructs that claim self reference. 
"To participate" is to recognize that nothing created stands alone. In line with Radical 
Orthodox thinking, there are no secular or autonomous realms. All space is God' s space. 
As a divine favor, God is letting us cohabitate with him. 
Participation finds no room to place epistemology at the center as a primary 
interpreter of reality or a first philosophy. Human knowing is a complex activity that 
takes places within a larger ontological context containing multiple, even innumerable 
factors that cannot be reduced. Participation puts a primacy on that ontological context 
which is transcendent in nature and specifically divine, hence participation is qualified as 
an "onto-epistemology," an epistemology that is ontologically informed and shaped. The 
claims of participation made in this research are Christian employing Eastern and 
Western sources, and are specifically Triune - a Trinitarian Ontology. 
There are at least eight characteristics featured in an onto-epistemology of 
participation. They are analogy, epistemic virtue and humility, difference, relationality, 
experience, faith or afiduciary component to knowledge, privation, and incarnation. 
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Analogy. Radical Orthodox sources have characterized a metousia Theou as being 
one that speaks of God in terms of the analogia en tis. Our understanding and speech 
about God is in terms of analogy, for God as being and the created order as being are 
expressed merely in comparable terms not equal or singular terms. Using a Radical 
Orthodox remix of Aquinas, I extended the analogization process to the created order 
within itself. Meaning is not so much deferred (Derrida) as it is shared. We understand 
things within reality as they participate in the divine according to their original purpose in 
God. I follow Maximus in his analogical understanding of created being according to its 
logoi. The analogous relationship between God and creation found in the logoi can be 
expressed semiologically. The semiotics of analogy, metaphor, model, and symbol is 
used to express our knowledge of created things in a type of critical realism. Our 
knowledge is real but contextual, provisional, partial and expressed in symbols. 
An epistemology of participation through analogization not only seeks to 
understand and describe the way we think and speak of God and the way we analyze the 
created order, but also that way in which we participate in God. Humanity is made in the 
imago Dei (image of God). In one sense, the imago is an analogue to God. Humanity is 
like God. Our logoi or reason for being and purpose is to be completely conformed to 
God's likeness. Eastern theology understands this as theosis. Epistemologically and 
theologically, it is the proper function or "proper participation" of the imago to become 
more like Christ. 
The process of theosis is an analogization of creation to the image of Christ. 
Participation recognizes analogy as the fundamental descriptor of predication in our 
knowing and being. Analogy allows for similarity and dissimilarity, continuity and 
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discontinuity, particularity and unity and other antinomies that make it difficult for 
pantheism, radical monism, pure hegemony and other totalizing structures, as we 
participate in God. Our apprehension of knowledge and truth is real and yet in 
eschatological process, as we pursue God and his will (logo i) as revealed in creation, in 
scripture, and ultimately in the incarnate Logos, Jesus Christ. 
Throughout this discourse, it has been made plain that participation in God 
functions analogically, and this analogical function plays off of the continuity and 
discontinuity expressed in the divine-human encounter. Everything sensible and 
intelligible and visible and invisible in the creative order is a metaphorical affirmation of 
God and God's work. The continuity of God's reason and purpose is revealed in its 
nascent form in the created order and realized in history unto its pleroma. The fullness of 
continuity issues forward and upward at the fullness of times into the Incarnation. The 
incarnate Word expresses hypostatically the continuity between God and humanity. 
However, the via negativa in such analogical discourse reveals the dark, vast, 
transcendent discontinuity, the diastema, between God and creation. The diastema is that 
incalculable and immense analogical interval between the otherness of God' s super-
essence and created nature ex nihilo (see Hart 2003: 300-318 for discussion of "analo gy"). 
As an interval it is also space, extension, and distance where motion (kinesis) and change 
(trope) take place; from purpose to realization, from privation to pleroma, from origin to 
eschaton under the impetus and drive of love and desire. Diastema is that analogical 
interval of ontological proportion between God and creation. Diastema is also creation 
itselfas a space-time extension, describing creation 's allotted finitiude (Gregorios 
1996:83). 
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It is our diastemic existence which prevents us from knowing God as God is in 
God's self - the claim of total knowledge. It is within that interval of analogical 
discontinuity stemming from our very created nature, which in change and motion starkly 
contrasts the one who is wholly other, that the silence of apophasis must quiet our mind 
and senses and lift us up in our unknowing into mystical union with God (theologia). 
Within diastemic existence there is an infinite play of continuity (participation) and 
discontinuity (diastema), similarity and dissimilarity, and cataphasis and apophasis 
expressed in the semiotics of analogy that allows us to struggle, rest, struggle and become 
in God forever, epektasis. 82 
God's immanence is experienced by us in God's descent. God's transcendence is 
forever attempted in our ascent, while in this epektasis we are humbled and emptied 
(kenosis) in our understanding. The play is never exhausted. The desire never consumed. 
The signs are always signifying in their fullness and yet ineffably falling short of the one 
who surpasses totalizing signification. The limits are stretched beyond epistemic horizons 
in claims of touching infinity only to give praise and glory to the infinite one through its 
faltering - the epektasis of analogy, the space of perfecting perfection, the doxological 
interval of eternal cascades and crescendos. 
For a theology of mission, it signifies our openness to learn. God reveals God's 
self within different cultural contexts through different worldviews and sign systems. We 
do not fall into epistemic pride and seek to convert people to our own worldview, culture 
or forms, but we let God speak analogically through different cultural systems. The 
challenge in an epistemology of analogy is to identify the timeless theological truths of 
82 A Greek word used by Gregory of Nyssa and other Eastern Christian theologians to describe the ever 
forward-moving struggle towards union with God in theosis. 
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Christ's supracultural gospel and allow them to be communicated in indigenous semiotic 
expressions that are analogically faithful to the gospel.83 
Epistemic Virtue and Humility. Some analytic philosophies speak of the means 
of the justification or warrant of knowledge in terms of "proper function,,84 and 
"virtue.,,85 An onto-epistemology of participation sees the need for both. "Proper" 
participation understands that the knower (the imago Dei) is to function according to the 
logoi (reason and purpose) for her creation that is to be conformed into the image and 
likeness of Christ (theosis). The process of theosis is in itself a cultivating and yielding of 
the fruit and virtue of the Spirit in our lives and in our knowledge. Hence, epistemology 
as participation involves properly functioning in Christ-likeness or holiness according to 
God's plan. 
I believe this bears strongly on our understanding of reason itself in terms of an 
epistemic humility towards the function of reason. Participation contends for a "soft" use 
83 Critical contextualization is one current practice that allows for this type of faithful witness. I will discuss 
critical contextualization later in this chapter. 
84 Alvin Plantinga has formulated a theory of epistemology known as ·'proper function," that involves the 
proper function of the cognitive faculties in the production of belief within an environment designed for 
truth as a goal in order to establish warrant for a belief. Plantinga's theory is a type of naturalized 
epistemology that works compatibly within a larger framework of supernatural theism. Thus, Plantinga's 
epistemological theory like this theory of participation is ontologically based, since it is connected with 
design (felos) and reason of being (logos) within God's creation. Though there are similarities between 
Plantinga's "proper function" and my "proper" participation, the difference is that Plantinga' s theory, as 
well as many analytic theories, reduces epistemology and the knower to individual cognition. It is still 
locked into the Cartesian model of epistemology as individuated reason or cognition. Proper participation 
acknowledges the whole imago Dei, not just the cognitive dimension or faculty, and it recognizes the 
community-tradition, narrative or social dimension of knowledge and virtue apprehension and production 
as well. 
85 Virtue epistemology is based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. It seeks to resolve the 
foundationalist and coherentist dilemma and debate concerning justification of true belief by proposing that 
the nurturing of epistemic virtues within the knower, such as honesty, truthfulness, conviction, diligence, 
and openness, is integral to developing a reliable process that produces justified belief. Some virtue 
epistemologists are Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and Linda Zagzebski. The writer does not hold that anyone 
current theory of epistemology provides absolute knowledge, certainty, justification or warrant for every 
situation or case. Warrant is in degrees and at times comes in different ways. Participation offers more of 
an onto-epistemological vision that incorporates and develops different theories as they find compatibility 
within a larger theological setting. A scriptural, theological vision of reality does not have to hold 
necessarily to one type of theory or model of epistemology, philosophy or science in order to be true. 
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of reason rather than a "hard" one. Reason is a function that does not stand alone but 
works in concert with the human condition within creation as it relates to God. As 
mentioned earlier that relationship is analogical. We are like God and relate to God 
through our creatureliness. Knowledge is a gift from God, and reason is one of the 
faculties God has equipped us with to know God better. Though we can know God in 
truth, our knowledge is qualified. It is comparable in relation to God. It is limited and 
finite due to our nature and perspective as humans - I Corinthians 13:12 For now we see 
in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face. Now I know only in part; then I will 
know fully, even as I have been fully known. It is also affected by the fall and often 
skewed by sin. It is also within a temporal perspective and thus provisional and 
. 86 progressIve. 
I believe that the Eastern dynamic of cataphasis and apophasis is an effective 
model for expressing the revelation, progression, and limitation of our knowledge, 
especially towards God. Cataphasis and apophasis characterize our ascent in knowing the 
knowable unknowable. What is knowable is cataphatic and by revelation or illumination. 
It is real experiential knowledge of God though revealed contextually. What is 
unknowable is apophatic, and that is the knowledge of God's hyperessence or to know 
God's self as God does. Also some knowledge is apophatic not because it is unknowable, 
but because it has yet to be revealed to us, or we have not come to it yet. 
Within the metaphorical continuity of our understanding there are unbridgeable 
gaps of perspectival obscurity merely due to our humanity and location, let alone our 
depravity. The darkness also looms over our temporality which providentially allows our 
86 Wolfhart Pannenberg notes the provisional nature of knowledge that unfolds eschatologically until we 
know in full at the coming of Christ. 
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understanding to serve provisionally. The renewing of the mind as a function of the 
ontological shift in the new creation in Christ is clearly an eschatological function and 
tension (II Cor. 4: 16 - "the inward person is being renewed daily"). Thus, in some sense 
all true knowledge in its analogical ascent and scope is real and yet provisional in its 
desideratum for pleromatic realization at the parousia of his glory. We are practicing the 
symbolic art of knowledge and along the way are often corrected by its apophasis, and 
yet still inspired by its function and satisfaction to create and further signify. 
The New Testament uses the metaphor of disciple, mathetes, signifying a 
"learner" or a "student" of a master. More and more, we are learners of the way of the 
cross, learning obedience through humility, lack, sacrifice and suffering, so that in 
participating in Christ's suffering and death, we may attain to the resurrection and the full 
realization of God's Kingdom. Our learning of Christ in the way of the cross becomes an 
epistemology of the cross. Our baptismal participation in the death, burial, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ is a command to follow Christ and be a learner of Christ and 
his way, a via crucis. 87 Theology becomes participation, participation in the life of Christ, 
and not merely an academic exercise or a scholarly game of cat and mouse, chasing the 
latest ideological or cultural innovations for the sake of relevance alone. We are learning 
to be like Christ. There is a connection between knowledge and holiness. 
For both Maximus and Wesley, humility and other virtues were an integral part of 
knowledge. In repentance and ascetic practice one contemplated the knowledge of God 
that would ultimately lead to sanctification. Both men realized that knowledge was meant 
to bring one to holiness. For Maximus and the Eastern Christian monastic tradition, 
"theology" was theologia, a spiritual union with God. It was the highest state of one's 
87 Latin for "the way of the cross." 
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journey in theosis. The believer begins in praxis (ascetic practices and spiritual 
disciplines of repentance and consecration) and moves to theoria (contemplation and 
meditation upon the truth of God) in order to arrive at theologia. Notice in this ordo that 
actions of repentance and humility precede contemplation of truth. The mind is humbled 
and purified that it may receive with meekness and openness God's word. Theoria is not 
"theory" as we know it, a conceptualization, a principle, a proposition or a formula, but it 
is the open-heart engaging the living truth of Christ through the Spirit. Also, theologia is 
not "theology" as we often use the term in the West. The Eastern Church has always 
shunned and condemned dry and reductive scholasticism. It has sought to make room for 
the work of the Spirit in the human heart. Theology is not reduced to abstractions, but, as 
theologia, it is a holy union with God. Participation embraces an epistemic humility as a 
spiritual discipline that works through virtue and develops virtue. 
The goal of knowledge is not knowledge but Christ-likness and Christopraxis, 
theosis, because our primary conviction about the knowledge of the truth is that Jesus 
Christ, the God-person, is the truth. The incarnation of truth is not merely reduced to truth 
as proposition, though it contains it. A mission of theology is concerned about 
propositional truth, scriptural theology, and a congruent biblical witness. Yet, orthodoxy 
is much broader than conceptualization. It finds its true locus in the living Triune God 
revealed by the Spirit in the Son made flesh and blood to a people through the worship 
and mission in which the church participates. In this way, the church can avoid the 
rational hegemony of mission found in modernist construals of the truth and be more of a 
communi ty of virtue that demonstrates the know ledge of the truth. 
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DifferencelDifferential Unity. While analogy allows for our human limitations in 
understanding God, univocity has no room for such apophasis and can end in totalization, 
hegemony and nihilism, the ad nauseam of sameness.88 With epistemic humility we not 
only approach the divine with respect, attentiveness and kenotic silence but similarly we 
approach that which is different. Analogical participation is compatible with an ontology 
of peace not differential violence. The structure of analogy is partly based on difference, 
as opposed to univocity. An example of difference within unity would be within the 
Triune life of God. There are three hypostases or persons in one ousia89 In an Eastern 
Christian understanding of person (hypostasis and prosopon/o there is difference. Each 
person is uniquely different, and yet there is differential unity in the life of the Trinity. 
The three are eternally one. 
The Christian revelation ontologically understands and lives out of differential 
unity, an ontology of peace, a unity even in difference. In another example, the 
Incarnation of Jesus Christ expresses a similar differential unity. Cha1cedonian logic 
conveys that Christ is two natures hypostatically united in one person. One nature is 
human, and one nature is divine. There two natures are quite different and find unity in 
one person, differential unity. The church, the body of Christ, and all of creation are 
called through the Incarnation into a similar union with Christ, theosis. In this process, 
we become like God. Theosis is analogical, and it unites that which is different. An 
ontology of peace allows us to approach other cultures, forms and meanings with respect 
and discernment. Univocal methods like tabula rasa are not necessary. Translation cross-
88 We had noted earlier how nihilism does not discern difference in its assessment of the history of 
Ehilosophy. All is a ruse of violence and power. 
9 Greek for "substance" or ·'essence" 
90 Prosopon is a Greek word that refers to the mask used in Greek theater that represented human freedom 
and the ability to attempt to escape fate . 
culturally is not a matter of one to one correspondence. But the Christian faith can be 
expressed in analogical forms that are critically derived from another context. 
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Relationality. Analogy is also a relational species. Derrida insists on the deferral 
of meaning in what I call a "metaphysics of absence" (Derrida 1997:22-23,73,152- 157; 
see also Milbank 1990:307). This is a partial truth. A further description would include 
deferral to the other, "shared meaning" out of a totalizing absence in a creation ex nihilo; 
yet shared in an analogization of transcendent presence signified in incarnational 
language and embodied logoi. Participation is an epistemological process that is 
relational and shared. Its very structure is dependent and relational. Knowledge is 
acquired in relationship, especially within the larger ontological context. As koinonia is at 
the core of the Triune God, creation is a dependent complex eco-sphere not only relying 
on the divine who holds all things together but also relying on its own manifold internal 
relations. We as well are social beings, and we know in relationship. Participation gives 
importance to communal structures of understanding and an ear to the totality of voices in 
a culture, subcultures, traditions (folk, ethnic, academic, ecclesial, organizational etc), 
local epistemologies, and other forms that are the study of cultural anthropology. 
One of the perennial sins and also a sin of modernism is excessive individualism. 
The heart of the fall of humanity in scripture for Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of 
Pergamon John Zizioulas (1931 ) is the rupture between being and communion 
(Zizioulas 1985: 102). With the fall, being becomes no longer dependent on communion 
but is given priority over communion (1985: 102). One has to know the being of 
something before a relationship of communion can occur (1985: 102). As a result each 
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individual being is given its own ontological status in se91 to be recognized prior to 
communion. Epistemic notions of subject and object and the primacy of individuality in 
ontology are created, whereas, in an ontology of participation, knowledge occurs in 
relationship (1985: 102-103). 
For Zizioulas knowledge is not acquired solo or in isolation without relationship 
and influence but in community and in community traditions. In community, we share 
life and experience, dialogue, challenge, disagree, struggle together, heal, and learn in a 
process that develops virtue, wisdom92 and trust among the community as it pursues the 
knowledge of God and the practice of God's mission in the world. For the believer, that 
community tradition is the church. It seems that the history of authority for Christianity 
can be crudely broken into three periods. The first period is the Catholic-Orthodox era or 
premodern period that looked to the church for authority. The second period is the 
modern period or Protestant Reformation that looked to Scripture for authority. The third 
period is the postmodern period or Pentecostal-Charismatic period that looked to the Holy 
Spirit for authority. 
These three sources need not be in opposition. The model of participation is one 
of participating in the Life of the Spirit. The Spirit's life extends to the birthing, 
sanctifying, worshipping and equipping of the church for the glory of God. It is the Spirit 
who both birthed the church and inspired scripture. It is the work of the Spirit in Scripture 
as interpreted (a hermeneutical community) and lived out (a praxis community) in the 
worship and mission of the church that is the authority for our faith and practice. 
Participation realizes the importance of working out our understanding and practicing of 
91 Latin for "in itself' 
92 Phronesis is the practice or habits of virtue and wisdom. 
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God's word within the community tradition of the church. Thus this is a radical challenge 
to the church that claims to participate in the Holy Spirit and in truth, to be a community 
tradition that demonstrates a virtue epistemology that is reliable, credible and responsible 
in its testimony of Jesus Christ. Too often the church has claimed this position 
propositionally but has failed as a praxis community. As a doxastic community, we are 
accountable to God and the world to live out the mission of God faithfully, if we are to be 
acknowledged by the world as a community tradition that embodies the truth. 
Experience. Being relational in nature, participation deals with the experiential 
dimension of knowledge. Reality as a univocal rational abstraction is not an accurate and 
full picture of what is before us but is a reduction and a dangerous caricature. Reality is 
something we know through experience. Often Christian life is reduced to scholastic 
theology.93 Jesus is the Word of Life according to 1 Johnl: 1. He is a living Word that 
gives fullness oflife to those who believe. We cannot reduce that promise oflife to mere 
abstractions and propositions. It is a life that we are to experience in the Spirit with all of 
the fruit of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of life (Romans 8:2). 
Both Wesley and Maximus depict a religious knowledge that is experiential. 
Participation is ontologically based and so has that dimension of transcendent interaction 
of beings not just ideas. Wesley's emphasized the source of knowledge as the grace of 
God imparted through the Holy Spirit. Wesley offers a pneumatic empiricism in which 
the spiritual senses perceive invisible reality and acquire experiential knowledge of God. 
93Throughout history, Christian theology has turned to scholasticism in many forms ; Catholic (Scotism), 
Lutheran (Abraham Calovius), Reformed (Beza), and others. In many cases, it becomes a tedious reduction 
of the living faith to pure orthodox conceptualization. 
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Participation in the oikonomia94 of the Triune God works within the presence of 
God, the energies of God - the Holy Spirit. Emphasis on the Holy Spirit and the work of 
the Spirit through grace in the cosmos, preveniently in all persons and fully in the church 
needs to be part of a theology of mission that incorporates participation. Such a 
pneumatology works consubstantially with a Christology that is faithful to Scripture, 
affirms Chalcedonian logic and recognizes the Logos of creation and salvation. In this 
eschaton, the church needs to recognize that in mission it participates in the mission of 
the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit sets the agenda of mission in the earth. We are to follow 
the lead of the Spirit, as we faithfully proclaim Christ. 
A Fiduciary Component. Also in conjunction with Wesley's spiritual empiricism 
is a fiduciary mode of knowledge apprehension.95 Wesley seems to work from the 
Augustinian tradition offides quarenes intellectum. 96 Faith is seen as a spiritual faculty of 
perception as well as a primary willing and desire of the heart which is the human 
response in participating in God and in knowledge in general. In some sense all 
knowledge has faith as its base (Polanyi 1962:266). A fiduciary component of knowledge 
owns up front our personal commitments in knowing and strips us of pretenses to pure 
reason or any other appeals to illegitimate authority that we use to control. Faith as trust 
puts a face on knowledge and a love for neighbor, adding a human dimension to the 
epistemic task that has often been calculated in cold, de-personalized logic. 
Often modern theories of epistemology are built from the bottom up and are 
framed by questions surrounding foundationalism, justification and warrant of belief. I 
94 A Greek word from the New Testament for the "economy," "household management" or "plan" of God. 
95 In Chapter Four, I examined Wesley's epistemology which incorporates faith as a mode of apprehension 
of knowledge. 
96 Latin for "faith seeking understanding." 
163 
am not against propositional truth and its justification, especially in theology. It has its 
place in proper perspective and balance. These questions are valid but only address half 
of the picture. Our picture is larger than a sense-perceived, rational world or even a world 
reduced to logical propositions. This sort of foundationalist blueprint for knowledge is a 
product of modernism and has questions in mind that presuppose reason as having an 
autonomous or self-sufficient nature. This blueprint also presupposes the ability for one 
epistemological theory to cover all scenarios and to provide absolute certainty in each 
case. I do not believe that there is one theory of knowledge that absolutely covers all 
cases. I am not contending for that kind of knowledge or justification. I leave that to God. 
Saying that does not mean we become relativists or skeptics. Some beliefs are 
basic and can be justified. Some beliefs are not. I believe at the penultimate level, the 
universe is basically rational, or to a degree comprehensible, to our fallen and limited 
reason in that we can symbolically describe, interpret and explain it in a limited way if 
we pursue truth through epistemic virtue.97 However, reason is a mode of apprehension 
that works with other modes of apprehension, like faith, that also rests in larger 
interacting contexts that are situated within creation.98 And creation operates under the 
grace and providence of God. Faith and reason work together. What we know, we believe 
we know. Faith is the "ground" of our knowledge, but our knowledge is also at some 
level and to some degree reasonable and reliable in order to function in creation and 
relate to God. 
97 Examples of epistemic virtue are humility, honesty, wisdom, and openness. Virtue epistemology finds 
!ustification of belief in the reliability and responsibility of the agent. 
S One interacting context is the socio-cultural context, and more specifically, a community tradition like 
the church. 
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Thus although we hold to a real external world that is ratio-empirically as well as 
contextually known in truth and in part, does not mean that that knowledge is built on 
purely rational and self-evident foundations. In an onto-epistemology of participation, the 
vision of reality is much larger. Whatever penultimate "foundation" we rest on in our 
basic, reliable and responsible beliefs about the external world is within the context of the 
created order that is "suspended" from God the Creator. Our picture includes a 
transcendent dimension in God. "Suspension" rather than "foundation,,99 is the more 
appropriate metaphor for describing how knowledge is positioned and functions in the 
larger cosmic vision. Movement within reality is from top to bottom to top again and not 
from bottom to top, as if the bottom, the Cartesian Archimedean pOint,100 is truly 
immovable and certain. God initiates movement towards creation, and creation responds. 
In such an ontologically informed vision of knowledge, divine revelation by grace 
through faith seeking understanding becomes a primary dynamic. The created order is a 
grace gift from God that reveals God's love and purpose for creation. We come to 
understand these things through a faith commitment and through the conviction and 
evidences of a reliably functioning reason, both working together. Reason cannot work 
alone or unaided. Ultimately nothing is autonomous or self-sufficient but God. Left to 
ourselves, or our own reason, we cannot understand God or God's world as God intends. 
In I Corinthians 2:14 Paul declares that the "natural man," the one who is not under the 
influence of God's Spirit, cannot understand the things of the Spirit, because they are 
99 Foundationalism builds its system of truth from the ground up through reason and! or empirical data. 
Suspension "hangs" creation from a transcendent God. Of course, the dimensional language is analogical. 
100 Archimedes was rumored to have said that if he could find a fixed point and a proper lever, he could 
move the world. Descartes sought such a fixed point in his "I think; therefore, I am" foundation of modern 
knowledge. 
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revealed by the Spirit and are spiritually comprehended. In God's eyes, we are justified 
by faith , and not justified by reason. 
Privation. Participation not only understands the locality of our understanding in 
terms of faith commitment, but it also locates our understanding in our privative 
context. lOl We participate in life as we are. Wesley did not understand prevenient grace 
as an improvement of our existing nature but as the power to move closer to God through 
repentance, pardon and regeneration. Both ontologically and in a lapsarian sense, we 
operate out of a state of privation. The diastema between God and humanity exists by our 
created nature and is then exacerbated by our sin. We lack full being like God and are 
caught in a tension of being and non-being as we choose to become what God intends. 
Morally we have inherited and often choose corruption, misusing our freedom and 
choosing a self-centered life of idolatry rather than serving God and others. Our natural 
limitations and our sin affect our noetic structure so that we are impeded, weakened, and 
bent towards ourselves even in the process of knowing (Plantinga 2000:213-217). 
Limitation and lapse greatly hinder our ability to know in the way God would 
have us to know, and so we stand in need of epistemological redemption. Our intellectual 
capacities and processes are often infected by unbelief, pride, injustice, selfishness, 
covetousness, ambition, and hatred, which blind and limit them from their purpose in 
knowing and loving God and loving others. Hence, any naive and ideal notion of any 
evolutionary perfection or deification within the capacity of the human nature itself to 
respond does not contain a drop of reality. Although depravity has not obliterated the 
image of God in humanity, and God's grace provides us with a universal witness, sin is 
101 "Privation" or "privative" comes from the Latin privatio or "private." My context is from the 
philosophical and Eastern Christian tradition that uses the term to mean "lack" or "without" (especially 
being - ontological lack), and in other cases, "moral evil due to an absence of good." 
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all too real and often hinders us from realizing God's vision in our own lives and in our 
world. 
Our sin is also communal and consequential, it is not just individual. Although we 
participate in God, in some sense, we universally participate in sin (Suchocki 1995: 101). 
Our organic solidarity with the human race enables sin to touch and affect others outside 
of ourselves (1995: 101). In a participatory scheme reality is relational, and Marjorie 
Suchocki believes "every act of violence reverberates throughout the race" (1995105). By 
limits of our human nature and our solidarity in fallenness, we stand as the poor in need 
of participation in Christ's righteousness and life, that we may move from non-being to 
being, privation to pleroma, and death to life. 
It is important to note that neither the Maximian vision of cosmic theosis or the 
Wesleyan vision of entire sanctification are a process of 'pure becoming' in either an 
evolutionary or natural sense or as a necessary universalism. Although for both thinkers 
all of creation is an expression of grace, there is a sense where the grace in creation is 
incipient and incomplete. Prevenient grace needs to progress to saving and sanctifying 
grace for Wesley. Knowledge as an eschatological function goes from the old to the new 
and thus from the sensual to spiritual. There is an implied first order of grace and a last 
order of grace, "the old" and "the new" in Pauline terms. 
Even though nature is "graced" for Maximus, he realizes a process and crisis in 
the knowledge of salvation in which the reason moves from "natural reason" under the 
"law of nature" to "supernatural reason" under the "law of grace," to use Maximus' terms 
(Maximus 2003:169). This transformation occurs through Christ in the Incarnation. 
Again the center for Maximus is always the Incarnation. We are not talking about an 
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undifferentiated participation that has no center, contra Reno (Reno 2002:72). Christ, the 
incarnate Logos, is the participatory center. 
Both men also realized the presence and activity of evil and sin in the world and 
in the human heart and the need for grace and a response from the human will. Wesley 
frequently preached on sin, evil, and eternal punishment, which is not disputed. Maximus 
along with his doctrine of the logos of providence recognized the collateral working of 
God's judgment which "punishes by word and deed those who deserve it. .. " (Maximus 
1996:133). He seems to reject the 'Origenist version' of the apokatastasis (unconditional 
universal restoration). In his Ascetic Life, Maximus regularly quotes from Scripture 
concerning eternal punishment (Maximus 1955: 118-119). The economy of salvation 
works with the human will and not around it. Evil, though non-being, is not a gloss but a 
choice against God's will that results in corruption and destruction but is overcome in 
Christ's death and resurrection. 
Maximus' ontology of differential unity is part of the created order of the logoi in 
the Logos and is good. However a morality of difference comes under the logoi of 
providence and judgment, and human choices for evil are punished and corrected for 
convertive purposes (Thunberg 1995:69-70). Neither Maximus nor Wesley' s vision of 
salvation is in any sense a natural process of pure becoming or a necessary universalism 
determined by the will of God. 
Incarnation. Finally, participation is inherently incarnational. Our participation is 
not initiated by an ascent and reaching up to God, as much as it is the grace of God 
through creation reaching down to us in fellowship. Incarnation is God's initial move. 
Participation is our response. We only participate in the creation because God has created 
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us. Similarly, it was Christ who became flesh and had fellowship with our humanity so 
that we may be like him in his divinity. Participation is initiated by the grace of God as he 
invites us into communion with him. 
Maximus believed that Jesus "incarnated," in some sense, in creation, Scripture 
and in the flesh. For us, participation is fulfilled in incarnation. For us, for the church, for 
mission, participation means to "be there." It means to be concretely present, spirit, soul, 
and body with God and others, participating in his grace and love. It means to be 
contextual without confusing, changing, combining or mixing the Logos with what is 
enfleshed.102 Incarnation means differential unity in mission wherever God calls. 
Differential unity describes the Chalcedonian logic that allows for Christ to be 
one person and have two natures without confusion. Although we can never be 
incarnations of God the way Christ is, we are called to be Christ-like, theosis. For 
Maximus, this occurs because of the Incarnation. Because Jesus, who is divine, became 
human, so we who are human can become like the divine. Theosis occurs through the 
Incarnation, because we are joined with Christ, and are deified through him. However 
although we are united to Christ and are one with God through the Incarnation, we are 
distinct from God in our humanity, a differential unity. 
Also, as we communicate the gospel in mission with Christ, we are called to 
reflect and manifest the Kingdom as a "theophany,,,I03 as well as to communicate it. We 
become living epistles read by all. Yet, our unity in Christ and our witness is contextual 
and thus differentiated. Its differentiation occurs in the expression of our own cultural 
context and when we contextualize in the culture of others. Difference is not necessarily 
102 I am suggesting the Chalcedonian logic for Christology as a model of contextualization that protects 
against syncretism. 
103 Here, meaning God appearing or manifesting through the church. 
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violence, in the Nietzschean and Focauldian sense. The message of Christ and our unity 
in Christ is a constant, though its expression is differentiated across cultural lines. 
Participation is the call and the freedom to be in Christ in any context as we are in 
mission with the Triune God. Critical contextualization of the mission has always been 
God's work in history. As we participate in this effort, we are invited to explore what 
incarnation may look like cross-culturally. 
An onto-epistemology of participation is characterized by these features and 
others, as it attempts to portray in human language the cosmic drama of God's grace. It 
does not offer so much a philosophical system as it does a philosophical and theological 
vision. I believe the term vision more accurately depicts the work of both Maximus and 
Wesley. I will look at the implications of such a vision within a theology of mission. As 
all mission begins with God, I will begin with the Trinity and how its oikonomia104 gives 
shape to the mission of the church. Following, I will examine participation as it bears on 
three key elements in a theology of mission, creation, incarnation, and new creation. 
Participation and Missio Trinitatis 
This research unintentionally took on somewhat of a Trinitarian form. My work 
with Radical Orthodoxy focused on reconnecting the cosmos back to God its creator. I 
then sought to develop that nascent form of participation through Maximus ' theology of 
Jesus Christ the Logos. And finally follow through with the soteriological consequences 
of participation by examining Wesley's ordo of grace and the work of the Spirit in the 
knowledge of God. 
104 Greek for "economy." In theology it refers to both the total plan and management of God's will in 
history, and also its implementation through the revelation and ministry of the three persons of the Trinity 
in history. 
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My Trinitarian scheme was laid out unwittingly, but there has been an intentional 
return to the Trinity and Trinitarian structures in recent theological endeavors, especially 
in missiology. In accordance with Christian revelation, the Trinity is beginning to take a 
primary and formative role in how we do theology. 
In this past century the notion of beginning theology with God may be best 
represented by the Swiss theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968). In the second chapter of this 
work, I explained the Radical Orthodox understanding of correlation. Part of this 
movement's purpose is to return theology to the roots of revelation and remove the 
hybrid influence of "secular" thinking. I propose to call this process "de-correlation." 
Barth may have been "de-correlating" before any of us, as he sought to return purely to 
the revelation of the Word of God. 
Karl Barth read a significant paper in 1932 at the Brandenburg Missionary 
Conference in which he repudiated the notion that mission or its conception was a human 
activity or a work of the church, but affirmed that mission was the activity of God who 
sends God's self in mission through the oikonomia of the Son and the Spirit (Bevans and 
Schroeder 2004:290). Mission became an enterprise authored by God and not the church. 
Earlier I had alluded to the Radical Orthodox critique of the secular as a product 
of the univocity of being. The Enlightenment idea of the nation-state, and the notion of 
national and even autonomous churches echo a univocal expression of being, as the 
church is able to declare itself in national terms and speak for God on its own terms. The 
autonomy of the national church and the subsequent splintering into a plethora of 
denominations may be one of the most poignant religious expressions of a univocity of 
being - the autonomy and space to speak independently for God. 
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Thus, in these Enlightenment terms the church owns the mission. The mission 
becomes the mission of the church. It took a "de-correlationist" like Barth to relocate 
salvation back in God. Later in 1934, Karl Hartenstein would take Barth' s idea and attach 
the term missio Dei (mission of God) to it, as opposed to missio ecclesiae (mission of the 
church) (Bevans and Schroeder 2004:290). The missio Dei conveys the idea that not only 
the mission is of God, but also that mission comes from the very nature of God. God is a 
missionary God (Bosch 1991:390). 
In 1952 at the Willingen Conference of the IMC, the notion of the missio Dei was 
put clearly in the context of the Trinity. Bosch states: 
The classical doctrine on the missio Dei as God the Father sending the 
Son, and God the Father and the Son sending the Spirit was expanded to include 
another "movement: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit sending the church into the 
world .. . Willingen 's image of mission was mission as participating in the sending 
of God. (Bosch 1991 :390) 
The missio Dei is a paradigm shift in mission from being church or human centered to 
being God centered. God is already in mission to the world through the oikonomia of the 
Trinity. The church is called to participate in this mission. An onto-epistemology of 
participation lends itself to a missiology of participation in the missio Trinitatis. Our 
understanding, theology and work come out of our participation in God' s mission in us 
and in others. Bosch puts it this way: "The missio Dei is God's activity, which embraces 
both the church and the world, and in which the church may be privileged to participate" 
(Bosch 1991:391). 
"Mission as participation in the mission of the Triune God," to use the phrase of 
Bevans and Schroeder, is also thematic to the Ad Gentes mission document of the Second 
Vatican Council: 
The church was now understood as a people, a communion, and mission 
was conceived as the participation in the dynamic communion of God's 
triune life, that is, the church was a sacrament of salvation, a sign and 
instrument of God's saving presence toward and within all of creation. 
(Bevins and Schroeder 2004:286) 
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Mission was understood, in Ad Gentes, as God's self revelation through the Son and the 
Spirit manifested in the history of creation to humanity who is formed by the Spirit into a 
community as an icon of the Trinity and is equipped by the Spirit with gifts to participate 
in God's mission (Bevans and Schroeder 2004:287). 
The Orthodox Churches in 1986 put together a mission document entitled "Go 
Forth in Peace: Orthodox Perspectives in Mission" which similarly reflects the theme of 
participation in the missio Dei (Bevans and Schroeder 2004:289). The Orthodox 
statement explores the "radical communal nature of God" as the wellspring for mission. 
The life of the Trinitarian community is what God reveals through Christ and the Holy 
Spirit to the world (Bevans and Schroeder 2004:288-289). The mission of God is the 
sharing of God's abundant life of communion with creation (2004:288). The church 
participates in this overflow of life, and from this participation comes its missionary 
nature (2004:289). 
More recently there have been emphases placed on a Trinitarian approach to the 
missio Dei in Catholic missiologists like Robert Schreiter. Schreiter "has indicated that 
the Trinitarian understanding of the missio Dei might hold out a new direction for 
mission theology" (2004:292). Schreiter echoes some of the insights that I have made 
from Radical Orthodoxy in terms of an ontology of difference and peace and the 
differential unity of the Trinity. Schreiter believes that the unity in diversity expressed in 
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the Trinity will be central to a theology of religious and cultural pluralism in response to 
postmodernism (2004:293). 
Bevans and Schroeder claim that "much of the renewal in Trinitarian theology 
in the West owes its inspiration to Orthodox theology" (2004:294). This author would at 
least agree to its influence in his own theology. The Trinity, as communal being as in 
Zizioulas, provides a theological model for koinonia, relationships, freedom and 
difference in personhood, diversity in community, and participation, in which the world 
is invited to share (Zizioulas 1985). This model is at the core of an Orthodox theology of 
mission and is best expressed through the church in the liturgy and the Eucharist, for the 
church participates in the triune God when it participates in the Eucharist (see Stamoolis 
for elaboration -1986:94-95). The limited scope of this research prevents further 
development, but an ecclesiology of Eucharistic participation is foundational to the 
church's identity as a doxo-liturgical being and to mission. 
~astern Orthodox contributions to Trinitarian theology also involve tying together 
the economies of the Son and the Spirit. Often the Western church tends to tends to be 
Christologically dominated over against pneumatology (Zizioulas 1985: 129). As 
referenced above in a Spirit-Word Christology the two being consubstantial work 
together in God's overall economy. Luke-Acts reveals a Spirit-Christology in which 
Christ is born of and empowered by the Spirit to do the work of the Father (Yong 
2005: 86-87). 
A Spirit-soteriology and ecclesiology understands that the Spirit births and 
empowers the church as a corporate personality of Christ (Zizioulas 1985: 130-131; Y ong 
2005:88-91). Papanikolaou paraphrases Zizioulas on the Holy Spirit that "the Holy Spirit 
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accomplishes the identification of Eucharist, church and the eschatological Body of 
Christ. It is by the power of the Holy Spirit that the Eucharistic community becomes 
conscious of their unity in Christ and of their participation in the triune life of God" 
(Papanikolaou 2006:33). For Zizioulas and Eastern Orthodoxy it is important that there is 
a synthesis between Christology and pneumatology. Wesley also connected the two with 
his theology of grace. The Spirit began to work early on in prevenient grace with the 
purpose of ultimately bringing one to Christ and continuing in grace to transform one into 
Christ's image. Participation in the missio Trinitatis needs to recognize the oikonomia of 
God in the work of the Son and the Spirit not in exclusion of each other but in 
conjunction. 
God the Father: Creation and Participation 
A theology of mission from the Missio Dei recognizes God's work beginning in 
creation. The Triune community freely expresses its love, grace, and wisdom through a 
desire to extend koinonia to the cosmos. In fact, the cosmos itself is a free gift of God's 
grace. It is also an icon of the image and communion of the Triune God. Creation in its 
existence, expression, and purpose is given participation in the life of God. God's 
economy begins in history through creation as an extension of the divine abundant life. 
Creation is therefore sacramental and the beginning of a sacramental theology that 
reaches its height in the Incarnation and is expressed globally in the Eucharistic theology, 
witness, and community of the church 
Both Maximus and Wesley recognized that creation houses the universal witness 
of God. Maximus saw that the contemplation of created things could lead to the 
understanding that their reason and purpose could all be traced to one God, the Logos, 
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because God created all things by his Word (creatio per verbum). For Wesley, creation 
and conscience were both expressions and instruments of God's prevenient grace that 
identified his existence, attributes, and a fundamental discernment of good and evil. 
Neither man thought of this knowledge in terms of "natural theology." Creation was a 
work of the grace of God, and humanity was never truly in a state of pure nature. 
The notion of a universal witness to the knowledge of God is compatible with an 
onto-epistemology of participation. It is in creaturely dependence and by God's grace that 
the universe participates in God. Radical Orthodox "decorrelation,,105 made it a point to 
demonstrate the nihilistic fate of giving creation the ground of its own being. There is no 
space in the cosmos for autonomy except in the realm of deception. The Christological 
hymn of Colossians reminds us that "everything was created through him and for him" 
and "he holds all things together." Creation does not have its own ground but participates 
in God. 
A theology of mission needs to develop a high theology of creation. Not one that 
diminishes the uniqueness and exclusivity of Christ, but one that is compatible with it, 
bringing the God of creation and salvation together as Maximus did in his theology of the 
Logos. Due to creation and the Incarnation, there is a special blessedness about the 
cosmos, in that it participates in the holy grandeur of God. Manichean, Docetic, and 
Gnostic dualisms do not cloud the vision of a sacramental universe whose very spatio-
temporal grounds were fashioned for doxo-liturgical celebration. Along with other 
scholars, Bruggemann notes that the creation narrative in Genesis chapter one was 
formed in the Priestly tradition for liturgical usage (Brueggemann 1982:22). 
105 "Decorrelation" is a term I am coining to denote the process of removing a "secular" correlation from 
theology. See "Correlation" in chapter 2. 
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God as designer and artificer built creation as a cosmic temple, metaphorical of 
his Kingdom, in which all the inhabitants of the universe are to praise and worship 
according to the liturgy of his word revealed in creation (Middleton 2005:81-88). 
Middleton also suggests that humanity, representing by analogy God as King in the 
imago Dei, imitates and carries out God's rule of justice and order through a royal and 
priestly function in which humanity impacts and blesses the entire created order, as 
organizers and "culture shapers" (2005:88-90). This view of humanity is similar to 
Maximus ' view of humanity as microcosm and mediator of the cosmos. The implication 
is that God seeks to accomplish his purposes or mediate them through cultures, and 
humanity is called to be a "culture shaper." 
A high view of creation bears witness in an ontology of participation and in the 
Scripture record of creation. Creation begins the mission of God revealing the grace, love 
and wisdom of God in all things. In its beauty creation reflects the sublime majesty of 
God and commands that its inhabitants glorify the one who has made all things. Creation 
provides the sacramental context for the work of God in history, specifically the 
Incarnation. The revelation of that work is written in the logoi of creation' s order, and 
creation becomes an icon of its maker. 
Applied to a theology of mission, a high view of creation acknowledges that 
through creation, although hindered by sin, there is a universal witness of God that has 
gone ahead of the church in every land among every people. This witness needs to be 
discerned and interpreted in every culture. As Middleton indicated, humanity as part of 
the created order is given the divine task of "culture shaping." Culture shaping is God's 
will and purpose in making humanity in the imago Dei, and it is his command in ordering 
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humanity to extend God's shalom to the earth. I believe there are many starting-points in 
communicating the Gospel cross-culturally, but one starting point is clearly through 
culture. 
The doctrine of tabula rasa which is based on a preferential option of Western 
culture due to its assumed superiority comes from a low view of creation and a high view 
of reason. The sacramental nature of creation makes for a level ground for all cultures. 
Each culture can be a vehicle through which God speaks and reveals him self. Stephan 
Bevans refers to this as the "anthropological model" (Bevans 2002:55). Its focus in 
contextualizing theology is on culture. The anthropological model is creation-centered, as 
it looks to human experience in culture as the starting point (2002:57). 
Theologian James Cone (1938 ) has picked up on this approach. His theology of 
liberation begins with blackness and the experience of blackness (ConeI986:23-24). 
There he touches on the heartbeat of an oppressed and suffering community. Participation 
in our theology of mission looks for places where God's grace is operating preveniently 
in the midst of our culture and experience. Cone finds it in a Jesus whose "righteousness 
is inseparable from the weak and helpless in human society" (Cone 1986:5). He finds it in 
the 'blackness of God," who identifies "with the oppressed to the point that their 
experience becomes God's experience" (1986:63). 
Cone continues that "the blackness of God means that God has made the 
oppressed condition God's own condition" (1986:63). He sees this echoed in the Exodus 
and Gospel traditions where "by electing Israelite slaves as the people of God and by 
becoming the Oppressed One in Jesus Christ, the human race is made to understand that 
God is known where human beings experience humiliation and suffering" (1986:64). 
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Kelly Brown Douglas picks up on this same type of identification found in the grace of 
God through her depiction of the "Black Christ," who found solidarity with the slaves 
and in the black experience of oppression and struggle (1994:20-21,54-55). 
In the case of the Black Christ and Black theology, the point of grace was found 
in the cultural experience of the people. Within the narratives of privation and suffering, 
the voices crying injustice were heard. It was in the midst of those cries that Blacks, 
themselves, heard the voice of grace and God's identification with their suffering. God 
had already gone ahead and not only was touching the culture where it hurt but was 
preparing a way of liberation and a place of peace. Black theology found participation in 
God's blackness and in God's empathy for the suffering and the oppressed. 
It is at that point that critical contextualization is necessary to begin to employ the 
meaning and truth of the Gospel in indigenous and culturally relevant forms (see Hiebert 
on Critical Contextualization 1985:171-192). I will look more in depth at 
contextualization in the next section. However, Cone used the cultural experience of 
"blackness" as a point of contact and even the core for his theology of mission. There are 
multiple models and points of entry that can be used, but in a theology of mission with a 
high theology of creation, the anthropological model is effective at finding God's 
universal witness in the very experience of the people. 
One of the primary benefits of a high theology of creation and an anthropological 
model of mission is that it works from an ontology of analogical participation. As I have 
noted, an ontology of analogical participation does not see the differences in creation as 
inherently oppositional, as is the case in a univocity of being. Analogy comprises 
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differential unity and expresses an ontology of peace. Creation expresses a differentiated 
unity of peace, cosmic shalom. 
Thus, in a theology of mission that is structured around participation, difference is 
honored and respected, though not diluted or blindly accepted in terms of cultural 
relativism. The context of creation is a basis for human value freedom and equality 
before God. In a participatory scheme, creation is sacramental and has been fashioned for 
God's use and glory. It is doxo-liturgical and sacred. Of course, in creation I am 
including culture. Since there are no autonomous realms, cultural hegemony is 
unauthorized and has no place in an ontology of peace or the missio Dei. All culture 
critically evaluated by the culture's own people along with the global church can be an 
instrument of God's grace. 
With creation as a basis and starting point for mission, among other models (See 
Bevans 1992), many opportunities arise. Remembering that creation is analogical in its 
expression of the grace and revelation of God, analogical models found in creation can be 
effective starting points in contextualizing and communicating the Gospel. Don 
Richardson 's Peace Child has popularized the potential of "redemptive analogies" and 
"functional equivalences" to reach a people group (Richardson 2005). While often we 
seek a literal or formal equivalence, which ultimately stems from a univocity of being, 
when communicating texts, form, meaning and messages it is an unrealistic expectation 
in a created world of analogical expression. Further research needs to be done exploring 
analogy as a primary method of cross-cultural communication. 
One example of analogical expression is wisdom. Robert Schreiter in his 
Constructing Local Theologies comments that sapiential knowledge functions 
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analogically (Schreiter 1985:86). Sapiential knowledge is creation-based. God leaves 
vestiges of himself (vestigia Dei), specifically his creativity and order, in type and 
antitype configurations, patterns in the world, hierarchical orders, controlled allegory, and 
the hidden in the visible in creation (1985:85-86). These are all analogical forms that 
function to lead us upward towards God through the things we know in creation. 
Schreiter observes the cultural conditions where sapiential theology is receptive. 
First, wisdom predominates "in those places where human life is seen as a unified cycle, 
marked by progressive development" (1985:86). Second, it occurs in cultures where both 
the visible and the invisible are seen as a unified whole (1985:86). Third, cultures that 
appreciate the underlying structures and patterns in the universe that serve as a pathway 
to human growth are open to sapiential theology (1985:86). Fourth, wisdom theology 
prevails in cultures that tend to focus on the inner way which leads to the outer reality 
(1985:87). Fifth, "cultures that adopt a two-level approach to ultimate reality, an exoteric 
and an esoteric one, are likely to follow the patterns of a wisdom theology (1985:97). 
Sapiential traditions become a way to approach certain cultures analogically. For 
example much work has been done to approach Asian cultures that have a strong 
orientation towards Taoism, which is a wisdom tradition. The Tao of Jesus and The Tao 
Te Ching are examples of inter-traditional attempts to communicate within wisdom 
traditions. Both texts use the Tao Te Ching by Lao Tzu and dialogue with the sayings of 
Jesus. Since the study is analogical, both similarities and differences are brought forward 
in an attempt to find mutual understanding through the common medium of wisdom. 
Through the reading of the text, points of grace in the Taoist tradition become clearer and 
clearer, providing a lens to see and interpret the culture as well a starting point for 
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contextualization. Creation, specifically culture needs to be explored as a starting point 
for dialogue in a theology of mission. 
Mission Implications: 
1. There is a universal witness of God across cultures in creation because of God's 
grace. 
2. The universal witness opens the door to an anthropological model of 
communication and mission in other cultures. Cultural anthropology and its 
participant-observation are effective in discovering that witness. 
3. One can employ a culture's wisdom tradition as a means of mutual understanding 
and communication in a culture. 
God the Son: Incarnation and Participation 
The second key point in a theology of mission using participation is the 
Incarnation. For Maximus, the Logos of creation is the Logos of Incarnation. For Wesley, 
prevenient grace purposes to move persons to saving grace. The Incarnation of Jesus 
Christ, which for Eastern Christianity includes Christ's life, death, and resurrection, is 
central to Maximus' theology and should be to any Christian theology. The Gospel is 
Jesus Christ. He is the Word of God. Velli - Matti Karkkainen in his Christology: A 
Global Introduction; An Ecumenical, International, and Contextual Perspective states 
that "Jesus Christ stands at the center of Christian faith and theology" (Karkkainen 
2003:9). 
Although this study is claiming a central position for Christ in a theology of 
mission, it is not within the scope of this study to explore a full Christology, ecclesiology, 
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Christology in terms of the theologies of religions, or the wide range of intercultural, 
contextual Christologies but to work within the simple framework of participation in its 
classic Christian formation to understand incarnation and its implications for a theology 
of mission. At this time I will briefly review Maximus' and Wesley' s Christologies. 
Von Balthasar comments that "Maximus builds his whole doctrine of salvation, 
with great consistency, on the basis of his formal Christology" (Von Balthasar 2003:256). 
Thunberg states that, for Maximus, "the doctrinal basis of man's deification is clearly to 
be found in the hypostatic union between the divine and human nature in Christ" 
(Thunberg 1995:430). In Maximus, the Incarnation is tied directly to the fulfillment of 
God's purpose in the cosmos, that is, deification. God is joined with humanity and even 
the world in the person Jesus Christ. Through his identification with and defeat of sin and 
death Christ has offered deliverance to the cosmos from non-being and restoration to life, 
according to God's original intentions. Christ's redemptive work was of a healing nature 
to restore creation to its natural capacity and original purpose. (see Maximus Ad 
Thalassium 21 for his understanding of Christus Victor and restoration). 
Although Maximus addresses the issue of redemption from sin and its connection 
with the Incarnation, he more so stresses the connection of the Incarnation to the 
overcoming and healing of the divisions of being that prevent cosmic unity (Von 
Balthasar 2003:272-273). Those divisions are male and female, earth and the oikoumene, 
heaven and earth, the sensible and intelligible realms, and finally uncreated and created 
being (God and creation) (Louth 1996:72-74). The purpose of the Incarnation and the 
restoration of humanity in theosis to its original microcosmic position is to heal, mediate 
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and synthesize these fundamental divisions. Thus, differential unity is perfected in theosis 
(Thunberg 1995:427). 
Meyendorff sums up Maximus' Christology and its relationship with salvation or 
theosis: 
This essentially dynamic doctrine of salvation supposes a double 
movement: a divine movement toward man consisting of making 
God partakable of by creation, and a human movement toward God, 
willed from the beginning by the Creator and restored in Christ. The 
hypostatic union of these two movements in the incarnate Word 
constitutes the essence of Maximus' Christology: two natures imply 
two energies or will meeting one another. (Meyendorff 1987: 143-144) 
In kenosis God descended into the human condition of suffering and death to make 
himself "partakable" through the Incarnation. Creation 's participation in God as an 
ontological order cannot change, but its participation in God's telos, life and community 
was sabotaged by the fall. God's grace and love in Christ calls creation back to reunite 
with him. This double movement within the dynamic of salvation is similar to Maddox ' s 
depiction of grace and salvation in Wesley, as we explored in chapter four. 
Both Maximus and Wesley held to the orthodox Cha1cedonian formulation of the 
Incarnation. In Wesley, there is an integration of Eastern and Western themes in his 
soteriology and thus one would expect those same themes to correlate to his Christology. 
, 
In terms of Western themes, Wesley' s view of the Incarnation strongly relates to the 
purpose of the atonement and its juridical orientation (Maddox 1994:96-97). Atonement 
brought pardon from sin, removal of guilt, imputation of Christ's righteousness and 
adoption as children of God to corresponding to justification in Wesley's ordo, which 
was basically a Western and Reformed construal, except for his understanding of 
universal atonement in which the benefits of the atonement were appropriated in 
particular by faith. 
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In terms of Eastern themes, Wesley's understanding of salvation as primarily 
holiness, that is deliverance from the power of sin, healing and wholeness, is more of a 
Catholic and Eastern Christian focus. For Wesley, sanctification like justification finds its 
basis in the atonement. However, except for his emphasis on holiness and his basic 
adherence to Cha1cedon, Wesley' s Christology is primarily Western. He does not 
correlate many of his Eastern soteriological convictions to his Christology, which in 
terms of atonement is juridical (Maddox 1994:96). 
Of course, both of these analyses of Maximus' and Wesley' s Christologies are at 
best cursory. However, it can be summed up that the purpose of the Incarnation is 
directed toward salvation, which is holiness, although Wesley did not develop the 
relationship between Incarnation and salvation as extensively as Maximus. The 
Incarnation calls us to participate in the divine nature and call others as well to 
participate in the divine nature. Incarnation shapes our theology of mission. God has 
come to us on our own terms in our own condition to reconcile the world unto him self. 
God calls us to participate and be joined with Christ that we may be transfigured and be 
God's agent to transfigure the world. Incarnation, theosis, and mission are teleologically 
connected because the same God with the same plan is behind it all. 
The church is called out of its baptismal participation in Christ to call others to 
participate in Christ and be transformed into his likeness. This functional understanding 
of the church does not take away from its everlasting ontological identify as the body of 
Christ, the triune community in hypostatic koinonia with his people through the 
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Incarnation and celebrated in the Eucharist. The limitation of this study prevents 
clarifying the link between the Incarnation and ecclesiology, but the relationship is 
fundamental and paradigmatic. 
For this research, it is enough to link the mission of Christ to the mission of the 
church. That the kenotic Christ has immersed himself in the human condition of 
privation, depravity, oppression and suffering to bring liberation and restoration is an 
indication to the church the nature and thrust of mission. The Spirit of the Lord anoints 
and empowers the church for this mission of liberation, healing and restoration, for this is 
the ministry of Christ. The church is in mission with Christ when it takes up the mission 
ojChrist. Maximus in his "The Church' s Mystagogy," makes this startling statement 
concerning theosis and participation in the mission of Christ: 
For if the Word has shown that the one who is in need of having good done to him 
is God - for as long, he tells us, as you did it for one of these least ones, you did it 
for me - on God's very word, then, he will much more show that the one who can 
do good and who does it is truly God by grace and participation because he has 
taken on in happy imitation the energy and characteristic of his own doing good. 
And if the poor man is God, it is because of God's condescension in becoming 
poor for us and in taking upon himself by his own suffering the sufferings of each 
one and "until the end of time," always suffering mystically out of goodness in 
proportion to each one's suffering. (Maximus 1985:212) 
Following the doctrine of the missio Trinitatis, a theology of mission is grounded 
in our participation in mission with the Trinity. Participation begins with baptism, as we 
participate in the death, burial, and resurrection with Christ and are gifted with the 
sacrament of the Holy Spirit who anoints us for holy living and service. Our participation 
in baptism and the chrismation of the Spirit lO6 mark us and call us into mission with 
106 Chrismation or the baptism with the Spirit is interpreted differently in many Christian traditions. 
Lutheran, Reformed, and Baptistic traditions understand the baptism with the Spirit as synonymous with 
regeneration and the reception of the Spirit, thus tying it to baptism. The Roman Catholic tradition views it 
as a post-baptismal and post-catechetical sacrament called confirmation, imparted by the laying on of hands 
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Christ. We join Christ in proclaiming the fullness of his Kingdom to the world. Christ 
allows us to participate in his eschatological Kingdom through baptism and the gift of the 
Spirit. We also remember and fellowship with his body and blood and celebrate his 
resurrection and his Kingdom through the Eucharist. The Eucharist brings us into unity 
with the Triune God and each other, and unity includes unity in mission. We participate 
in the death, burial, and resurrection with Christ and are filled with the Spirit of Christ for 
our transformation and for service with Christ. 
The church is called to healing and theosis that it may be like Christ in the world 
and take up his ministry. Christ calls us to participate in his sufferings by taking up the 
suffering of those around us. The prevenient grace of God in Christ is upon the poor with 
Good News as it was when he was on the earth. Luke-Acts scholar Joel Green indicates 
that Jesus' ministry was a Jubilee of release, reversal and comprehensive restoration for 
the poor, involving forgiveness, healing (physical and social), deliverance from the 
demonic, and total wholeness (Green 1995:78-79). Green understands Lukan soteriology 
as preeminently status reversal (1995:94). 
A kenotic church also empties itself of sin, corruption, privilege, inward focus, 
parochialism, and ethnocentrism and whatever else ails it and unites with Christ by the 
Spirit to be transfigured in his image and sent into in his mission. The church is then 
prepared to be en fleshed in the world for a ministry of liberation, healing and restoration. 
The participation of the church in Christ for the purpose of Christ revealing himself 
of a bishop. Wesleyan and Pentecostal-Charismatic view it as a post-conversional experience for 
sanctification and/or power for service. Pentecostals include speaking in other tongues as evidence of the 
experience, while Charismatics expect the gifts of the Spirit, which may include tongues, as one sign of the 
experience. Eastern Orthodoxy, and recently United Methodism, understands chrismation as the gift of the 
Spirit received immediately following baptism through the laying on of hands as part of the baptismal 
liturgy. 
through the church to the world conveys the nexus between incarnation, theosis and 
mission. 
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Participating in Christ's comprehensive mission of liberation involves the model of 
incarnation. Christ incarnates within the context of a people. In missiology the terms 
indigenization, acculturation and contextualization have been used. Critical 
contextualization is that process that analyzes and evaluates a given culture in terms of its 
forms, meanings, and practices in light of phenomenology, Scripture, and reality in 
search of forms, meanings and practices that are indigenous and rooted in the local 
context and owned by local leadership - self governed, self propagating, self supporting, 
and self-theologizing (Hiebert, Shaw and Tienou 1999:21-29). David Hesselgrave defines 
critical contextualization as the "properly applied means to discover the legitimate 
implications of the Gospel in a given situation" (Hesselgrave 1991: 136). Critical 
contextualization is the balance of communicating and living the truth through culture-
specific forms that do not change the meaning of the truth. 
Now there is often debate as to whether mission should contextualize or not. The 
problem is that there is no debate in Scripture. God has already contextualized when he 
decided to work through a specific nation, Israel and through a specific language Hebrew. 
In the New Testament, God specifically contextualized his eternal message through 
Judeo-Hellenistic forms and the Greek language. In fact, the Incarnation is an extreme 
form of contextualization. When God becomes human, he becomes a specific human 
within a specific culture and genealogy. The particularity of Christ and the particularity of 
the gospel narratives are all indications of contextualization. If I had time, I would go into 
the global mission document entitled the book of Acts to continue the discussion, but it is 
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not necessary. The point is we always experience God's self revelation in a context. The 
question is whose culture will we communicate the gospel in theirs or ours? 
It is enough to say that participation in a theology of mission involves incarnation or 
contextualization. Incarnation allows for an authentic, powerful, and liberating witness of 
Christ in the world for the purpose of transforming the world. Incarnation in mission is 
for transformation. In his book The Celtic Way of Evangelism, George Hunter III 
recaptures how incarnational strategies were employed in the conversion of the Celtic 
people to Christianity (Hunter 2000). 
Hunter contrasts the Celtic way of evangelization with the Roman way. The Roman 
way was to "civilize," a people by forcing the adoption of Roman customs, then they 
would "Christianize" them by forcing them to adopt Roman Christian customs (Hunter 
2000: 17). The Roman model of Christianizing was basically present the Christian 
message; invite the people to a faith decision; and welcome them into the fellowship of 
the church - basically believe first and then belong (2000:53). 
The Celtic model stressed belonging first before believing. Persons are brought into 
the fellowship and accepted; there they interact and engage in conversation and the life of 
the church; and as their faith develops they are invited to commit (2000:53). Patrick, 
Columba, Aiden and other Celtic leaders were effective because of their strategy to 
incarnate and be with the people, creating community, and in that process the people 
were convinced by the influence of the Christian life, the "ethos" that they lived out 
(2000:63-64). 
Community living was vital for Celtic Christianity, as it is today for postmodern 
Christianity. Hunter offers five lessons concerning community or missionary ecclesiology 
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to be learned from the Celtic movement. First, evangelization was done in teams not solo, 
and it involved identifying with the people through shared living (2000:47). Second, the 
Celts formed monastic communities for discipleship and leadership development that 
involved shared living with a "soul friend," a spiritual mentor, small groups, and the 
entire community. Training in these communities not only prepared persons in Scripture 
and ministry, but it also prepared people to live and serve others in mission (2000:47-48) . 
Third, the Celts practiced spiritual disciplines, specifically "imaginative prayer," 
which was a creative experience of the contemplative life whether in solitude or with 
others. This indigenous form of prayer released the poetic creativity of the Celtic soul to 
strengthen their fellowship with God. Out of these experiences, Celtic Christians wrote 
new prayers and psalms, again illuminating a natural cultural inclination in the Celtic 
people. Thus they employed spiritual disciplines in indigenous forms (200:48-39). 
Fourth, the monastic community practiced radical hospitality to seekers, visitors, refugees 
and other guests (2000:52). They would be welcomed with a foot-washing from the 
journey, food, sleep, and Christian community. The final theme is the "belonging" before 
"believing" principle mentioned above. 
Within the community life of the Celtic movement contextualized forms and 
practices were employed. Patrick and other apostolic leaders incorporated Celtic cultural 
forms into the life of the church. Hunter elaborates: 
Philosophically, the Irish were accustomed to paradox, which prepared them to 
appreciate some of Christianity's central truth claims. Their belief in Ultimate 
Reality is complex, and their fascination with rhetorical triads and the number 
three open them to Christianity's Triune God. Christianity's contrasting features 
idealism and practicality engaged identical traits in the Irish character. No other 
religion could have engaged the Irish people's love for heroism, stories, and 
legends like Christianity. Some of Christianity' s values and virtues essentially 
matched, or fulfilled, ideals in Irish piety and folklore. (Hunter 2000:20) 
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As a result, the Celtic movement intentionally adopted Celtic rather than Roman 
forms . Leaders would explain God in terms of Trinity because of the Celtic predilection 
to the number three and paradoxes. The clover was used as a natural analogy (2000:72). 
The creation-based Celts often drew natural analogies. This tendency may have stemmed 
from their roots in Druid natural mysticism (2000:87). Hunter claims "the doctrine of the 
Trinity became the foundational paradigm for Celtic Christianity (2000:82). 
The Celts seemed to be a more of an expressive people than their colder British 
counterparts. Hunter remarks that they were more of a "right-brained" people, that is 
intuitive, emotional, imaginative, artistic, and experiential (2000:72). As a result, 
contextualized approaches that appealed more to the right-brained Celts than the left-
brained logical and abstract Romans were used. Among the forms employed were 
analogies, poetry, storytelling, music, nature, visual arts, symbols (2000:72-74). Truth 
was communicated in Celtic poetic verse and rhythms as well as through the storytelling 
of bards. Even the death of Christ was communicated through Celtic sacrificial traditions 
(2000:83). Celtic evangelization engaged all of the senses and thoroughly used the forms 
of the culture. 
Hunter explains that such contextualizations are not just lessons from the past but 
need to be applications for today. The once Christianized West has become the "New 
Barbarians" of postmodernity. Like the barbarians that were converted through the Celtic 
Christian movement, Westerners with "no Christian memory" need to be reached once 
again (2000:96). 
As the Christian movement is becoming more centralized globally in the South 
and the East, the West has opened up once again as a mission field. Christianity as a 
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global movement is living in strategic times, as the West needs to be reached in its post-
Enlightenment, post-critical context. Attempts are being made by "younger evangelicals" 
to rethink their theology in light of its encounter with postmodernism through the lenses 
of classic and patristic Christianity (Webber 2002). However in the South and East, 
although the Christian movement is advancing, there is still a greater need for 
Christianity to express itself in non-Western forms. 
The global South and East are faced more with postcolonialism than 
postmodernism (Jenkins 2006:5). Their concerns are not how to respond to nihilistic 
rationalism and its accompanied forms: global market capitalism, the bureaucratic nation-
state, and the secular university and media, all of which produce unbelief and skepticism. 
Issues involving poverty, injustice, sickness, famine, racial and gender oppression, 
political violence, corruption, and chaos need to be addressed by faith (2006:5). Hence it 
is no surprise that Pentecostal and charismatic type churches that address needs through 
the teaching of a comprehensive salvation that includes signs, wonders, healing, and 
transformation are flourishing. 
As the gospel continues to spread in postcolonial settings, contextualization 
becomes more and more significant, especially in Christology. How is Christ incarnated 
among the people? Since Christ is the center of the gospel and the means of salvation, 
contextualized Christology is a major challenge for a theology of mission. Karkkainen 
affirms that "Incarnation is God's highest self-expression; it is a real meeting place 
between the divine and the human. Jesus of Nazareth is not only the total and final 
revelation of God but also of humankind" (Karkkainen 2003:260). Karkkainen lists four 
basic Christologies in currency: 
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1. the incarnational Christology of the early church and Catholicism 
2. the theology of the cross of Protestantism, especially of the Lutheran tradition 
3. the resurrection and ascension Christology of Eastern Orthodoxy 
4. the empowerment Christology of Pentecostalism and the Charismatic 
movements (Karkkainen 2003: 15). 
The fourth Christology listed has been adopted in the two-thirds world by many. 
In contexts where people have been oppressed and powerless, Christ has revealed himself 
as a deliverer and a healer (2003 :246). In many of these cultures a spiritual worldview is 
embraced. The spirit world regularly interacts with the affairs of everyday life. The 
causes of everyday occurrences and problems are seen as spiritual in origin. The Western 
Jesus of propositional truth will not suffice (2003:248) . In Africa, Christ needs to be a 
wielder of power and a healer. African cultures are searching for both. Healing, as a 
holistic term covering physical, mental and spiritual, is often sought by the religious 
specialist (2003:253). The message of Jesus Christ as healer and protector often 
proclaimed by Pentecostal type churches has been received greatly by indigenous people 
and has been paramount to the rapid growth of Pentecostal and Independent churches in 
Africa (2003:253). 
Another example in Africa is Christ the Proto-Ancestor. The African Christ is the 
Proto-Ancestor who is "the unique ancestor, the source of life and highest model of 
ancestors hip" (2003 :256). He is the essence of all of the "good and positive elements of 
the African cult of ancestors and serves as the critic of its less honorable features" 
(2003 :257). Christ the Proto-Ancestor becomes the model for living, which is one of the 
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chief functions of ancestry. As the ancestors are invoked for direction and help, so Christ 
is invoked as the fulfillment of the ancestor cult in all its functions . 
Contextualization of key doctrines like Christology and soteriology and 
contextualization of various liturgical forms are the beginning of an incarnational 
theology of mission. Incarnation is an effective model because it preserves the integrity 
of the gospel and culture. In Cha1cedonian logic the two natures are not changed, mixed, 
confused nor divided but joined in a perfect union. Incarnation preserves the nature of the 
gospel and the fundamental nature of the culture. All cultural practices are critiqued, 
since no culture is without sin. However the integrity of the culture is preserved. 
Participation in the missio Dei means that the church empties itself of its own 
agendas, participates in the leading of the Holy Spirit, and begins participant-observation 
within a culture along side the people of that culture in order to find where God is 
working, and how the Jesus of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John is revealing himself today 
in that context. We are called to participate with God in this process of incarnation, which 
involves critical contextualization. The goal of incarnation for the church and the world is 
ultimately theosis, to be an icon of God. 
Incarnation needs to be the key in our communicating the gospel. For Maximus it 
was the key to understanding the reconciling of the world of its divisions. The 
Incarnation crosses the diastema or distance between God and humanity. Mediation in 
Maximian thought also echoes of a Platonic as well as scriptural solution. Mediation to 
the One was always the conundrum to solve, especially in Middle Platonism. 
Yet even today mediation is at the center of our diastema. Consider interpretation. 
Hermeneutics has virtually swallowed up epistemology, thus creating an ontological 
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semiosis. In popular culture, the digital sign is one of our primary mediators, especially 
via the Internet and satellite. The old dictum is true that "the medium is the message." 
The postmodern world is in search of mediation for its salvation linguistic mediation, 
digital mediation, semiotic mediation, mediation to the real. Incarnational mission 
strategy is cultural mediation of the gospel. 
Mission Implications 
1. Through the Incarnation, Christ came into the human context, so that humanity 
can be transformed in Christ's image (theosis). 
2. We participate in ministry with Christ in a particular context. Critical 
contextualization of the forms of a culture in order to communicate and live the 
gospel in a meaningful way to the receptor enables us to better minister with 
Christ to a people. 
3. Learn from the culture and the Spirit find a contextualization for the person of 
Jesus Christ that is relevant to the culture. 
God the Holy Spirit: the New Creation and Participation 
Participation in a theology of mission begins with the mission of the Trinity in the 
context of creation in which the whole cosmos participates in God. The Logos of creation 
is the same Logos of Incarnation. God's plan in creation is to join creation together with 
himself. He accomplishes his purpose in Christ, the incarnate Logos, by becoming 
human. By the divine becoming human, we are enabled by the Holy Spirit to become like 
God through union with Jesus Christ. Deification is God's missio for creation through the 
Incarnation. From creation to Incarnation to new creation, the missio Dei has worked in 
history through the economy of the Trinity, bringing in the new eschaton of the Kingdom. 
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I have examined creation and Incarnation, and how they are connected with the mission 
of sanctification or theosis. Theosis, in turn, is the penultimate telos of God's mission, 
thus it is the telos of the participating church. The glory of God, the visio beatifica, which 
elicits the transformation into theosis is the ultimate telos. God's primary mission is his 
glory, and that is followed by the transformation and glorification of all creation. 
The church participates in the death, burial, resurrection and Spirit of Christ. Out 
of its experience of union and transformation, the church serves as a liturgical and 
witnessing community of the transforming power of the resurrection in Christ Jesus. The 
witness of the church is in fellowship with the witness of the Spirit, as the Spirit goes 
ahead and orchestrates the agenda of God in the earth to dethrone the powers of evil, heal 
the sickness of sin, and sanctify the cosmos. The presence of the Spirit himself is the sign 
of the eschaton. He is the living sign of the resurrected Christ walking among us in this 
fallen world. He testifies of and manifests the risen and exalted Christ in the church and 
in the world. Thus our participation is in the Spirit. 
The presence of the Spirit in the believer, the church, and in the world is radical. 
When one experiences the resurrected Christ, one experiences an ontological shift from 
"the old" to "the new," from death to life, from "in Adam" to "in Christ." One is a new 
creation in Christ by the Spirit and abides in the now and not yet of the Kingdom. It is the 
Pentecostal work of the Spirit, the Spirit that is bringing the eschatological reign of Christ 
into the earth. Our participation, as far as the influx of the Kingdom in this world is 
concerned, is in the economy of the Holy Spirit, which eschatologically carries out the 
economy of the Son into its pleroma. 
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The Holy Spirit is central to the practice of God's mission in the earth. 
Christology and pneumatology work symbiotically as the Spirit is the presence of Christ 
in the earth to save and the presence of Christ in the church to perfect and to serve. 
Charismatic theologies of Luke-Acts make no distinction between the work of the 
Charismatic Christ in the Gospels and the Charismatic church in the book of Acts 
(Stronstad1984; Lord 2006:68). The Christ who saved the lost, healed the sick, fed the 
hungry, cast out demons, clothed the naked, and preached the Kingdom is the same 
Christ living in and working through the church in the book of Acts. Luke 4:18-19 are not 
only programmatic for the ministry of the Servant Messiah but also his church in Acts 
1 :8, whose mission program is to do what Christ did to the ends of the earth. 
We cannot separate the economy of the Son from the economy of the Spirit. Too 
long the Western church has operated out of an Enlightenment world view which has 
embraced a rationalist's gospel of propositional truth within a closed naturalistic universe 
governed by the laws of scientism. Kraft calls Western Christians "practicing deists" 
(Kraft 1989:39). As in the example that I gave from Charles Kraft in the first chapter, the 
church is often ineffective in cultures that operate out of a spiritual or supernatural 
worldview. The mission of the church is reduced to the cognitive transference of 
information about Jesus Christ. The mission of the church is not a rational exercise but 
nothing less than a participation in the life and work of the Holy Spirit in the earth as the 
Spirit ministers salvation. 
Salvation (soteria) involves every dimension of life, including the physical, 
spiritual, mental, emotional, familial, relational, social, existential, ecological, global and 
cosmic dimensions of life. The eschatological reality of the new creation involves every 
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aspect of life in a now and not yet tension of the realized and the hopefully awaiting (See 
Snyder 1991:16-17). 
The Jesus who performed miracles and forgave sins also fed the multitudes and 
honored the status of women and ethnic minorities. Scripture does not operate out of a 
bifurcated worldview, splitting material from spiritual or personal from social. Both 
Maximus and Wesley's versions of participation accommodate for a total picture of 
reality which values physicality and discerns the invisible. Participation in a theology of 
mission brings an integrated worldview and is open to a complex topography of the 
cosmos. It recognizes that there are multiple layers that characterize reality and an infinite 
number of epistemic locations within the ontological sphere of participation from which 
to see. It also recognizes that we operate on many levels as beings who are spiritual, 
physical and social, and so the grace of God works on some many different levels 
through a wide variety of standpoints and positions. The church needs to expect the work 
of the Spirit to reproduce the comprehensive works of Christ through the church. 
Participating in Christ through the Holy Spirit, the church' s lens for mission needs 
to be as wide and clear as God's . One paradigm for approaching spirit-incorporating 
worldviews is M. Kraft's worldview of "spiritual-power" oriented societies. She lists the 
basic assumptions that these societies characteristically hold: 
1. Spiritual power, both good and evil, exists apart from human power. 
2. Spiritual powers are active and involved in human daily experiences. 
3. Human beings have limited power and hence have need for spiritual power in 
many areas of life. 
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4. Humans need good spiritual power to counteract the evil spiritual power 
affecting them in life. 
5. There are ways for humans to access spiritual power. 
6. Evil spiritual power may be used by humans to harm other humans. 
7. Some spiritual powers are stronger than others. 
8. The strongest spiritual power wins In the encounters involving more than one 
spiritual power. 
9. Good spiritual power is to be drawn in, and evil spiritual power must be 
dispersed or driven away. 
10. The struggle with spiritual powers continues throughout life. (M. Kraft 
1995:28-29) 
M. Kraft's work along with her husband Charles Kraft's work is part of a growing 
movement that seeks to work out of a worldview that extends to spiritual powers and 
spiritual phenomena, as many two-thirds world cultures do. 
Another comprehensive work on the subject comes from the Lausanne Committee 
for World Evangelization, Deliver Usfrom Evil: An Uneasy Frontier in Christian 
Mission. The work of the writers and practitioners draws primarily from Scripture and 
secondarily from experience to demonstrate the reality of such encounters and the need to 
understand the authority we have in Christ to pray for healing, deliverance and other 
needs in a balanced and scriptural way. Also, the exploration of spiritual power has not 
just been the focus of Pentecostal-Charismatic types but scholars like Walter Wink and 
Robert Linthicum who come out of more a socially liberal camp have written profoundly 
and practically on this subject as well. 
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Of course the whole area of the spirit realm, the demonic and spiritual warfare 
often stirs controversy, but the church needs to come to a biblical understanding of such 
phenomena and the power of God if it is to be effective. Too many of our critiques of 
these movements come from a Western Enlightenment worldview. An ontology of 
participation in God recognizes both a world that is visible and invisible. Enlightenment 
thinking would tend to demythologize the ontic status of invisible being and an invisible 
world. Some of this thinking needs to be de-correlated and allow the revelation of God to 
stands in the power of its own canonical rhetoric without explaining such phenomena 
away. We often find this type of thinking in a radical fundamentalism that holds to an 
Enlightenment worldview that does not allow for the "supernatural ," and seeks a more 
rational explanation for such phenomena. 107 
Yet, we also can find similar thinking in more "liberal" theologies. One example 
of a mission theology that in word claims a salvation that extends to the realm of the 
spiritual, but in practice it often reduces salvation to the socio-political, are various forms 
of liberation theology. I strongly agree with the liberation impetus to touch and empower 
the poor. I confirm that there is a gospel-based preferential option for the poor. I also 
prophetically stand in solidarity with liberation theologies in their indictment of the 
church (often its conservative expressions) that it not only neglects the poor and the 
outcast, but also greatly contributes to this marginalization. The Western church has 
mingled too much and has inbred with the powers of socio-economic and racial 
oppression. The church itself needs liberation. 
On the other hand, if the church proclaims a message of holistic liberation, it 
needs to deliver on it. Of course, much of liberation theology has its roots in different 
107 I had made reference to Charles Kraft 's experience in Chapter One. 
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nuances of Marxist, critical, and social theory. Although it is theistic, unlike Marxism, in 
practice it operates out of an ontological vision that is more immanent than transcendent. 
I believe this is due to its genetic makeup that, in part, bears the DNA of dialectical 
materialism, which is a product of modernism. Understandably then, the historical and 
socio-political condition of the poor is the focal point of the theory not the manifestation 
of the absolute idea, as in Marxism' s step-father Hegel's dialectical idealism. Liberation 
becomes more material driven and moves from the bottom up. Liberation theology's 
ontological orientation is flipped over from the one in this work on participation. While 
participation moves from the spiritual to the material, it may be said that in liberation the 
movement is from the material to the spiritual. 
Ultimately, liberation theologians do oppose theologies that bifurcate their 
metaphysics into spiritual and natural, and define salvation as a spiritual glorification in a 
transcendent afterlife and neglect the historical, the here and now, and the condition of 
the poor (see Gonzalez 1988:41-46,83-85 and Boff 1987:91-100). Gustavo Gonzalez 
expresses some of the twentieth century reaction among Catholic theologians to the neo-
Thomist nature-grace dualism by concluding that, "The natural and supernatural orders 
are therefore intimately unified" (Gonzalez 1988:44). In word, liberation does 
acknowledge the spiritual, though it seems to be penultimate and at times even absent. 
Yet in spite of these assertions that allow for the penetration of the "supernatural" 
into the natural order, liberation theology often expresses a gospel that is merely socio-
politically oriented to the exclusion of issues that are usually categorized as "spiritual" or 
"supernatural" for lack of better terms, such as spiritual warfare, conversion or physical 
healing to name a few. It is not to disregard the socio-political, but to include it, and yet 
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not to reduce the mission to it. Gonzalez, like many liberation theologians, understood 
liberation primarily in these terms. He states that: 
Everything has a political color. It is always in the political fabric - and never 
outside of it- that a person emerges as a free and responsible being, as a person in 
relationship with other persons, as someone who takes on a historical task. 
(Gonzalez 1988:30-31; see also Chapter Eleven for Gonzalez on the political) 
Understanding the intent of Gonzalez in this passage, I realize that he envisions a 
liberation that is historically conscious and concrete concerning the human condition in 
its socio-existential context. For salvation to be real it must touch us as socio-political 
beings, where we live. Yet, nowhere in his magnum opus, A Theology of Liberation, does 
he address issues that would touch on a holistic gospel, such as forgiveness of sins, 
spiritual warfare and deliverance, conversion, or physical healing. Even though he 
condemns the dilemma, "either a spiritual redemption or temporal redemption," it is often 
the spiritual redemption that suffers loss (1988:96). Gonzalez warns against "excessive 
spiritualization" and a "disincarnate" spirituality, but we do not find him addressing these 
issues and needs as they relate to even the temporal realm (1988:96). 
I do not want to make a blanket statement concerning liberation theologians that 
they neglect "the spiritual," for there are some in praxis and theory who demonstrate a 
comprehensive salvation (Costas 1989). Yet, in the major works by other liberation 
theologians, such as Segundo and Boff, I did not find that to be the case (Boff 1987; 
Segundo 1976). 
A theology of mission that is shaped by the person and work of the Holy Spirit 
has to extend the work of the church to display the full power of God's salvation - God's 
purpose in all this was to use the church to display his wisdom in its rich variety to all the 
unseen rulers and authorities in the heavenly places. Eph. 3:10 (NLT). The 
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transformation of the cosmos into a new creation entails a comprehensive work of God, 
and the church needs to modify its worldview, its theology, and its structures to 
accommodate for a comprehensive work of God. 
Andrew Lord outlines a "holistic vision for mission that encompasses: 
evangelistic mission, healing mission, social mission, reconciling mission, ecological 
mission, Christian spirituality, and Christian character and relationships" (Lord 2005:63). 
A holistic work of God requires a holistic worldview and holistic ministry. It may not be 
the entire content of a theology of mission, but a model of theosis needs to have warfare 
(Christus Victor) and healing components that are worked out practically in everyday 
life, especially among those whose worldview operates within those categories. 
I have been discussing holistic ministry that has revolved around addressing a 
variety of needs at multiple levels of life. Much of this discussion ties in with 
evangelization, seeking to reach people with the gospel. Another implication of 
participation in a theology of mission that ministers the new creation is structures for 
growth in community or discipleship. Participation epistemology is a realization that we 
come "to know" in relationship, and the discipleship process is a learning (mathetes) 
process. Discipleship structures also provide stability in the Christian life of growing in 
grace by offering discipline, accountability, teaching, fellowship and development. If new 
churches are called to be self theologizing, self supporting, self propagating, and self 
governing, then leadership development needs to become a vital function in the church. 
Both Maximus, who was a monk, and Wesley knew the value of small group 
structures and community life for spiritual formation and discipleship. Wesley had a 
small group for every mode of spiritual formation. According to D. Michael Henderson, 
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the Society dealt with the cognitive mode of discipleship (Henderson 1997:83) The Class 
Meeting was behavioral formation (1997:93). The Band Meeting touched the affective 
domain of discipleship (1997: 112). The Select Society was the training mode for 
leadership development (1997:121). And the Penitent Bands were the rehabilitative mode 
of discipleship, for those struggling with social dysfunctions (1997: 125). 
Renewal specialist and Free Methodist theologian, Howard Snyder (1940- ) 
acknowledges the impact that discipleship structures can have on the life of the church. 
He refers to these ecclesiola structures as "new wineskins" (Snyder 1980:53). In the case 
of the Methodist movement it "constitutes the genius of the whole movement" (1980:53). 
In studying renewal movements, Snyder identified the collegia pietatis10B of German 
Pietism, the bands of Moravianism and the small group structures of Methodism as key to 
the revivals in those movements (Snyder 1989 Signs of the Spirit). 
There is a need to create contextualized structures cross-culturally for 
discipleship. The Chinese house church movement is a good example of contextualizing 
a central institution for the Chinese, the extended family, into a small group of believers 
gathered for worship, prayer, and teaching. In the West, there is a movement called "New 
Monasticism" which is calling persons out of the Empire and into the urban deserts to 
live together, to serve the urban poor, work for justice, and grow in grace in disciplined 
communities (Rutba House 2005). This movement is a reflection of the postmodern quest 
for identity, especially in community. 
Finally, one of the most important implications of participation for a theology of 
mission is its universal appeal and facile contextualization cross-culturally, since many 
108 Snyder recognized that Pietism's collegia pietatis (colleges of piety) or small groups, Moravian chore 
(choirs) or bands, and Methodists (societies, classes, and bands) often functioned as a "church within the 
larger church," or ecclesiolae in ecclesia in order to bring renewal to the church as a whole. 
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religious systems have union with God at the center. An onto-epistemology of 
participation in creation, incarnation, and new creation has theosis as its theological goal. 
Clark Pinnock selects theosis rather than justification in his theology of the Holy Spirit in 
order to summarize salvation as well (Pinnock 1996: 149-150). 
Echoing Maximus, I am specifically referring to a cosmic theosis. This goal is 
high but it's broad as well. It is inclusive and comprehensive and touches on the desire of 
the ages, union with God. Pinnock claims that "the purpose of life is a transforming 
friendship and union with God" (Pinnock 1996: 152). Karkkainen quoting M.e. 
McDaniel writes, "All major religions agree on one thing, the deepest desire of the 
human person is to get in contact and to live in union with his or her God" (Karkkainen 
2004: 1). Karkkainen continues in his own words: 
Different religions offer distinctive understandings about the nature of that 
union, and the way to the attainment of salvation. These differences, not-
withstanding, it seems reasonable to argue that salvation involves some 
form of union with God. Thus, the desire for union is the theme of religions 
and consequently theologies ... This search for union with God is undoubtedly the 
leading motif in religions. (Karkkainen2004: 1-2) 
Karkkainen 's work One with God: Salvation as Deification and Justification is an 
in-depth, ecumenical attempt at uniting Christian soteriologies and Christian theologies 
of religions under the over-arching theme of theosis to construct a global theology. He 
states, "the idea of union with God has profound implications not only with respect to 
Christian ecumenism but also for a Christian theology of religions (the relationship of 
Christianity to other world religions)" (Karkkainen 2004:4). 
Another attractive dimension of participation and theosis to other cultures is that 
often other world and folk religions share the common theme of apophaticism concerning 
the ultimate nature of God or what Eastern Orthodoxy calls the hyperessence of God. 
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Hinduism, Buddhism, and other Eastern religions share a similar apophatic sensibility 
when it comes to fully knowing God. There is a certain negative theology that 
reverberates throughout nirvanic thinking. Transcendence brings one past and out of the 
illusory realm of senses and thought. 
Apophasis also characterizes Eastern Orthodox mystical theology as humanity 
ascends by the Holy Spirit through ascetic practices into union with God, it becomes a 
process of unknowing. God is not reduced to the sensible or the intelligible realms. In his 
transcendence, God is beyond categories of being and non-being and any other antinomy 
offered by human reason. Like in other Eastern religions silence is the only response to 
having touched the divine. Apophaticism would surely be an expression of epistemic 
humility valued by Asian hearers of the gospel. Often Western Christian knowledge of 
God is so systematic, scholastic, reduced and even commercialized that it causes people 
from Eastern cultures to turn to skepticism concerning the Christian witness. The idea of 
knowing God enough to transform one's life but knowingly not being able to know the 
unknowable may be an attractive experience for a religious Asian. 
Ultimately, I believe that cosmic theosis defined by a pneumatologically 
informed Christology, expressed in Eucharistic ecc1esiology and holistic missiology, and 
developed in communities of disciplined spiritual formation could function as a central 
theme in a global Christian theology of mission. 
Mission Implications: 
1. The church is to understand its dependent role in mission as it participates in the 
mission of the Holy Spirit. 
2. Let cosmic theosis be the measure and scope of our holistic mission to a people. 
3. We are called to develop contextual structures of community that foster 
discipleship, nurture and transformation for mission. 
Conclusion, Contributions and Questions 
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What happens when ontology is detached from God and collapses under its own 
weight of nothingness? The last seven hundred years of philosophy may call it an 
epistemological crisis. I call it an ontological crisis with an epistemological impact on 
truth, meaning and certainty. One of my contributions to the solution of this problem has 
been an ontological critique of the epistemological issues within modernism and 
postmodernism. I have concluded that from modernism to postmodernism ontology has 
been deflated, while epistemology has inflated and taken a central role of first 
philosophy. Even more so, epistemology has morphed into hermeneutics which have 
become closed-systems that do not allow for the transcendent. 
Christian theology of mission has been guilty of co-mingling with such 
epistemologies in crisis. The Enlightenment up until the end of the modern period of 
mission best expresses the nature of the problem. Colonialism and Christianity, 
exploration, exploitation, and evangelism, and hegemony and holiness often went hand in 
hand, as the Western missiological enterprise collaborated with Western national interests 
in geo-politics, scientism, technological advancement, and cultural imperialism. 
Today in an era of postmodernism, the foundations of modernism have been 
thoroughly critiqued. Autonomous reason and all of her manifestations have been 
stripped of her illusions of omnipotence and underneath the will-to-power has been 
discovered by her critics. Postmodernism has taught us to be suspicious of all knowledge 
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claims, doing a clever job of reducing them to various semiotic derivatives. However in 
the process, knowledge is not only not what it used to be, it is basically nothing. 
Radical Orthodoxy has made an erudite critique of the seemingly invincible 
claims of Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault, the postmodern trinity, as well as others. 
Radical Orthodoxy has unearthed a nihilistic genealogy of modern and postmodern 
thinking that goes all the way back to Duns Scotus and his univocity of being. The 
univocity of being has been the primary gene of nihilism that has allowed its 
philosophical ancestors to assume ontological autonomy apart from God on the grounds 
that being is a common predicate shared by God and the created order. Thus, the created 
order has its own being to ground itself. 
Radical Orthodoxy demonstrates that this claim is an illusion, and in fact the 
ancestry of a univocity of being actually rests on a univocity of non-being, hence the fruit 
of nihilism. Radical Orthodox philosophical theology offers a corrective in participation. 
An ontology of participation brings the created order back into connection with the 
transcendent God. Within this scheme of ontology, there can be no secular or 
autonomous domains. Everything is defined theologically. 
A second major contribution afforded by the author is a further critique of Radical 
Orthodoxy's version of participation by using the theology of Maximus the Confessor. In 
response to a critique within their own Radical Orthodox circle by James K.A. Smith, the 
writer sought to ground the doctrine of participation in a more "Christian" source rather 
than in Plato and picked that great defender of orthodoxy Maximus the Confessor from 
out of the patristic closet. Maximus proposed a metousia Logo, a participation in the 
Logos. His incarnationally centered theology provided an alternative for the ontology of 
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participation in a purely Platonic sense. Maximus' construct is rooted and grounded in the 
Christian revelation of the incarnate Logos. 
A further contribution of the author is that in the process of developing Maximus ' 
ontology of participation in the Logos, the writer drew upon John Wesley to add 
soteriological and missiological detail to the vision of participation. The writer has 
attempted to combine the work of Maximus and Wesley to contribute to an onto-
epistemology of participation that could have missional implications. Like Maximus, 
Wesley focused on participating in the divine nature. His primary theological concept 
that drove his doctrine of sanctification was grace. Wesley's theology of grace took on a 
similar function to Maximus' logoi. Wesley's theology of grace offered an entire 
soteriological ordo to define and direct the Christian experience into entire sanctification 
or theosis. Wesley's theology of grace, beginning with prevenient grace and extending to 
sanctifying and glorifying grace also gave direction to God's work in the earth. 
Along with Wesley's theology and practice of social holiness, Maximus' cosmic 
liturgy moving toward theosis offered a comprehensive vision of recapitulation that could 
serve as a central theme in a theology of mission. A unique contribution of the author to 
mission theology is the development and application of an onto-epistemology of 
participation to a theology of mission. Radical Orthodoxy has talked much about 
participation but has yet to apply it to mission. Much has been written by Maximus and 
Maximian scholars on participation, but the author is not aware of any material that 
applies participation to mission. The author has developed eight characteristics that 
highlight an onto-epistemology of participation and has then sought to apply it to a 
theology of mission, using three basic categories that can serve as a global theology: 
creation, Incarnation, and new creation. 
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With participation beginning in creation and moving to incarnation and then to 
the new creationltheosis, it (participation) has great implications for missiology. An onto-
epistemology of participation understands mission as God's, a missio Dei. The church is 
called to participate in God's work of cosmic transfiguration. Creation provides the 
universal context from which God begins. Incarnation is the climactic cause which makes 
possible deification. And the new creation is the eschatological reign of Christ through 
the Spirit in the universe, the pleroma. 
The new creation is new in every aspect. Only a holistic world view can 
comprehend the scope of the nature of the work that God desires to do in the earth. And 
only a holistic mission that touches every area of life is sufficiently compatible with the 
missio Dei. The Holy Spirit is at the center of this global witness. The Holy Spirit goes 
ahead of the church working within cultural contexts and empowers the church to 
participate in the work which will restore people's lives to God's original design. The 
church is called in this process to discern critically how to communicate the truth in 
culture-specific forms without changing the meaning of the everlasting gospel of Jesus 
Christ. And it is called to find faithful forms of community to serve in nurturing the 
spiritual growth of others, forms that will further God's mission in the church and in the 
world. The result is that the cosmos become a living icon of the glorious triune God. 
Through and for God's glory, theosis is the telos of God's mission. God desires to 
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transform us through the visio beatijicaJ09 into his image that we may be one in loving 
fellowship with God and give God glory throughout eternity. 
What are some of the questions that can come out of this research and could 
further research in the direction of an actual theology of mission? I believe the first set of 
questions would be concerned with how participation relates to the traditional categories 
of theology and mission. Does participation suggest or even require theological specifics, 
i.e. a certain doctrine of election and condemnation, theory of atonement, soteriology, 
ecclesiology or eschatology? If it does, then how does it affects the practice of mission? 
For example, the view of participation that I have offered is informed primarily by 
Maximus and Wesley. Needless to say, sanctification is central to a soteriology of 
participation. How does this affect justification and regeneration? Maximus and Eastern 
Orthodoxy do not stress a Protestant form of justification by faith. Is it left out of a 
theology of mission, or is it included in a via media, as Wesley synthesized it with his 
therapeutic notion of salvation. Its inclusion or exclusion will have an impact on how we 
understand conversion, and our doctrine and ecclesial forms of post-conversion. An 
exclusion of a strong justification by faith would be replaced by a gradualism towards 
theosis. Conversion may be understood in a sacramental sense via baptism. Strong 
catechetical structures would be necessary to promote growth and maturity in the faith. 
If there is a strong justification by faith teaching and practice, then conversion 
may be preached and experienced in a more evangelical sense rather than a sacramental 
one. Yet, strong catechetical structures would still be necessary, as evangelicals have 
found out through the insufficiency of crusades and revivals. The last thirty years of 
evangelical discipleship has put a premium on small group structures. 
109 Latin for the "beatific vision" 
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Also indigenous forms need to be considered as such theology is contextualized. 
How can participation be contextualized, especially within religions that already hold to 
some form of participation or union in the divine, i.e. Hinduism? Would participation be 
more of a hindrance or a more conducive stepping stone towards contextualization? What 
distinctions would have to be made between "Christian" participation and other religious 
notions of participation in God? Are they the same? Why or why not? In our example of 
sanctification, would indigenous notions of participation and theosis have to be 
distinguished from other religious forms of divinization? What are those distinctions? 
What are the distinctions between methodologies of religious sanctification? Also would 
certain indigenous understandings of communal participation have an impact on the 
communal nature of salvation and discipleship? These and other questions begin to arise 
as the notion of theological participation is brought to bear on a theology of mission. 
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